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ABSTRACT
Empathy as Sacred Ethic: A Chaplain’s Perspective on Difficult End of Life Cases
By
Rev. Peter L. Bauck
Because of our increasingly intercultural world, it can be difficult for patients,
families, and medical teams to decide on what they should do for patients who are, in the
medical team’s opinion, near the end of life. The family and medical team can hold
disparate beliefs and values around what they should do for the patient. Ethics
committees often get involved in these difficult end of life cases. These cases are also
emotionally charged, especially for the family as they wrestle with the intensity of their
loved one’s situation and try to decide what to do. Because of the emotional intensity and
the potential for dissimilar beliefs, I argue the medical team must empathize with the
family. Current models of making end of life decisions do not stress the importance of
empathy, especially in emotionally charged difficult end of life cases.
To address this lack of empathy, I develop normative guidelines to help medical
teams practice empathy. As a practice, empathy helps the medical team practice neighbor
love. Neighbor love is a way to love the family as they want to be loved—a holistic love
that coalesces around the experience of the family and sees them as worthy of respect.
Empathy may also help these cases reach a resolution that ends with a plan of care in
place as well as mutual respect and love between the family and medical team.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Most importantly, I dedicate this to my loving, patient, and caring wife, Kristin
Bauck. She has been a constant source of support during the evenings and weekends
spent writing and reading. I also want to thank my family and friends. Without my
community of saints, I could not have finished my degree. They keep me going and give
me hope. My advisor, Rev. Dr. Jessicah Duckworth, has helped shape me as a scholar,
and I am forever indebted to her selfless time and attention. Lastly, I want to thank all of
my faculty mentors for their role in my scholarly pursuits: Cristina Traina, Carla Dahl,
Theresa Latini, Gary Simpson, and Amy Marga.

v

ARTICLE I. TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................................................................v
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..............................................................................................x
PART ONE: SETTING THE STAGE.....................................................................1
1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................2
Scope of the Project ...............................................................................................2
Contemporary Landscape ......................................................................................5
Empathy and Moral Reasoning ...........................................................................12
Looking Ahead ....................................................................................................18
2. CLINICAL ETHICS AND SENTIMENTALISM ................................................25
Clinical Ethics .....................................................................................................26
Medical Indications ......................................................................................27
Patient Preferences .......................................................................................29
Quality of Life ..............................................................................................31
Empathy and Emotions in Ethics Consults ..................................................33
Why Don’t Medical Teams Start with Empathy? ........................................35
Loving My Neighbor Is Loving Myself ..............................................................38
Aristotle ........................................................................................................39
Aquinas.........................................................................................................44
Summary ......................................................................................................49
Sentimentalism and Beginning to Love the Neighbor as Neighbor ....................50
David Hume .................................................................................................51
Arthur Schopenhauer ....................................................................................53
Summary ......................................................................................................55
Empathy: Loving the Neighbor as Neighbor .......................................................56
Psychology ...................................................................................................58
Philosophy ....................................................................................................61
Theology.......................................................................................................64
Looking Ahead ....................................................................................................67
3. METHODOLOGY: REVISED FUNDAMENTAL PRACTICAL THEOLOGY 70
Practical Theology ...............................................................................................70
Lartey’s Intercultural Model................................................................................74
Pastoral Theology as Contextual Theology..................................................75
Pastoral Theology at Work in the World .....................................................78
Revised Fundamental Practical Theology ...........................................................80
vi

Theoretical Framework ................................................................................80
Overall Dynamic: Hermeneutics ...........................................................81
Intercultural Practical Moral Reasoning and Empathy .........................84
Visional/Metaphorical Dimension ................................................ 85
Obligational Dimension ................................................................ 87
Tendency-Need Dimension .......................................................... 89
Descriptive Move .........................................................................................90
Intercultural Practical Moral Reasoning Move ............................................92
Strategic Move .............................................................................................93
Looking Ahead ....................................................................................................93
PART TWO: REVISED FUNDAMENTAL PRACTICAL THEOLOGY ...........95
4. DESCRIPTIVE MOVE: COMPOSITE CASE .....................................................96
Introduction .........................................................................................................96
Case: Brain Injury in the ICU ..............................................................................99
Before the ICU .............................................................................................99
Week One ...................................................................................................102
Weeks Two and Three ................................................................................104
Weeks Four and Five: Ethics Consult and Discharge ................................111
Case Study and Empathy ...................................................................................116
5. INTERCULTURAL PRACTICAL MORAL REASONING MOVE .................119
Introduction .......................................................................................................119
Visional/Metaphorical Level .............................................................................120
Hoffman’s Moral Development .................................................................120
Martha Nussbaum’s Philosophy of Emotion .............................................123
Pannenberg’s Anthropology .......................................................................125
Empathy and the Visional/Metaphorical Level ..........................................129
Obligational Level .............................................................................................130
Hoffman’s Moral Development .................................................................131
Martha Nussbaum’s Philosophy of Emotion .............................................135
Pannenberg’s Anthropology .......................................................................136
Empathy and Obligational Level ................................................................141
Tendency-Need..................................................................................................141
Hoffman’s Moral Development .................................................................143
Martha Nussbaum’s Philosophy of Emotion .............................................148
Pannenberg’s Anthropology .......................................................................151
Empathy and Tendency-Need Level ..........................................................155
Looking Ahead ..................................................................................................155
6. INTERCULTURAL PRACTICAL MORAL REASONING: DEFINING
EMPATHY ..........................................................................................................157
vii

Definition of Empathy .......................................................................................157
God as Present Calling Us to Love ............................................................158
The Case Study ...................................................................................160
Developmental Antecedents .......................................................................161
The Case Study ...................................................................................163
Dialogue of Care and Feeling Felt .............................................................163
The Case Study ...................................................................................165
Understand Mental and Emotional States of Others ..................................166
The Case Study ...................................................................................167
Respond to Their Distress with Compassion .............................................170
The Case Study ...................................................................................172
Limits in Our Ability to Empathize ...................................................................174
Theology.....................................................................................................175
Philosophy ..................................................................................................177
Psychology .................................................................................................180
Looking to the Final Chapter .............................................................................182
7. STRATEGIC MOVE: NORMATIVE GUIDELINES FOR HOSPITALS.........184
Introduction .......................................................................................................184
Looking Back ....................................................................................................185
Normative Guidelines ........................................................................................187
The Medical Team is Required to Empathize with the Family..................187
Connection in Life’s Tragedies ...........................................................188
Care as Normative Frame for Life ......................................................190
Medical Team’s Empathy and End of Life .........................................192
The Medical Team Must Attune to the Family’s Emotional State ............193
Emotional Map of the World ..............................................................194
Basic Trust and God’s Love................................................................196
Emotions are Central to Empathy and End-of-life Cases ...................197
Medical teams must empathize with the values and beliefs of families ....199
Openness to the World and Honoring Each Other ..............................200
Neighbor Love and Dissimilar Beliefs ................................................202
Bringing the Guidelines to Life .........................................................................203
Patient Case Simulations ............................................................................204
An Example ICU Case ........................................................................205
The Case Summary ..................................................................... 205
Reflection with Medical Team Members ................................... 207
Verbatims with Medical Team Members ...................................................208
Verbatim Case .....................................................................................208
The Chaplain ..............................................................................................211
Concluding Thoughts ........................................................................................214
APPENDIX A: PATIENT CASE SIMULATION ..........................................................215
Scenario .............................................................................................................215
Family/Friends Roles.........................................................................................216
viii

Physician Roles .................................................................................................220
APPENDIX B: CHAPLAIN VERBATIM EXAMPLE ..................................................222
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................226

ix

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
IPMR

Intercultural Practical Moral Reasoning

EOL

End of Life

CT

Computed Tomography

ICP

Intracranial Pressure

ICU

Intensive Care Unit

x

PART ONE
SETTING THE STAGE

1

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Scope of the Project
I want to provide a rich definition of and guidelines for practicing empathy from
the perspective of a chaplain. More specifically, I will address the importance of
practicing empathy in patient cases where the medical team and family1 hold disparate
views on whether to pursue a cure through more aggressive treatment or shift the focus to
palliation and comfort care as the patient goes through the dying process. I will refer to
these situations as “difficult end of life (EOL) ethics situations” throughout the
dissertation. On the one hand, from the perspective of the medical team, these are EOL
situations, and on the other hand, the family may not view their loved one as an “EOL
patient.” Practicing empathy is important in these situations for two reasons. One, in our
contemporary diverse cultural context, people encounter other people who do not pursue
the same goods or share the same worldview on what is Good. Two, emotions impact
how people make moral claims. The practice of empathy in these situations can cultivate
neighbor love by connecting the medical team to the emotions and values of a family that

1

At the outset, it is important for the reader to know that surrogate or health care agent are also
terms used for the person involved in making medical decisions for the patient when the patient cannot
make his/her own decisions. I will use the term “family” through the work because my composite case in
chapter four deals with family making decisions for their father. Surrogates can be a variety of people:
family, friends, guardian, or a person who knows the patient well. Different states and healthcare systems
have different laws and policies around surrogates and medical decisions. I can only speak from my
experience in Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota.

2

3
holds to a different worldview, and help the family and medical team in the decision
making process.
At the outset, I must state this is not a healthcare ethic, per se, but an exploration
of the role of empathy as it applies to a specific type of situation that takes place in
hospitals. There are many great volumes on health care ethics, theories of biomedical
ethics,2 and theology and healthcare ethics,3 and my goal is not to provide a
comprehensive theory of biomedical ethics or healthcare ethics. Though my interpretive
moves draw on a wide range of theories, some of which make comprehensive and
universal claims related to ethics, for my purposes these interpretive moves are aimed at
difficult EOL situations. What follows will be the most useful to those interested in
clinical ethics—the ethics decisions that happen at the bedside, in family care
conferences, and in ethics committee meetings.
I also intend to write a Christian theological justification for the practice of
empathy in EOL situations involving diverse staff, family, and patients. As a Christian
theologian, ordained minister in the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, and
chaplain, I interpret empathy through the lens of Christian theology. As such, there are
certain assumptions about the world to which I adhere. This does not mean, however, that
Christians are the only people who can practice empathy, understand the power of
empathy, or interpret it. From my own unique vantage point, my ultimate goal is to shed

2
Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 7th edition (New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 2012). This is one of the most popular textbooks to use in biomedical ethics
courses.
3

David Smith, Caring Well: Religion, Narrative, and Healthcare Ethics (Louisville, KY:
Westminster John Knox Press, 2000); Lisa Sowle Cahill, Theological Bioethics (Washington, DC:
Georgetown University Press, 2005).
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light on the power of empathy in end of life discussions for those who practice and are
interested in clinical ethics. For me, the discourse and language adequate to the challenge
and depth of such a task is Christian theology. Many people can interpret empathy and
argue for its importance without bringing theology into the discussion, but something
sacred occurs when empathy is present with which people of a variety of spiritual
traditions could resonate and agree. In the same way that a variety of religious, spiritual,
and humanistic traditions have versions of the Golden Rule, I think many people would
agree on the power and necessity of empathy in difficult EOL situations.
The first three chapters are background and lay the groundwork for chapters four
through seven. But chapters four through seven unfold in such a way that reflects my own
journey in understanding empathy as a chaplain. There are three phases of my journey.
First, my journey as a chaplain began in my post-graduate chaplaincy training in 20072008. It is there I became fascinated with end of life ethics cases and the practice of
empathizing with patients, families, and staff. An end of life case study in chapter four
represents this part of the journey—my initial experience of chaplaincy and empathy.
Second, continuing on my journey, I began to reflect on and explore empathy when I
began working as a staff chaplain in the fall of 2009 and when I started Luther
Seminary’s Ph.D. program in the fall of 2010. After more exploration and reflection, I
eventually arrived at a definition of empathy. Chapters five and six represent this part of
the journey—interpreting empathy and arriving at a definition of empathy. Third, my
journey with empathy is now more developed. After my initial experiences and thorough
explorations, I am in a place where I have matured in my profession. I have developed a
strong professional identity as a chaplain and feel comfortable making claims about

5
empathy’s importance. Chapter seven represents this part of my journey—making
normative claims about empathic clinical practice in hospitals. We will now move into
the first three chapters that lay the groundwork for my empathy journey.
Contemporary Landscape
Because of the changes in the global spiritual and communal landscape, there is
increasing interaction with different worldviews within the same community (city, town,
and institutions)—worldviews that could differ fundamentally in every way. Some have
referred to this as late modernity or postmodernity. Ethical disagreements in communities
are not new phenomena—as if in the modern period when communities were more
culturally homogeneous everyone somehow agreed with everyone else. Cultures have
never been completely bounded and demarcated units that were homogeneous in their
praxis and belief. There has been and is a blurring of boundaries and cross-fertilization
between cultures, as well as pluriformity and fluidity within cultures.4 The contemporary
non-homogeneity is different because of the extent to which cultures from different parts
of the globe interact with each other.
In Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers, Kwame Appiah provides a
philosophical and social description of the contemporary diverse context.5 Though I do

4

Like Kathryn Tanner in Theories of Culture, I adhere to a more fluid and flexible understanding
of culture. She terms this “postmodern,” but I find myself resonating more with the term late modernity, as
Anthony Giddens describes it in Modernity and Self Identity. Modernism understood cultures as more
internally holistic/complete. Wholeness results in shared values/beliefs, and cultural elements are
systematically integrated. Post-modernism, per Tanner, understands culture to be much more fluid. I say I
adhere to a late modern understanding of culture, because in practice and day-to-day life people see group
themselves into distinct cultures and draw strength form this. See Kathryn Tanner, Theories of Culture: A
New Agenda for Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1997) and Anthony Giddens, Modernity and
Self Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 1035.
5

Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006).

6
not agree with his pragmatism, his description of the contemporary intercultural reality
resonates with my experience as a hospital chaplain and a member of the ethics
committees at urban hospitals. Theologians who focus their work on social realities and
relationships have also been paying attention to and writing about the contemporary
cultural diversity. For example, Emmanuel Lartey’s pastoral theology acknowledges the
tensions of doing theology in an intercultural (his word for the diversity) and global
context: “pastoral theology is currently engaged within a global context…and pastoral
theologians are convinced that truth and goodness lie in the tensions between opposing
positions.”6 In the “tensions between opposing positions,” loving your neighbor is
important.
Hospitals, as sites in which the contemporary cultural non-homogeneity is
expressed, will continue to become more intercultural, and medical teams will continue to
encounter dissimilar worldviews when addressing the question “What should we do in
this situation?”7 This is not to say all ethical disagreements are between people from
different parts of the globe. Intercultural disagreements can be between varieties of
people, people otherwise assumed to be “like each other.” If we accept Appiah’s
argument and my assessment, then the medical team will continue to encounter ethical
strangers in the hospital and have to figure out what should be done. When ethical

6
Emmanuel Lartey, Pastoral Theology in an Intercultural World (Cleveland, OH: The Pilgrim
Press, 2006), 125-126.

“What should we do in this situation?” is not the only moral question that arises when
communities face a decision or challenge. One could also ask, “what ought to be the case?” or “who should
I/we be?” My question solves problems and leads to different problems when compared with the other
moral questions.
7

7
worldviews potentially differ to a large degree, answering that question and embodying
neighbor love is far from simple.
How does this relate to the work of the medical team at the end of life? Part of
Appiah’s argument and solution is that necessity takes over, that is to say, communities
may not agree with each other completely, but they get used to each other through
interchange and eventually have to decide on doing something.8 In my interpretation, and
pushing back against “necessity,” decisions are reached through practical moral
reasoning. Neither is moral reasoning driven solely by pragmatic necessity, nor is the
reasoning the detached theological or philosophical equal regard of Gene Outka or John
Rawls, respectively.9 Hospitals, as an example of Appiah’s diverse communities, might
be driven by pragmatic necessity when figuring out how to care for patients, but
questions and answers about what should be done in a particular case are connected to
people’s deeply held values and have an significant impact on the shared life of the
hospital community. More specifically, moral reasoning that occurs within end of life
cases is a visceral and embodied process of figuring out what people should do in a
situation. My stress on the visceral and embodied nature of reasoning comes from Francis
Hutcheson, and other sentimentalist philosophers, who stressed that the basis of our
ethics is benevolence and emotion. Here we see a more affective and interpersonal
interpretation of ethics when compared to the paradigms of Rawls, Outka, and Appiah.

8

Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, 78.

9
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edition (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1999); Gene
Outka, Agape: An Ethical Analysis (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977). In terms of the former,
I am focusing on the way he constructs the “original position.” While the original position requires that one
consider others as one constructs a just society, one is not in relationship with said others in the original
position. One is alone behind a veil unable to be in relationship. Empathy is part of the dialogue of care that
takes place in relationship and cannot take place when someone is isolated.

8
The sentiments, and the accompanying interpersonal interactions, when considered
alongside a more principled or pragmatic process of moral reasoning add a level of depth.
From my perspective as a chaplain there is a particular sentimental approach that can aid
the healthcare team when they face divergent worldviews in difficult EOL ethics cases:
empathy.10
Some may gravitate to sympathy. I do not find sympathy helpful in difficult end
of life situations. There is also a great deal of confusion around the difference between
sympathy and empathy. I will briefly define how I understand the difference and why
sympathy is not helpful in EOL situations. My definition of empathy will come in chapter
six, but for now I will make a few brief claims here. Both empathy and sympathy have to
do with experiencing the feelings and thoughts of others, but the difference lies in what
we do with those thoughts and feelings. Sympathy literally means, “with-feel.” The
prefix “sym” comes from the ancient Greek “syn/sym” that means “with.” Sympathy,
therefore, focuses more on the feelings within oneself that the other’s pain stimulated or
triggered. Karsten Stuber says it in the following way:
Rather, sympathy is seen as an emotion sui generis that has the other's negative
emotion or situation as its object from the perspective of somebody who cares for
the other person's well being (Darwall 1998). In this sense, sympathy consists of
“feeling sorrow or concern for the distressed or needy other,” a feeling for the
other out of a “heightened awareness of the suffering of another person as

10

Other theologians have made an argument for empathy. My claim that empathy can play a role
in bridging diversity is not a new claim. See H. Edward Everding and Lucinda A. Huffaker, “Educating
Adults for Empathy: Implications of Cognitive Role-Taking and Identity Formation,” Religious Education
93, no. 4 (1998): 413-430. Cathryn Cornille notes the importance of empathy in interreligious dialogue. In
the context of people who do not share the same beliefs, empathy can transpose the experience of another
onto the self and one can potentially use analogous experiences from one’s own history to understand
another. See Cathryn Cornille, “Empathy and Inter-religious Imagination,” Religion and the Arts 12 (2008):
102-117.

9
something that needs to be alleviated. (Eisenberg 2000a, 678; Wispe 1986, 318;
and Wispe 1991).11
This is where sympathy’s weakness lies. It might sound well and good to feel
someone’s feelings along with them—especially in emotionally charged EOL
situations—but the lines between the self and the other can get blurred and one’s own
feelings cloud the feelings of the other. The other’s feelings and experience become our
experience instead of standing alone as the other’s experience. One might care for the
distressed person and want to alleviate suffering, but that desire is caused by the feelings
triggered within oneself not the distressed person’s feelings or experience. Empathy, in
contrast, literally means “in-feeling.” This might sound more intrusive and clouding than
sympathy, but empathy attempts to set one’s own feelings and thoughts aside and “feel
into” the experience of another so that experience can stand on its own. In order for one’s
happiness or sadness to be empathic, it has to be happiness or sadness about what makes
the other person sad or happy; one’s own happiness or sadness about the other’s
emotional state is not empathic. I will say more later, but for now note that when we
empathize, we are present with and walk alongside others so as to understand their
particular situation separate from our own feelings. Let us return to the importance of
empathy.

11

Karsten Stueber, "Empathy," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/empathy/. The in-text citations in
the quote refer to the following works: S. Darwall, “Empathy, Sympathy, and Care,” Philosophical Studies
89 (1998): 261–282; Nancy Eisenberg, “Empathy and Sympathy,” in Handbook of Emotions, eds. M.
Lewis and J.M. Haviland-Jones (New York, NY: Guilford Press, 2000), 677-691; L. Wispe, “The
Distinction between Sympathy and Empathy: To Call Forth a Concept a Word is Needed,” Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 50 (1986): 314–321; and Wispe L., The Psychology of Sympathy (New
York, NT: Plenum Press, 1991).

10
Interpersonal human interaction in its variegated forms happens each day. These
interactions are saturated with conscious and less conscious sentiments and affections.
Smiles, hand holding, greetings, hugs, tears, anger, hate, laughter, listening, and desires
are all part of the conscious and less conscious matrix of human interaction in the
hospital. Further, empathy is an important element in these human interactions as people
try to relate to and care for each other.12 When someone is in distress, one might
approach that person to try to provide comfort; when someone is overjoyed about a
meaningful experience, one might approach him or her to share in and understand his or
her joy. The connection in the painful and joyous experiences occurs through empathy. I
will argue that understanding another’s mental state and sharing in an emotional state
through empathy is one of the ways in which connections between people are formed in
difficult EOL situations.13 From my perspective as a chaplain, this is how neighbor love
is cultivated. More principled and pragmatic approaches to difficult ethical issues are
important, but without the interpersonal, affective, and empathetic, they lack an important
element of the human experience and what it means to be created in God’s image.

12

It is not my intention to ignore the line of thinking connected with Thomas Hobbes: people are
naturally selfish and the laws and social customs are only a veneer overlaid this immoral core. Though not
completely convincing, Hobbes and others touch on an important part of human nature. I do not agree with
Hobbes and would argue that compassion is innate. For examples of this discussion in psychology see
Susan Dwyer, “How Not to Argue Morality Isn’t Innate: Comments on Prinz,” The Evolution of Morality:
Adaptations and Innateness, vol. 1 of Moral Psychology, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2008), 418. Jesse Prinz had argued in a previous essay in the same volume that morality is
something learned either form a general purpose conditioning mechanism or a new learning for a system
that evolved for other purposes. Susan Dwyer argues humans have a moral faculty in the brain, or a general
faculty/module that develops the capability to morally think.
13
This line of thinking is supported by research. See Alan Sroufe, “Attachment and development:
A prospective, longitudinal study from birth to adulthood,” Attachment and Human Development 7, no. 4
(2005): 349-367. The results of this study were also published in book form but this article is a good
summary of the book.
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Communities of God’s people across historical contexts are built on the connections
between people. When the question, “What should we do in this situation?” arises and
there is disagreement in ethical worldviews, empathy can cultivate neighbor love within
the medical team and help the family and medical team decide on a plan of care with a
sense of mutual respect and love for each other.
In chapter four, I will provide a concrete example of an ethical disagreement that
frequently arose at the end of life in my work with families in hospitals as a chaplain and
on the ethics committees. The case will focus on a disagreement between the medical
team and family. The family’s beliefs and values will differ from the medical team’s,
which will serve to illuminate one example of the “ethical strangers” to which Appiah
refers. These disagreements were often over definitions of what it meant to be alive, what
type of end of life care was right or wrong, and how much or little medical care was
warranted before the suffering was considered too great. There was also a dynamic of
distress in these situations. The patient and family were in physical and emotional pain,
the medical team came to the family and cared for them, and the medical team tried to
understand what the family was experiencing.14 The role of the chaplain in these
situations, as I have practiced it, is to tease out the values and beliefs of all involved—
tease out by listening with empathy, patience, and compassion. I will come back to these
ideas and struggles in chapter four when I focus on a case study. For now, I will move
forward to look at my proposal for a solution to these ethical divides that medical teams

14
Power and hierarchy are important dynamics when talking about empathy. The context in which
empathy occurs is rarely one of parties meeting each other on equal terms: caregivers reach out to those for
whom they care, someone in distress receives help from another, or many other situations. Empathy is in
response to a need or distress in another person, and it is in the hands of the people responding to the
distress out of care and concern to empathize with those in distress.

12
and ethics committees encounter. I hope, along with Lartey, that goodness lies in the
tensions between opposing positions.
Empathy and Moral Reasoning
Given the strong emotional responses involved in the EOL reasoning process, I
will argue that empathy is a practice that can help cultivate neighbor love in EOL cases.
Though there are many different possible angles one could take when addressing the
EOL moral reasoning process in the current cultural context, I will focus on empathy.
There are many definitions of empathy. The following definition will grow out of
chapters four through six of the dissertation, but I want the reader to have a flavor for
where my argument is headed.
Empathy is a practice that develops out of the developmental antecedents in early
childhood experiences with the caregiver as a result of the dialogue of care with
one’s caregivers and feeling felt. In adults, this results in the ability to understand
the mental and emotional states of others and a desire to respond to their distress
with acts of care, in which we can think of God as present calling us to love the
neighbor as they want to be loved.
I will not go into the myriad of possible definitions. Beyond my focus on
hospitals and EOL situations, empathy is far from a narrow area of study in academic and
public life. Within the disciplines of philosophy and psychology (and its various subdisciplines), for example, there is extensive research going on related to empathy,
compassion, and altruism: counseling psychologists and counseling pastors discuss
empathy in the therapeutic encounter,15 University of Chicago’s Center for Cognitive and

Helen Reiss, “Biomarkers in the Psychotherapeutic Relationship: The Role of Physiology,
Neurobiology, and Biological Correlates of E.M.P.A.T.H.Y.,” Harvard Review of Psychiatry 19, no. 3
(2011): 162-174; and Leonard Hummel, “Heinz Kohut and Empathy: A Perspective from a Theology of the
Cross,” Word and World 21, no. 1 (2001): 64-74.
15

13
Social Neuroscience is doing research on moral neuroscience,16 Stanford University has a
Center for Compassion and Altruism,17 University of Minnesota’s Extension Center for
Youth Development researches the role of social and emotional learning in the lives of
youth,18 political philosophers discuss the role of empathy in public deliberation,19 and
philosophers take on the relationship between empathy and the ethics of care.20
Beyond the research centers, the overall sense is that the presence of empathy
within dialogue about social injustices and difficult communal decisions will help when
there is an impasse (e.g., in the United States the racial injustice highlighted by the
shooting and death of Michael Brown).21 In terms of communal life, empathy will aid in
understanding the experience of another person and/or community, thus allowing one to
understand the particular issue at hand from their perspective. Taking the perspective of
others creates shifts in ethical frameworks as the others’ frame is incorporated into a
community’s existing framework.
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(accessed September 13, 2016).
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Michael E. Morrell, Empathy and Democracy: Feeling, Thinking, and Deliberation (University
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010).
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Virginia Held, Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2007); and Michael Slote, Ethics of Care and Empathy (London, UK: Routledge, 2007).
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See, for example, Rev. Theresa Latini’s blog post, “Ferguson, Race, and the Evangelical
Problem,” The Twelve (blog), December 4, 2014, http://blog.perspectivesjournal.org/2014/12/04/fergusonrace-and-the-evangelical-problem/ (accessed September 13, 2016). Rev. Theresa Latini, Ph.D., is professor
of practical theology and pastoral care at Western Theological Seminary. Latini argues for the importance
of empathy, social action, and public policy.
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Stating that empathy and emotions play a role in communal life and EOL
situations hinges on the fact we can argue emotions play a role in making moral claims. I
argue that, yes, emotions are part of the building blocks of a particular community’s
worldview and are how a community’s morals are constructed. Emotions lead to moral
claims through physiological and cognitive processes. Combing the theories of Daniel
Siegel, a psychiatrist, and Jesse Prinz, a philosopher, we can see how emotions lead to
moral claims.22 Emotions are the bodily reactions and energies that are not yet
categorized into a sentiment; they are vague and based in a physiological sense awareness
that something is stirring and we need to be on alert. These stirrings are then further
refined into a sentiment. Simply put, sentiments can be negative and we have a feeling of
disapproval towards the object or experience, or they can be positive and we will have a
feeling of approval. Sentiments of approval or disapproval are further categorized into a
judgment about the stimulus or object. The judgment pertains to whether something is
right or wrong. Therefore, to think something is right or wrong is to have a sentiment of
approval or disapproval based in the bodily energies and dynamics, which lead to making
moral claims. In this sense, emotions are our basic experience that are further refined into
our convictions, values, and beliefs; any communication about the latter during EOL
discussions in hospitals needs to be carried out with empathy for the former.
Empathy allows the understanding of the emotional world of others, especially as
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Jesse Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals (New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
2007); and Daniel Siegel, The Developing Mind: How Relationships and the Brain Interact to Shape Who
We Are, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 2012).
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it is connected to the ethical problem under consideration in EOL ethics consults. 23
Growing out of their emotions, the family and medical team have developed a belief
about what is right and wrong in a particular case. These cases are saturated with anger,
sadness, grief, guilt, and compassion combined with different moral frameworks about
health and end of life. As I already stated, the emotions are connected to the moral claims
of the family. Having empathy for the distressed family, in particular, will aid the
medical team in understanding how the stirrings, sentiments, and judgments lead to moral
claims about what care plan is right or wrong for their loved one. Following the line of
thinking related to other public issues, the presence of empathy in these situations could
create an understanding of moral frameworks and the visceral pains and hopes of others.
However, I want to push this a little further and dig a little deeper.
I would like to add a theological perspective to the philosophical and
psychological views explored so far. Empathy is a sacred ethic. I will argue that empathy
is part of the visceral moral reasoning process calling the medical team to love the
neighbor. We can think of this call to love and empathize with the neighbor as the
presence of God. In the specific situations under consideration here, the team should
strive to empathize with the family in order to embody God’s love in the form of
honoring the neighbor’s (i.e., patient and family) dignity as persons with values,
relationships, and meaning. My push for empathy stems from the dual love commands in
Mark 12:30-31:
And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and
with all thy mind, and with all thy strength: this is the first commandment. And
Bert Molewijk et al., “Emotions and Clinical Ethics Support. A Moral Inquiry into Emotions in
Moral Case Deliberation,” Healthcare Ethics Forum 23 (2011): 257-268; Florian Bruns, “Ethics
Consultation and Empathy,” Healthcare Ethics Forum 23 (2011): 247-255.
23
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the second is like, namely this, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. There is
none other commandment greater than these.24
It is from the commandment to love thy neighbor where my push for empathy in
EOL ethics consults comes. Loving the neighbor as thyself—an ethic of neighbor love—
arises out of the interpersonal encounters within the muck and mire of life.
Loving another as “thyself” is only part of the solution in situations at the EOL in
hospitals, however. Seeing, hearing, and responding to another through one’s own lens
and needs would not be loving the neighbor as they need to be loved. Like my critique of
sympathy, the Other can be eclipsed by how one would want oneself to be loved. Seeing
oneself in another and loving the other as one would want to be loved is a humanizing
first step, but it is empathy that moves one to love another as they want to be loved.
Loving the neighbor in this way does not mean acting, giving, and relating to the
neighbor exactly as they want and doing everything they desire. What I mean by “loving
the neighbor as they want to be loved” is a way of being in relationship that does not
eclipse the thoughts and feelings of the neighbor—present with and walking alongside
others so as to understand their particular situation. Loving the neighbor as they want to
be loved is a love that coalesces around the experience of the neighbor; it sees the
neighbor as a unique being worthy of respect, of being honored, and loved holistically.
How does one cultivate neighbor love to love the Other as they want to be loved
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Text quoted is from the King James Version (italics mine). One of my frustrations with practical
theologies is the lack of attention to a thorough exegesis of the biblical texts quoted within their theories,
particularly the broader historical context in which the texts took shape. In the same breath that I mention
this frustration, I regret I will not be able to provide an in-depth exegesis of this text. Adela Yarbro Collins,
for example, extensively explores the textual and philosophical history of these verses drawing on the
LXX, Qumran texts, Hebrew Bible, Greek philosophy, and the Hellenistic Jewish philosopher Philo of
Alexandria (d. 45-50 C.E.). She demonstrates how first century Jewish interpretations of the law (i.e., Mark
12:30-31) were indebted to Greco-Roman paradigms of virtue ethics. See Adela Yarbro Collins, Mark
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2007), 566-575. Her historical interpretation is one among many others.
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in the midst of diverse ethical worldviews when trying to answer questions of what
should be done at the EOL? Though there are many ways in which neighbor love can be
cultivated, empathy is a critical component. Cultivating empathy in difficult EOL cases
fosters neighbor love. Not only does empathy foster neighbor love, but also it is required
at the end of life from the medical team and nurtures a love that coalesces around the
thoughts, feelings, relationships, and beliefs of the family. Cultivating empathy, in my
interpretation, occurs in a specific way. Empathy occurs in the dialogue of care between
and within the staff, families, and patients at the hospital, in which we can think of God
as present, moving the medical team to love the family as they want to be loved in the
midst of diverse ethical worldviews.25 In thinking of God as present, I am referring to the
possibility that our quest to practice empathy and love is not totally of our own volition:
“And the harmonious working of all these factors is guaranteed solely by the fact that in
all of them God himself, the origin and goal of our destiny to communion with him, is
influencing us.”26 The divine created intention is not solely within humans or solely
external to humans.27 God is connected to us and we are connected to God, the practice of
empathy and neighbor love is a goal with which humans and God are involved. As
humans, we are grounded in God and touched by grace. I will unpack these claims and

25

Does mutual understanding through empathy lead to neighbor love or is neighbor loved already
required before one can empathize? In my interpretation it is the former, but there are good reasons to
support the latter claim as well. One might be part of a family or community that adheres to neighbor love
as their primary value. In this way, neighbor love as a cultural value could drive the empathic process.
Further, with empathy moving people to love the other as they want to be loved, there are moments where
critical reflection is required. Just as there are dangers with loving the neighbor as thyself, there are
dangers with loving the neighbor as they want to be loved. The self-centeredness merely gets shifted to the
other in that we now assume they ways the other wants to be loved are always fruitful.
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark LTD, 1985) 53, 58.
26
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Ibid., 60.
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make my case for them in chapters four and following. 28
Looking Ahead
What follows will be an interdisciplinary analysis of empathy grounded in a
composite case study that highlights my thesis above. The analysis and case study will
assist in arriving at greater clarity of my interpretation of empathy and how it helps
difficult EOL cases come to a resolution. Further, I will use a version of Don Browning’s
fundamental practical theology as an interpretive framework. Browning’s fundamental
practical theology follows a particular pattern that helps religious communities decide
how they should reshape their current practices when faced with the question: what
should we do in this particular case? Browning stresses that the life of a community and
its practices are what drive any detached theoretical reflection and analysis of what is
happening in a community, and the aim is always to reshape practice. He argues for this
practice-theory-practice pattern in contradistinction to models and patterns that begin
with detached theory and apply that theory to change practice.29 An example of the latter
involving empathy would be a hospital ethics committee that reads the latest
psychological interpretation of empathy and simply pulls this theory into their ethics
consult practices without first looking at their specific context as a healthcare community,
a healthcare community in a specific setting with a specific patient population.

28

In answering these questions, one could take many different approaches. For example, it is
important to note a crucial aspect of neighbor love that my interdisciplinary exploration of empathy leaves
out. Neighbor love is much more than empathy and requires public advocacy that focuses on transforming
the structural and social injustices that plague society. Empathy, as I said, is necessary for neighbor love
but is only a first step in achieving a more complete theological response to the command of love thy
neighbor as thyself.
29

Don Browning, A Fundamental Practical Theology: Descriptive and Strategic Proposals
(Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1996).
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Because of his practice-theory-practice approach, Browning’s interpretive
paradigm is useful for clinical ethics in a hospital setting. We will look at a case study
and how it unfolds (practice), reflect on empathy and the case study through three
paradigms (theory), and then I will suggest normative guidelines to help hospitals
practice empathy at the EOL (practice). I will use select current research to do the
interpretive work of empathy and the case study: the philosophy of Martha Nussbaum,
the psychology of Martin Hoffman, and the theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg. Hoffman
and Pannenberg will illuminate how empathy can expand one’s circle of understanding
and love the neighbor as they want to be loved; all three of the thinkers will deepen how
care and empathy happen between and within people and communities; and Pannenberg’s
anthropology will elucidate how a theology of God’s presence within the caregivers and
their care deepens our understanding of empathy. What will arise out of the
interdisciplinary exploration of empathy and the case study is a definition of empathy and
normative guidelines for those involved with clinical ethics. Guidelines require the
specifics of a particular context to be of any use, so I leave it to particular contexts to
work out how these guidelines will live within their community.30 I will, however,
provide some suggestions for how hospitals can bring them to life.

30
One may wonder why I am offering guidelines for hospitals and ethics committees when I
disagreed with principle based and detached rationalistic paradigms of practical reasoning. One may not be
wondering this, but I think it is appropriate to respond in some way. In many ways, the question of
principles and ideologies or affective experience becomes a “chicken or the egg” question. For example,
one might ask me why I think empathy is a desirable quality to cultivate, and why “loving the neighbor as
s/he wants to be loved” is a valid goal for communities. Focusing on cultivating empathy is a normative
move and based on the dual commandment in Mark 12:30-31. To this argument, I would say one has made
a good point. If there is a principle within my line of reasoning, then it is as follows: empathy should be
cultivated in communities. I cannot deny this. However, my guidelines are flexible and will have come out
of a composite case study based on years of experience in hospitals. Normative guidelines are not the same
as universal principles. Saying that empathy ought to be cultivated in communities is not to a make a
declaration about every time and place empathy occurs. Further, empathy itself is a fluid and flexible
interpersonal dynamic and does not demand specific behavior.
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The composite case arises out of my work in hospitals, which has provided me
with multiple situations of ethical disagreement between the medical team and the family
at the end of life. Chaplains are involved in EOL cases for many reasons beyond the
general therapeutic listening I mentioned earlier. When a patient’s clinical picture
declines, chaplains will often visit the patient and family again or make an initial visit.
This decline often causes more distress in the family and they might need more emotional
support and to draw on their spirituality to help them cope. Chaplains, officially interfaith chaplains, are trained to provide emotional and spiritual support to patients and
families of all belief systems. Briefly, spirituality refers to values, beliefs, and the ways
people make meaning and find hope in their lives. Chaplains attempt to help people draw
on their spirituality while going through a health crisis. The family can always refuse this
support. Specifically related to difficult ethics cases and EOL, chaplains are often the
staff members that provide grief support to the family; EOL cases are usually
accompanied by distraught family members and sometimes distressed staff, so chaplains
provide emotional support to both staff and family; and chaplains are often members of
the hospital ethics committee because of their training in listening to and discerning the
values and beliefs of a family.
My composite case explores a patient who had an anoxic brain injury and
remained in critical condition in the ICU for the duration of the hospital stay. He was in a
minimally conscious state with occasional seizures. He was unable to communicate or
care for himself, and he would never be able to indicate he knew who he was or whom he
was with, according to the medical team. The family decided to have a tracheostomy and
feeding tube and had him cared for in a nursing home. The medical team completely
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disagreed with this decision. The patient ended up going to a nursing home in a
minimally conscious state (unable to verbalize, unable to acknowledge the presence of
others), fully dependent on staff for cares. Cases such as these are often stressful for the
family and the medical staff because of the tension around the dissimilar ethical
worldviews. Both the family and the medical staff care deeply about the patient and are
concerned with his or her well-being. When there are ethical disagreements at the EOL,
hospital ethics committees are consulted in hopes of resolving the disagreement—not to
issue a verdict on what the plan of care will be for the patient but to facilitate a discussion
between the family and medical team.
Ethics committees and the medical team will often use a particular method to
help resolve the disagreement. One of the most popular methods today comes from the
book Clinical Ethics by Albert Jonsen, Mark Siegler, and William Winslade.31 Both the
Minnesota Center for Healthcare Ethics and Mayo Clinic’s ethics committee in
Rochester, MN, use the method outlined in the book to help resolve ethical conflicts.32
The pragmatic and thorough approach of the authors is attractive for those in clinical
ethics. The authors propose four topics that need to be clarified in reference to the patient
in order to make a decision in clinical medicine: medical indicators, patient preferences,
quality of life, and any contextual features that impact the decision. I don’t take issue
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Albert Jonsen et al., Clinical Ethics: A Practical Approach to Ethical Decisions in Clinical
Medicine, 7th ed. (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2010).
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I spoke with a member of Mayo Clinic in Rochester, MN about the ethics committee and this
person confirmed the use of the Clinical Ethics book. The Minnesota Center for Healthcare Ethics is a
center sponsored by Fairview Health Services, HealthEast Care System, and Sisters of Saint Joseph of
Carondolete. The center provides ethics education and consultation services to the clinical sites of all three
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in healthcare.
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with these four topics, per se, but the approach in Clinical Ethics, along with other
approaches,33 lack an appropriate acknowledgment of the visceral and emotional decision
making process of the family. The pragmatic and in-depth approach of the authors is very
helpful in resolving ethical disagreements. Nonetheless, their needs to be a fifth topic in
my interpretation; they need a topic about empathy, or at least a more significant
acknowledgment of its role in making EOL decisions when there is ethical disagreement
between medical team and family. 34 The absence of empathy in this clinical ethics
paradigm is not because end of life deliberations lack affect or love-of-neighbor from the
medical staff, but the decision making process is often employed by the medical staff
from the perspective of loving the neighbor (in this case, the family and patient) as
thyself (the medical staff’s opinion). What about the experience of the family? The
family and patient are the ones in more distress in this situation. The distress the medical
team feels caring for the patient is weighed differently than the distress of the family and
patient in this case. Though it is fruitful for the family to enter into the experience of the

Thaddeus Mason Pope, “Dispute Resolution Mechanisms for Intractable Medical Futility
Disputes,” New York Law School Law Review 58 (2013/14): 347-368. Pope, a prominent legal scholar on
medical futility, makes the case that 95% of medical futility disputes can be resolved with better
communication between the medical team and patients/families on what a particular patient’s wishes are
for medical treatment with a poor prognosis. The other 5% of intractable cases can be resolved by replacing
the surrogate if they are going against the wishes of the patient. There is good legal precedent for replacing
the surrogate in these cases. Similar to Jonsen et al., I agree with the content of Pope’s resolution process,
but he too fails to emphasize the importance of affectivity and empathy in intractable EOL cases.
33
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Religious ethicists have noted the importance of empathy in medical training and as a
characteristic that contributes to the excellence of a physician. See Lenny Lopéz and Arthur J. Dyck,
“Educating Physicians for Moral Excellence in the Twenty-First Century,” Journal of Religious Ethics 37,
no. 4 (2008): 651-668. While these authors are not addressing my claim about EOL ethics cases
specifically, their claims support my more general claim that the medical team needs to embody empathy.
See also Neil Pembroke, “Empathy, Emotion, and Ekstasis in the Physician-Patient Relationship,” Journal
of Religion and Health 46, no. 2 (2007): 287-298. The following quote from page 297 summarizes his
position: “Empathy, when it incorporates both cognitive and affective elements, has the power to produce a
deep level of connectedness between patient and physician. Ekstasis and communion, then, are the
fundamental moments in clinical empathy.”
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medical team, the medical team needs to empathize with the family. Given the
importance of empathy from the medical team in the critical care literature, it is
surprising the authors of Clinical Ethics do not mention it.35
Empathy is clearly needed in these EOL cases where there is disagreement.
Empathy of a particular sort, however. Empathy is, on the one hand, a practice that can
help bridge the divide in ethical disagreements so that all involved can compassionately
arrive at a solution as to what to do in a particular situation. It is powerful moment of
intimacy and intersubjectivity in which the love of God is present drawing people
together to love each other. Empathy is, on the other hand, capable of being misused and
there needs to be an awareness of its limits. I will use the composite case study as a way
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to ground the dialogue within the interdisciplinary conversation and arrive at a
constructive understanding of empathy—both its limits and its possibilities.

CHAPTER TWO
CLINICAL ETHICS AND SENTIMENTALISM
Before moving into my methodology, I want to provide a brief summary of one
paradigm of clinical ethics and a history of the role emotions have played in moral
philosophy and theology. Why these two things in one chapter? By stating empathy is a
helpful practice to embody in difficult end of life ethics cases, I am stating that the
emotions and the accompanying interpersonal dynamics—be those referred to as care,
compassion, approbation, and benevolence—have a central role in these cases reaching a
resolution. Ethics committees and hospitals employ approaches to clinical ethics in hopes
of resolving ethical disagreements that often lack empathy. I will summarize a paradigm
of clinical ethics, demonstrate where I think it lacks empathy, and then provide a brief
history of the role of emotions in moral philosophy, psychology, and theology so as to
demonstrate the role that emotions play in making moral claims and the need for
empathy, especially in EOL cases in hospitals.
Providing a brief history of empathy and as it relates to sentimentalism presents
some issues. First, empathy is at the same time an old and modern word, and draws on a
number of contemporary intellectual trajectories. It is translated form the Greek: em +
pathos, literally feeling into. The English concept of “empathy” started out in German
psychological circles as Einfühlung, which means feeling-in or feeling-into. Two, the
history of philosophy, psychology, and theology is also inextricably linked; the
distinctions between them are a product of contemporary academic and social contexts.
25
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Given the blending of disciplines, my interdisciplinary review of emotions will be
blended. My historical summary will also be selective in that it will focus on thinkers and
topics related to an ethic of neighbor love and empathy.36

Clinical Ethics
As I indicated earlier, the paradigm of clinical ethics in Clinical Ethics by Jonsen
et al. is one of the dominant paradigms of making ethical decisions in clinical settings,
especially in my context of Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota. The paradigm of Jonsen
et al. focuses on a particular decision making process that covers four topics: medical
indications, patient preferences, quality of life, and contextual features. Each of these
topics must be addressed when making ethical decisions in clinical settings. I will briefly
summarize each of the first three topics and demonstrate how this paradigm lacks
empathy and fails to acknowledge the role that emotions have in families making
decisions about their loved ones at the end of life. The first three topics have a strong
focus on the relationship between the medical team and family in the context of day-today medical care. The fourth topic, however, focuses more on hospital policy and public
policy in the context of justice issues, such as the distribution of healthcare resources.
This is not to say there are not justice issues and policies at work in EOL cases when the
family and medical team interact with each other, but I want to focus more on the
affective elements of the relationship between the family and the medical team. My hope
36
I will only be able to highlight the intellectual and cultural tradition of Europe, countries
bordering the Mediterranean, and the United States of America. This has typically been called “western,”
but such a designation sounds silly to me because “west” is an arbitrary directional descriptor. I recognize
this bias leaves out many marginalized voices deemed insignificant by the forces of history, power, and
dominant cultures.
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would be that when justice issues are at work in EOL situations, empathizing with the
family would contribute to equitable care planning for each family.
Even if the authors agree with me that EOL ethics consults require empathy, they
do not stress it in their model. The first three topics are interdependent even though I will
parse them out separately. The authors intend their model to be used in a wide variety of
clinical situations, but I will focus on EOL. In the process of an ethics consult, the
medical team and ethics consultant are supposed to cover these four topics with a patient
and family.
Medical Indications
The authors begin with medical indications. Regardless of the presence of
empathy, any ethics consult in a hospital needs to include a thorough discussion of the
clinical picture and prognosis of the patient. The medical team needs to make sure that
the patient and family understand the diagnoses, the prognosis, and have all of their
questions about their loved one’s diagnosis and prognosis answered. The authors give the
following definition for medical indications: “medical indications are those facts about
the patient’s physiological or psychological condition that indicate the forms of
diagnostic, therapeutic, or educational interventions that are appropriate.”37 Appropriate
treatments are guided by the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence—the duty to
benefit and do no harm to a patient. As the medical team weighs treatment options, they
consider how much a particular plan of care will benefit or harm a patient.
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In the EOL case under consideration in chapter four, the main question that the
medical team will be trying to answer is whether a plan of care is beneficial or overly
burdensome for the patient. A critical and severe diagnosis that comes with a very poor
prognosis is always hard for the medical team. They have to balance curing the patient
with not causing unnecessary suffering; when a cure is not possible, the team wants to
make sure the patient is comfortable and free from pain and anxiety in the dying process.
We can see this balancing act in the authors’ stated goals of medical treatment:
1. cure of disease.
2.

maintenance or improvement of quality of life through relief of
symptoms, pain, and suffering.

3. promotion of health and prevention of disease.
4.

prevention of untimely death.

5. improvement of functional status or maintenance of compromised status.
6. education and counseling of patients regarding their condition and
prognosis.
7.

avoidance of harm to the patient in the course of care.

8.

providing relief and support near time of death.38

To some extent, these goals represent a continuum ranging from more aggressive
curative measures to end of life care. As we will see in chapter four, our patient in
chapter four suffered a non-survivable brain injury, to use the medical team’s term. The
family and medical team were faced with deciding what they should do for the patient
given his poor prognosis. In the process of exploring which of the goals of medicine are
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reasonable for a particular patient, there is no mention of how the medical team should
listen to the family, demonstrate care and compassion, or empathize with them. Granted
the “medical indications” topic does not focus on the emotions, values, and beliefs of the
patient and the family like the subsequent topics will, but the current topic does focus on
the goals of treatment and the assessment process of the medical team. Assessing a
patient requires listening to the patient and family, so the medical team can hear the
whole story from the patient and family. A proper assessment based on the physiological
and psychological facts, especially in emotionally charged EOL life situations, requires a
disposition of empathy and compassion for the patient and family. The medical team
must empathize with the emotions and experience of the family if they hope to benefit the
patient. The authors fail to stress the importance of empathy and interpersonal connection
in fully understanding the medical indications.
Patient Preferences
The preferences of the patient must also be the center of any medical discussion
according to Jonsen et al., and this is especially the case in EOL situations where families
wrestle with deciding between curative measures or pursuing a comfortable dying
process. Jonsen et al. define patient preferences as follows:
By preferences of patients we mean the choices that persons make when they are
faced with decisions about health and medical treatment…The patient applies her
personal experience, beliefs, and values to the information and recommendation
of the physician, who makes a best interests-based recommendation of
interventions that might objectively improve the patient’s clinical condition.39
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Jonsen et al. note that the goal of medical treatment is shared decision making
between the patient/family and the medical team. After the medical team has made their
recommendation, the patient/family preferences should be honored among medically
reasonable options. The ethical principle guiding this topic for the authors is respect for
patient autonomy (i.e., in having their wishes for medical care followed), which is part of
a larger principle of respect for persons: each person has moral value and dignity, and has
the right to be respected by others.40
Jonsen et al. cover numerous issues in this topic: informed consent, decisional
capacity, surrogate decision makers, and others. I want to focus briefly on how they treat
a patient in a similar situation to the upcoming case study. Our patient will be unable to
make his own decisions and has not given his wife and family any indication of what his
medical wishes would be if he were in such a state. For a patient in this condition, Jonsen
et al. make the case that the surrogate decision maker (i.e., patient’s wife in our case)
should use the best interests standard of promoting the best interests of the patient. The
medical team, according to this model, would lay out a range of medically reasonable
options that would meet the needs of the patient’s clinical condition (though not
improve), the surrogate would state what she thinks the best interests of the patient would
be, and decision would be reached in light of the patient’s best interests and the
reasonable options.
In a case where the patient has a poor cognitive outcome (i.e., not able to indicate
she knows who she is, or who she is with), the patient has likely been through a
devastating experience and the surrogate decision maker is faced with making a decision
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in the midst of a traumatic situation. While there are reasonable options for particular
prognoses, the surrogate decision maker may not be worried about being reasonable and
may be overwhelmed, grieving, and anxious. Reason and emotion are not in opposition to
each other, but in instances like our upcoming case, the emotional states of the family
may inhibit thinking more reasonably. In order to learn about the patient’s preferences in
this situation, the medical team must listen to and empathize with the surrogate decision
maker if they want to decide on a plan of care for the patient. There is very little mention
of tending to the emotional elements of deciding among reasonable options and what is in
the patient’s best interest. The surrogate decision maker is likely experiencing intense
emotions around the initial incident and whatever consequences the plan of care have for
his or her life with the patient. These emotions are a central component of making any
plan of care decisions and important for building trust and rapport between the medical
team and the family, especially if one of the goals of medicine, per Jonsen et al., is shared
decision making between patient/family and medical team.
Quality of Life
Patient preferences are inextricably tied to a patient or family’s assessment about
what type of life is worth living. In EOL ethics consults, quality of life assessments are at
the center of the discussion. The medical team, patient, and family reflect on what type of
life the person would want to live given their prognosis. Jonsen et al. define quality of life
as follows:
One significant feature of all medical interventions is the aim to produce a state of
satisfaction for the patient who has sought treatment. Quality of life…refers to
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that degree of satisfaction that people experience and value about their lives as a
whole, and in its particular aspects, such as physical health.41
They ask many questions related to how the medical team and family can and
should make judgments about a patient’s quality of life, but one of their questions is
particularly relevant to the upcoming case study: Do quality of life assessments of
patients who will have restricted, diminished, or profoundly diminished quality of life
raise any questions regarding changes in treatment plans, such as removing life sustaining
treatment?42 Our patient in the upcoming chapter has suffered a traumatic injury with a
very poor cognitive outcome and will fall under the category of profoundly diminished
quality of life. In answering the above question, “patients and their physicians must
determine what quality of life is desirable and attainable, how it is to be achieved, and
what risks and disadvantages are associated with the desired quality.”43
To their benefit, Jonsen et al. caution the medical team about imposing their own
set of values and beliefs on a patient in a profoundly diminished state; different people
value different kinds of experiences and conditions differently. By comparing the values
of the medical team to the family, they indicate the importance of understanding the
experience of the family. However, the nomenclature they use to describe these efforts
lacks the necessary affectivity. The focus is on making assessments and value judgments,
and clarifying the beliefs of the patient and family. Equal time and attention needs to be
given to how the medical team can affectively hear the story of the family. As we will see
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in the historical summary in the latter half of the chapter, how the family feels will impact
the family’s process of making judgments. The fear, anxiety, and grief may be
overwhelming for a family in situation like the upcoming case study in chapter four.
These emotions are at the core of how the family will work through making any decisions
about treatment plans.
Empathy and Emotions in Ethics Consults
It should be clear by now that I think the clinical ethics topics outlined above lack
a focus on the emotions in EOL cases and do not stress the importance of empathizing
with the family as they try to decide what they should do for their loved one. Emotions
play a central role in how families make EOL decisions. The process of empathizing with
the family is how neighbor love gets cultivated—the medical team can love the family as
the family wants to be loved in this EOL situation. Empathy clearly has positive
influence on the relationship between the medical team and the family. In the context of
making life support decisions and EOL care in the ICU, families report feeling
understood, heard, and a greater sense of satisfaction with care when the medical team
empathizes.44 In a superficial sense, a family’s feeling of satisfaction does not
demonstrate the presence of neighbor love from the medical team. A family can feel
satisfied for a variety of reasons. However, in a superficial way the reports of family
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See the following studies: Bert Molewijk et al., "Emotions and Clinical Ethics Support. A Moral
Inquiry into Emotions in Moral Case Deliberation," HEC Forum 23, no. 4 (December 2011): 257-268,
Business Source Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed May 23, 2016); R. Selph et al., "Empathy and Life
Support Decisions in Intensive Care Units," JGIM: Journal Of General Internal Medicine 23, no. 9
(September 2008): 1311-1317, EBSCO MegaFILE, EBSCOhost (accessed May 23, 2016); Laura J. Hinkle
et al., "Factors Associated With Family Satisfaction With End-of-Life Care in the ICU," Chest 147, no. 1
(January 2015): 82-93, EBSCO MegaFILE, EBSCOhost (accessed May 23, 2016). These studies mostly
discuss the family’s satisfaction with care and how empathy contributes to that satisfaction.

34
show that empathy is a good thing when making EOL decisions. Empathy from the team
helps them see the family (i.e., neighbor) truly, honestly, and holistically. Neighbor love
should be cultivated at the EOL simply because the neighbor is worthy of being seen in
this way, being honored and respected, but empathy can also help these cases come to a
resolution by loving the family how they want to be loved.
Empathy solves a unique contemporary problem in these EOL cases. Given the
growing intercultural reality, empathy is required for people to feel and understand the
experience of others. Ethical worldviews can be completely dissimilar, and in a world
where our neighbor is not guaranteed to be a close version of ourselves, empathy, driven
by love, is required to cultivate neighbor love. In the brief history of love, empathy, and
sentimentalism that follows, I will show how empathy is needed to love the neighbor on
his or her own terms and why emotions are foundational for moral claims and decisions
at the EOL. Early theologians and philosophers spoke of loving the neighbor as another
version of the self and importance of love in morality. Enlightenment and nineteenth
century thinkers continued to stress the importance of emotions in morality such as love,
but loving the neighbor was less about loving our neighbors as other versions of
ourselves; the neighbor might have different needs and emotional states, to use
contemporary terms, than one’s own. Finally, in the contemporary period, psychology
and philosophy have shown us that we cannot assume that we know what our neighbor is
thinking or feeling. In addition to the increasing interaction between cultures from
different parts of the globe, the concept of “ethical strangers” is related to how the social
sciences have shown we cannot assume that we know what our neighbor is thinking or
feeling. Because of the discoveries in the social sciences, we cannot say we know the
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feelings and thoughts of another, thus an ethical stranger could be anyone. It is here that
empathy becomes necessary, especially in trying to resolve a difficult EOL case between
parties with different ethical worldviews.
Why Don’t Medical Teams Start with Empathy?
In terms of finding an answer to this question, I have not completed interviews
with physicians, nurses, nursing assistants, and other staff. I have my experience as a
chaplain working in a teaching hospital on which to draw. My practice as a chaplain has
been to start with empathy—empathy for the patients, families, and staff that takes care
of them. There are other members of the medical team that likely start with empathy, of
course, but I can only speak to my own intentions as a chaplain.
I assume medical staff are practicing what they are taught to do. Based on my
experience with medical staff in teaching hospitals, I don’t believe it is common place
that medical training—whether it is physician, nursing, or various therapists—includes
education in empathy and the interpersonal elements of working in healthcare as part of
required curricula. Medical staff are taught about physiology, biochemistry,
pharmacology, hospital policy and procedure, and technology. Physician James Plumb
(quoting a medical professional) states it the following way:
As Inui writes: “And how are we fairing as medical educators in preparing future
physicians for professional roles in our complicated world? I would conclude that
the “formative arc” of education today is strong on the acquisition of technical
knowledge and weak-to-negative on the acquisition of values and moral
formation. While preparing successfully to pass tests of knowledge, our students
measurably move from being open-minded and curious to test-driven and
minimalistic, from openhearted and idealistic to self-centered and well defended,
from altruistic to cynical.”45

James Plumb, “Video: Commitment to Improving Access to Care-Commentary,” commentary
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Neither do I mean to say medical staff are all cynical and bereft of empathy, nor
that medical educators lack an understanding of empathy’s importance. This would be
overstating the current state of things. A counter-example comes from Stanford
University’s Center for Compassion and Altruism Research and Education (CCARE). In
relationship with Stanford’s School of Medicine,
CCARE investigates methods for cultivating compassion and promoting altruism
within individuals and society through rigorous research, scientific collaborations,
and academic conferences. In addition, CCARE provides a compassion
cultivation program and teacher training as well as educational public events and
programs.46
Stanford offers training programs for professionals to learn how to practice
compassion, empathy, and altruism. A simple online search of “empathy and medical
education” reveals that medical practioners and educators understand empathy’s
importance. People are aware of empathy’s important role in medical practice.
However, I think there is a preference for the mechanical and technical in medical
training, even though people enter the profession because they have a passion for caring
for the sick and understand empathy’s importance. That is not to say the mechanical and
technical training are not extremely important. Obviously, technical and mechanical
training are important. People come to their nurse, physician, nurse practioner, and
physician assistant for help in times of need and expect their medical professional to
know the mechanics of the body. When staff are faced with difficult end of life situations

August 2, 2016.) James Plumb, M.D., M.P.H, is a professor of family and community medicine at Jefferson
Medical College. Plumb provides a footnote for his quote with a link to an interview on the American
Association of Medical College (AAMC) newsroom web page. The interview is no longer available on the
AAMC web page.
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where there is disagreement—situations in which family are terrified, angry, or
hopeless—there might be a tendency to fall back on technical training, regardless of the
presence or lack of empathy training in medical school. The thought process of a medical
staff member might go something like this: “If the family simply understood more about
the specifics of the injury and the likelihood that the brain will heal, then they will make
the more sensible decision.” To enter into and care for the family in their distress is scary
and difficult to do even for those trained to provide therapeutic listening and support. As
a chaplain, I have had a hard time dealing with family’s distress depending on the flow of
the workday, how I feel at a particular point with my own life, and the specifics of the
case. However, to be human is to experience this type of distress. Medical staff are
trained and have a professional role, but they must also embody their role to be human
and to be present to the family’s pain. Even though technical training is important,
embodying their role to be human is foremost. The more one tamps down one’s emotions
the more one is operating outside of oneself and are not being human with the family that
is in distress.47 As we will eventually see in the final chapter, to counterbalance the

Daniel Siegel’s understanding of the mind supports this claim. There are three main elements to
his definition of the mind. 1) Experiences—both intra- and interpersonal—shape the internal structures of
the brain. 2) “A core aspect of the human mind is an embodied an relational process that regulates the flow
of energy and information within the brain and between brains. 3) The mind is the result of the relationship
between “internal neurophysiologic processes and relational experiences,” thus the mind emerges out of the
interaction of these two dynamics. Attachment theory is the lens through which he interprets how our
relational experiences shape our brain, thus the mind. The central thrust of Siegel’s use of attachment is that
one’s early relationship with one’s caregivers shapes both one’s interpersonal experiences in adulthood and
the development of the pathways and structure of one’s brain. The development of attachment is, therefore,
a significant part of the mind. Based the patterns of communication and emotional sharing one can develop
secure or insecure attachment patterns. Emotions are the central dynamic of attachment and the formation
of the mind for Siegel, and they “represent dynamic processes created within the socially influenced, valueappraising process of the brain.” Emotions are, therefore, the building blocks of the brain’s
neurophysiology and the relationships with one’s caregivers. Secure attachment reflects an ability to
integrate or hold together the complexities of one’s experiences with little accompanying stress, respond to
new and novel stimuli with flexibility, and an awareness non-conscious and conscious emotion. Siegel,
Developing Mind, 3-7, 93, 148.
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technical medical training requires guidelines that overemphasize empathy. For now, we
will continue our history of how emotions have played a role in western thought and why
we need empathy.

Loving My Neighbor Is Loving Myself
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.) 48 and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 C.E.) begin to
make a case for the role of love and friendship in relationship to morality. I will highlight
portions of their respective paradigms for two reasons. First, Aristotle and Aquinas have
a particular way of constructing neighbor love. Along similar lines to Mark 12:30-31,
“Thou shalt love the Lord thy God…thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,” they argue
for loving the neighbor because the neighbor is another self. We love, honor, and respect
the neighbor because they are another version of us. The two do not agree on whom we
should love and consider a friend, but they both justify loving others because the other is
another self. Second, when discussing the relationship between friendship and love,
Aristotle and Aquinas highlight the role that emotions play in our relationship with our
neighbor. Aristotle notes three kinds of friendships and lands on mutual love as the most
virtuous form of friendship. Aquinas pushes this further and argues that mercy and love
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I will not discuss Plato here, though his thinking was equally as influential. In my interpretation,
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are the foundational virtues for our lives and how we relate to our neighbor. Later on in
history, David Hume (1711-1776) and Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), will continue
to emphasize the role emotions play in relationship to one’s neighbor through
approbation and compassion respectively.
Aristotle
Aristotle’s interpretation of friendship is our entry point into his philosophy. One
cannot ignore the context in which he writes and the classical Greek philosophies he
inherited. Aristotle was a member of the elite class, was a tutor for Alexander the Great,
and his philosophy reflects a hierarchical society. Nonetheless, his reflections on
friendship are important for our understanding of neighbor love in the early history of
philosophy.49
In books VIII and IX of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle discusses the nature of
friendship. Immediately he defines friendship and its importance for individuals in
society.
For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods.
… Those in the prime of life it stimulates to noble actions—‘two going together’
[Iliad X. 224]—for with friends men are more able to both think and act. …
Friendship seems too to hold states together, and lawgivers to care more for it
than for justice … and the truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly
quality.50
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First, friendship is one of the goods in life, even in the presence of great wealth
and power. One needs to understand the distinction here in Aristotle between the good
and the “other goods” of which he speaks in this quote. The other goods are material
goods one can acquire in life and not a reference to the highest good, which is
contemplative wisdom.51 Second, he notes how humans are better able to think and act
when they are in the company of friends. He elaborates this second point when he talks
about love and the different kinds of friendship, but here he is clear that friendship
stimulates and inspires one to a noble and virtuous life.52
Further specifying the nature of friendship, Aristotle claims there are three types
of friendships based on three objects of love. The question is posed in the form of how
people love and what they love: “Do [humans] love, then, the good, or what is good for
them?” Concluding that all humans love what seems good to themselves, there are three
grounds on which people love: the love of lifeless objects to which the term “friendship”
is not applied, the love or goodwill wished to other humans that is not reciprocated, and

Ibid., X 1177a 1-20. The first sentence of the Nicomachean Ethics touches on the good: “every
art and every discipline, and similarly every action and rational choice, is thought to aim at some good; and
so the good has been aptly described as that at which everything aims.” The first statement assumes
Aristotle’s metaphysical biology, which is that nature has created humans, as distinct from animals, with a
purpose or telos.” See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,
2007), 148. There is also a distinction between good and highest good in Aristotle. An action is judged
virtuous depending how close it is to the divine activity or the highest good. All humans pursue the same
pleasure for all things have by nature something divine and the highest good in them. Something is good
for Aristotle when it is most complete (we pursue a good only for its own sake, like happiness) and selfsufficient (makes a life choice worthy and lacking nothing all on its own). Happiness is the thing most of
all worth choosing, and there are two kinds of happiness: one that is simply human (practical
virtue/happiness) and complete happiness (divine contemplation). The latter form of happiness helps direct
the former for Aristotle. See John E. Hare, God and Morality: A Philosophical History (Oxford: WileyBlackwell, 2009), 50
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then true love where there is a mutual exchange of feelings between people. The highest
form of love is one of mutuality where there is a choice to equally exchange feelings
between people. This is not a version of contemporary altruism by any means, but it does
demonstrate that love is at the root of friendship for Aristotle. True love, a mutual love,
involves a choice to love, for Aristotle. People can have feelings of love for anything,
even a lifeless object, for example, but deciding to love another stems from someone’s
character.53
Corresponding to the three main kinds of love are three forms of friendship:
mutual, utility, and pleasure. That latter two, in Aristotle’s eyes, occur when people
pursue a relationship for what is useful (utility) or pleasant (pleasure) for them.54 Only
the first form of friendship is true friendship for Aristotle. For the first form of friendship,
Aristotle uses the term good or virtuous. Good and virtuous people find themselves in the
first category because they are good in and of themselves and wish good for the other
person as well. True friendships, as friendships between good and virtuous people, are
enduring. They are not based on a temporary quality (utility or pleasure) but on a
permanent quality of goodness and virtue, and for Aristotle, good is a constant and static
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quality.55 Aristotle goes into many different distinctions and relationships between the
various kinds of friendship, but the main thread is that true friendship is something that is
“of the good,” and it is only when both parties in the friendship are virtuous and good can
there be true friendship.
For Aristotle, one is related to one’s virtuous friend as oneself, or put another
way, one’s friend is another self. One wishes for oneself to live and be preserved,
experience what is good, live with oneself in pleasure, contemplate the good, grieve and
rejoice, and to have harmonious opinions.56 After all, people love and have friendship for
what is good for them. Since one wishes these good things for oneself, and the friend is
another self, one wishes these things for one’s friend as well. It seems he is saying that
one ought to love the self above others, and this is correct, but he places an important
qualification on the love of the self: a good man ought to love the self. Evil men, per
Aristotle, will love themselves more and will only “assign to themselves the greater share
of wealth as though they are the best of all things.”57 A good man, however, will be a
lover of the self and will also be a lover of others: “for he will both himself profit by
doing noble acts and will benefit his fellows.”58 There is a branching out beyond the self
in Aristotle. Fellows here include the immediate family (though Aristotle talks about
greater regard for the father) and friends, with the latter understood broadly.59 The love of
the self finds its truest expression in the love of others outside of the self.
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For a moment, let us look past Aristotle’s claim that mutual love and friendship
can occur only between two virtuous people—people being defined as men, educated,
and able to live a leisurely life. I understand the error in this, but I want to briefly point
out how emotions impact morality for Aristotle. Aristotle stresses the importance of
correct love in forming relationships between people and for the sake of the city. The
virtuous life depends on the right kind of love and friendship. Though Aristotle’s claims
do not directly state that love impacts how people make moral claims, he does claim that
love impacts the moral life. Love and friendship impact the virtuous life and the life of
the city. In terms of neighbor love, Aristotle clearly argues that the neighbor is another
self, and what one wants for oneself one also wants the same for one’s neighbor. When
we love our neighbor, we love them as we love ourselves. However, given the cultural
landscape I laid out in the introduction, can we say the neighbor is another version of the
self? No. Aristotle only takes us so far in his claim that love is part of the mutual
exchange of love between friends. Our neighbor—the family’s encounter with the
medical team—is not another self and needs to be loved in a unique way, a love that sees
the neighbor honestly, truly, and holistically even when there is disagreement on what
should be done in difficult EOL cases. Aquinas will take us a bit closer to this goal in the
way that he stresses both the inter-subjective nature of love and the importance of loving
someone even if they do not share the same view of the good. Even though he will still
claim the neighbor is another version of ourselves, the claim that we have a shared
experience with the neighbor takes us closer to seeing the neighbor as unique. Even
though we will not agree with how the neighbor defines and pursues the good, we still
ought to love them.
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Aquinas
For our purposes, Aquinas’ views on charity and mercy are the most fruitful for
our discussion. 60 Aquinas’ Summa Contra Gentiles will be considered where
appropriate, but the majority of the focus will be on his Summa Theologica II-II,
questions 23-33. As Aquinas moves through the internal (joy, love, and mercy) and
external (beneficence, alms deeds, and fraternal connection) qualities of charity, mercy is
one of the internal qualities where we find support for the ways in which emotions impact
moral claims in relationship to one’s neighbor, as well as how the neighbor is another
version of the self.
First, we will focus on mercy. Mercy for Aquinas is a person’s compassion or
suffering heart at the sight of another’s suffering: “I answer that, as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei ix, 5), mercy is heartfelt sympathy for another's distress, impelling us to succor
him if we can. For mercy takes its name misericordia from denoting a man's
compassionate heart (miserum cor) for another's unhappiness.” 61 More importantly,
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I will pass over many thinkers after Aquinas. Martin Luther, for example, stressed loving the
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however, is the inter-subjective connection Aquinas notes in expressions of mercy
towards another. The primary reason one takes pity or has mercy on another is because of
a defect in the self. Defect here must be understood in terms of Aquinas’ understanding
of happiness and unhappiness. The Latin defectus is similar to the current modern English
definition: “a failing, a failure, a lack, disappearance, a weakness.”62 In context of
discussing mercy, Aquinas understands a defect to be something that is left wanting, thus
in some translations of the Summa Theologiae one sees “want” and in others one sees
“defect.” One can understand defect or want as one seeing unhappiness or suffering in
another that resonates or connects with unhappiness of suffering in the self. The
resonance between the self and another occur because one’s friend is another self. When
one loves another in true friendship, or another is the object of charity, one looks upon
that other person as the self and will grieve when the other grieves and rejoice when the
other rejoices.63
Second, we will look at Aquinas and charity. Like Aristotle, Aquinas suggests
that seeing the neighbor as another self creates love for the other, though, unlike
Aristotle, Aquinas ties neighbor love to sin, grace, and a strong sense of the imago dei in
all people. A brief note about Aquinas’ use of the word charity is in order. The word

4925-4927. Mercy occurs in response to a variety of situations, but it is in response to suffering something
against one’s will. It follows that if one wills one’s evil then it is not deserving of mercy. There are three
degrees, so to speak, of mercy. First, humans have a natural appetite to live and be well, thus mercy is felt
if someone suffers something that makes the sick and disheartened. Second, humans have the ability to
choose their happiness, and mercy is felt if one suffers evil by chance. Third, humans wish for a thing,
such as being good, and mercy is felt for such individuals who are met by nothing but evil.
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Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part II-II, Kindle Locations 4958-4960: “I answer that, Since pity
is grief for another's distress, as stated above (A. 1), from the very fact that a person takes pity on anyone, it
follows that another's distress grieves him. And since sorrow or grief is about one's own ills, one grieves or
sorrows for another's distress, in so far as one looks upon another's distress as one's own.”
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translated as “charity” is the Latin caritas. Caritas does not refer to modern English
notions of charity as giving to the poor or those in need. More properly, caritas, is
understood as “love,” the Latin equivalent of the Greek word agape. “Charity,” therefore,
refers to the act of love or a loving interpersonal dynamic between people the source of
which is God.
In question twenty-five Aquinas analyzes the relationship between the self and
others by considering whether charity stops at God or extends to the neighbor. The belief
one should direct their charity to the neighbor in addition to God is quickly affirmed;
charity unites us to God, thus charity toward the neighbor is also charity directed to
God.64 Aquinas goes on to state one ought to love sinners and one’s neighbor, but one
also ought to love the self. In article six, countering a belief that one should only love and
associate with those who are virtuous,65 Aquinas cites Augustine and claims one ought to
consider every person one’s neighbor, sinners do not lose their humanity in sinning, and
so one should love sinners and enemies. Simultaneously Aquinas asks if one should love
oneself out of charity. Contrary to the claims that people are labeled blameworthy for
loving themselves, he cites both the Hebrew (Leviticus 19:18) and Christian (Mark
12:11) scriptures that one should love the neighbor as the self.66 Having already

64
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concluded that one loves sinners and neighbors out of charity, and because we both find
our highest good in God, and we must love our own highest goods and others, it follows
that one must love the self out of charity as well; the self and the other are to be loved
equally. As Aristotle argued, we have a true friendship because we act toward that friend
as we act toward ourselves, thus for Aquinas love of the self is the “root and origin of
friendship.”67
How does the love of self and neighbor as charity relate to Aquinas’
understanding of virtue? For Aquinas, action is based in intention, which is highly
subjective.68 Wrapped up in intention are both the will and the intellect—the former
moving one to act or not and the latter deciding what the action will look like in pursuit
of the good. In order to pursue the good, one depends on one’s powers (intellect, will, and
natural appetites) to guide one to a particular end, in this case a posture of charity and
mercy. Continuing with virtues, Aquinas defines a virtue as “a certain perfection of a
power. Now a thing’s perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But the end of
power is act.” Charity is one of the virtues for Aquinas; therefore, charity results in the
perfection in regard to one’s end, which is ultimately God (as first cause and the end).
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In fact, charity is the principal virtue, there can be no genuine virtue without
charity, and charity is that which results in the perfection of one’s end (i.e., the good as
God).69 Loving God is the perfection of one’s end, and in acts of charity toward the
neighbor we also act with charity toward God. Given it is the root and foundation of
virtue, charity is what shapes the other virtues—creates dispositions and habits in the
person in order to cultivate the moral and intellectual virtues. Charity gives shape to the
intending, choosing, and acting that have their ends in happiness and the good, both
penultimate and ultimate well. The posture of love toward others is an example of
charity, and this love is directed toward those who are virtuous and un-virtuous because
one sees their common humanity.70 With a posture of love for others as fellow humans,
one will intend, through the will and the intellect, the good for oneself and the good for
the other.
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Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Part II-II, Kindle Locations 3406-3527. A detailed discussion of
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Summary
From Aristotle and Aquinas, we can begin to see how the emotions relate to
making moral claims, and how loving the neighbor was understood as loving another
version of ourselves. First, Aristotle claims that emotion and state of love create good
dispositions and habits in people if the love is the right sort of love. Though I agree with
Aristotle when he acknowledges the role that love and friendship play in creating a good
society, he does not go far enough in claiming the necessity of relationships between
people; they are a good thing and contribute to the good, but they are not absolutely and
ultimately necessary. He also does not go far enough in extending love and friendship to
all people. Regardless of one’s station in life or if one’s love for someone is not
reciprocated (e.g., the latter is one of Aristotle’s types of friendship described above), we
ought to love him or her and empathize with him or her.
Second, Aquinas states that love can serve as the foundation of relationship with
our neighbor and love is the foundation of all other virtues in life. Similar to my critique
of Aristotle, Aquinas does not take his neighbor love far enough in terms of the necessity
of the interpersonal relationship. Though I agree that we love God when we love our
neighbor, and we can experience the joys and distress of our neighbor as our own, we are
not determined by our social relationships for Aquinas.
What we can see in Aristotle and Aquinas is that we connect with the suffering
and experiences of our neighbor because they are another version of ourselves; this is
why we love them. We love them because the needs and hopes of the neighbor are a
version of our needs and hopes. However, if neighbors are to be loved honestly,
holistically, and truly as their own person, then loving them because they are another
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version of us does not work. In the EOL case in chapter four, we will see a variety of love
in how the medical team and family relate to each other. We will also learn how empathy
is necessary when our neighbor is not assumed to be another version of ourselves.
Sentimentalism and Beginning to Love the Neighbor as Neighbor
In the development of emotions, empathy, and their impact on moral claims, the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are crucial. David Hume and Arthur Schopenhauer
will be our focus from these centuries. Their thinking is important for two reasons. First,
David Hume comes onto the scene and continues the arguments of his mentor Francis
Hutcheson (1694-1746 C.E.) that the passions (i.e., emotions) are the foundation of how
humans decide whether an action or person is right/good or wrong/bad. Arthur
Schopenhauer is not grouped in the same philosophical school as Hume. However, he
makes the case for compassion as the foundation of and catalyst for our actions towards
our neighbor. In EOL cases, Hume and Schopenhauer’s claims are important for
understanding how a family’s emotions influence the decisions they make about their
loved one’s care plan. Second, in these centuries we begin to see a new kind of
distinction between self and other. Hume and Schopenhauer will no longer say we love
our neighbor because they are another self; our neighbor is worthy of love as a human
being, and the self and the object—be that a person or thing—are more differentiated
than they were in Aristotle and Aquinas. The growing distinction between another and
myself is part of the gap that empathy will play in the EOL of life. This is not to say that
any of the emotional dynamics named so far—love, friendship, compassion, mercy, and
benevolence—are not robust enough to fill the space between another and myself but that
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empathy helps us to more fully understand the thoughts and emotions of others. Through
empathy we are able to love the neighbor as they want to be loved.
David Hume
David Hume and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) represent the two main versions of
Enlightenment ethics: basing obligation to the other respectively in an emotional
response to specific circumstances and basing this response in rational, a priori
principles.71 As a sentimentalist, David Hume is in the former camp. Sentimentalists
make the case that ethics and morality are based in our emotions rather than in reason.
Hume makes some room for reason in making ethical decisions. Reason plays a role in
gathering and determining the facts of a situation, and once we have the facts before us,
reason has played its part and we must depend on our emotional reaction to the facts—
either approbation or disapprobation. Morality cannot only rely on reason and the facts of
a situation. Deciding whether something is right or wrong is closer to how we decide
whether something is beautiful; when we describe something as beautiful we rely on a
sense of approbation or disapprobation towards a particular thing/case/situation of
beauty. Our gut sense about the object of beauty is the reason we describe something as

Immanuel Kant places special importance on the a priori or “pure” part of moral philosophy. In
Kant's normative ethics, Kant draws heavily on observations and ideas about human nature. But both in his
normative works and in his foundational work, the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant makes
explicit that the supreme moral principle itself must be discovered a priori by the individual, through a
method of pure moral philosophy. By “pure” or “a priori” moral philosophy, Kant has in mind a philosophy
grounded exclusively on principles that are inherent in and revealed through the operations of an
individual’s reason. Ethics cannot be grounded in the phenomenal world or dependent on an external
source of authority, but must come from the pure noumenal, autonomous, and rational self. Immanuel
Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, eds. Mary Gregor and Jens Timmerman (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 4:444; and Critique of Practical Reason, eds. Mary Gregor and
Andrews Reath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 5:61.
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beautiful. A judgment about beauty is not achieved via a process of taking measurements
or relying on a list of facts about what counts as beautiful, per Hume.72
From this, in Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume explores “that
complication of mental qualities, which form that, in common life, we call Personal
Merit: we shall consider every attribute of the mind, which renders a man an object either
of esteem and affection [i.e., approbation], or of hatred and contempt [i.e.,
disapprobation].”73 One of these qualities that “renders a man an object of esteem [is]
benevolence towards one’s neighbor, tender sympathy with others, and a generous
concern for our kind and species.”74 Benevolence—as sympathy and concern for one’s
neighbor—is tied to a sentiment of approbation. Benevolence is approbation within
oneself towards those who embody it and it works as a catalyst within the self for
compassionate action.
As we look toward our difficult EOL ethics case and the need for empathy, Hume
has provided us with more of a direct connection between emotions and making moral
claims, as well as the normative claim that we, as humans, ought to be benevolent. Given
the role that emotions play in making moral claims, the process of making decisions in
clinical ethics should include not only discussion of the role that emotions play in clinical
ethical decisions, but also discussion of empathizing with the emotions of the family.
Emotions of the family members in our case impact how they make moral claims about
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their loved one in the hospital. Empathizing with the family would fall under Hume’s
understanding of benevolence: “A generous concern for [one’s] kind and species.” This is
a highly admirable quality, but Hume’s claim needs to be pushed further. Difficult EOL
ethics cases require greater nuance to the interpersonal encounter: how a caregiver can
have a generous concern for, to use Hume’s words, the specific distress and emotions of
someone in need. Hume speaks in generalities and there needs to be more differentiation
between the self and the one for whom one expresses “a generous concern.” Hume’s
benevolence is helpful in getting us a little closer to loving the neighbor in a unique and
honest way that honors the beautiful distinctness of the neighbor, but we simply need to
push benevolence further to get there.
Arthur Schopenhauer
In order to continue our journey to loving the neighbor in a specific way that
tends to their needs in a unique, honest, and holistic way, I will now turn to an oftenoverlooked moral philosopher: Arthur Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer was not satisfied
with Kant’s ethics, particularly the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.
Schopenhauer did not think a priori ethics made any sense for developing a foundation of
ethics. In fact, Kantian ethics pull any sort of foundation, to use Schopenhauer’s words,
out from under one’s feet:
By discarding any empirical basis of morals he rejects all inner, and even more
definitely all outer, experience. He therefore establishes his moral principle—and
to this I wish to draw attention—not on any demonstrable fact of consciousness.
… Human consciousness, as well as the whole external world, together with all
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the experience and facts therein, are swept from under our feet. We having
nothing on which to stand.75
According to Schopenhauer, human consciousness and human phenomena need to
play a role in ethics. If one removes all elements of human experience, consciousness,
thinking, and feeling, then one's proposal for ethical theory lacks any validity. After all,
one is doing moral reflection to form the moral life of people, so how does it make sense
to excise lived reality from ethical theory?
Schopenhauer wants ethics to explain and trace the varied behavior of humans.
Here he takes head on the issue of self-love and other-love, framing it as egoism and illwill versus loving-kindness and justice. Loving kindness and justice stem from a
complete lack of egoistic motives, and they are “the criterion of an action of moral
worth.”76 Compassion is one form of loving kindness is where all the criterion of moral
worth are fulfilled, for it is in acts of compassion that one is focused completely on “the
weal and woe of another . . . [and] requires that I am in some way identified with him.”77
Schopenhauer, however, avoids over-identification with another and a loss of the self in
compassion: “ . . . at every moment we remain clearly conscious that he is the sufferer,
not we; and it is precisely in his person, not ours, that we feel the suffering.”78 But what
does this add to the conversation on empathy and neighbor love? In empathy, it is
important to maintain a distinction between the feelings in the self and the other’s
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feelings. Schopenhauer stresses this distinction—a distinction that touches on loving the
neighbor as they want to be loved in their own unique and holistic way. He has taken
Hume’s benevolence and added differentiation between the self and the other.
Summary
There are some very clear and helpful threads in Schopenhauer and Hume’s
thinking that point to how neighbor love helps us to love the neighbor as they want to be
loved. In line with Hume’s locating of morality in the sentiments, benevolence, and
approbation, Schopenhauer critiques reason and a priori methods as the foundation of
ethics and stresses the importance of compassion and other-love as the ground of the
moral life. One can see this in his emphasis on compassion and connecting with the
suffering of other humans. We also see a crucial distinction taking shape in their
thinking: the distinction between the suffering of another and our own suffering. For
Schopenhauer in particular, we are identified with the suffering of others, but are at the
same time it is the suffering of others and not our own suffering. Hume does not make as
strong a statement as Schopenhauer. He does, however, draw a subtle line between the
subject and the object of approbation or disapprobation. Compared to the my-neighbor-isanother-me of Aristotle and Aquinas, Hume and Schopenhauer’s distinctions between
self and other demonstrate the recognition that there are differences between the self and
the neighbor. The needs and hopes of our neighbor may not be the same as our own.
Hume and Schopenhauer also make the case for emotion’s role in making moral claims.
It is our feelings of approbation and disapprobation towards something that impacts
whether we think something is right/good or wrong/bad. It is in our compassion—when
we are focused on the suffering of others in acts of loving kindness—that we find ethics.
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Feelings are part of how we make moral claims and act morally.
Specifically in difficult EOL ethics cases, when family members and loved ones
are experiencing a whirlwind of emotions around their critically ill loved one, feelings
will play a large part in how a family comes to a decision about what should be done.
This claim may sound too general and obvious, but I am simply trying to build a case for
the role that empathy needs to play in these difficult EOL cases. The degree to which
emotions impact making moral claims will be different for each person involved in the
case. However, if the medical team wants to practice neighbor love and empathy, they
need to take account of the specific emotional states of mind, needs, and hopes of the
family members.
Empathy: Loving the Neighbor as Neighbor
Where does empathy come into play? The concept of empathy entered intellectual
discourse in 1909 via Edward Tichner’s concept of einfühlung, grew in and out of favor,
and has found renewed interest in a variety of disciplines such as theology, psychology,
and philosophy.79 The rise of empathy and conversation around emotions and morality is
important for the same two reasons I gave at the beginning of the previous two sections in
this chapter: the role of emotions in morality and the way neighbor love gets constructed.
First, compared to our previous thinkers, the role of emotions in morality is elaborated
and deepened through the richness of Martin Hoffman’s psychology, Martha Nussbaum’s
philosophy, and Wolfhart Pannenberg’s theology. Especially in the former two, there is a
move beyond the simple assertion that emotions impact moral claims to the ways in
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which emotion impact community relationships and how we experience others’ emotions.
Second, related to the entrance of empathy on the scene, there is the realization that it is
difficult to understand the mental and emotional world of another.80 We cannot
assume—like Aristotle and Aquinas, and to a lesser extent, Hume and Schopenhauer—
that the other person is another version of me, and therefore it is easy to understand their
world. Given the importance that emotions play in moral claims and that we cannot
assume we understand the experience of others, empathy is necessary.
The contributions of Aristotle, Aquinas, Hume, and Schopenhauer in terms of
love, compassion, friendship, and benevolence are important in helping EOL cases with
divergent worldviews come to a resolution. Each in their own way demonstrates the ways
in which our emotions have an effect on what we think is right and wrong. Healthcare
workers also tend to be in their profession because they care deeply about their patients
and embody compassion and love when they care for the sick. However, in spite of this
deep care, there are times when the care team does not understand what the family is
going through. This is why empathy is required, especially in difficult EOL situations.
Not only can empathy help the medical team understand the family, but also it may help
the medical team introduce more affectivity into their care. Hoffman, Nussbaum, and
Pannenberg will demonstrate the continued importance of emotions for shaping moral
claims and how empathy is necessary to cultivate love of neighbor as they want to be
loved in these EOL cases. I will briefly introduce each of them here with an eye to
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chapter five where each of them get more complete treatment in dialogue with my case
study. My intent is not to give preference to psychology, theology, or philosophy. I want
to place them in dialogue with each other in a way that all three of them will help to
illuminate empathy’s role in helping difficult EOL ethics cases reach a resolution.

Psychology
Though there are many thinkers on which I could focus for psychology—such as
Daniel Baston, Heinz Kohut, or Carl Rogers—I want to focus on the thought of Martin
Hoffman and his work in empathy and moral development.81 In terms of the need for
empathy, Hoffman makes the case for responding to the distress of another as their
distress and not our distress; that is, we cannot love the neighbor completely if we love
them as another version of ourselves. In terms of my thesis, his arguments demonstrate
how empathy fosters neighbor love and pushes one not only to love another as thyself but
as the other him- or herself wants to be loved, as well as how empathy occurs in the
dialogue of care between and within the staff, families, and patients at the hospital.
His book Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring and Justice
was preceded by a key debate in moral developmental theory: the Kohlberg-Gilligan
controversy.82 Lawrence Kohlberg is one of the seminal figures in moral psychology.

Daniel Baston, “How Social an Animal: The Human Capacity for Caring,” American
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Kohlberg understands moral development as proceeding through a series of stages: preconventional, conventional, and post-conventional.83 At the same time as Kohlberg was
developing his theories, Carol Gilligan in Mapping the Moral Domain stressed that the
caring capacity is equally as important as Kohlberg’s definition of post-conventional.84
After the debate between universal justice orientations and care orientation in moral
development occurring in the 1980s, Hoffman develops his theory of moral development
that includes empathy, care, and justice.
Hoffman published his theory in 2001. He tends to the dialectic between care of
self and others in the development process in more affective ways than Kohlberg and
begins to shed light on how children eventually develop moral imagination. Empathic

generalized other in Kohlberg and concrete other in Gilligan. The generalized and concrete other
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distress and its development is Hoffman’s central concept. Empathy for Hoffman is the
“involvement of psychological processes that make a person have feelings that are more
congruent with another’s situation than one’s own.”85 Empathic distress, therefore,
involves psychological processes where another’s distress stirs up distress in us, but we
respond to and care for the other’s distress in a way that is congruent with the other’s
situation and not our own. Empathy is a central part of developing this ability to respond
to the distress of another. He elaborates on this distress and draws conclusions about
caring, community, and justice. Empathic distress goes through a series of stages where
he draws on object-relations theory. Tracing empathic distress from preverbal forms
through sophisticated attention to subtle emotions allows Hoffman to show how empathy
contributes to prosocial action. Prosocial action relates to moral internalization for
Hoffman, though he never states this explicitly. Moral internalization occurs when one
feels obligated to abide by one’s principles even when nobody is around, regardless of
external reward or punishment. Moral internalization, qua prosocial moral motive, is the
result of combining the process of empathic arousal with one’s principles. One constructs
one’s principles from a variety of places: caregivers, culture, and the social context. The
overall prosocial moral structure (i.e., prosocial action) consists of one’s internalized
principles (caring and justice principles), behavioral norms, rules, a sense of right and
wrong, and images of one’s acts that have helped or hurt others.86
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Hoffman’s theory of empathy teaches us how people struggle, despite the best
intentions, to experience another’s feelings and respond to their distress with prosocial
action. He outlines how this experience is possible, but he cautions that we cannot
assume our thoughts and feelings are an accurate reflection of another’s situation. We
may love them as ourselves as the golden rule and the gospel of Mark instruct us to do,
but it is difficult to move beyond our feelings and thoughts and love them as they want to
be loved. In addition to simply stressing the importance of empathy, Hoffman’s thought
will help us enrich empathy’s role in EOL consults through his principles of caring and
justice, as well as his detailed construction of how we develop our ability to empathize,
all of which will be elaborated in chapter five after the case study. Now, we turn to
philosophy and situate Martha Nussbaum in her discipline.

Philosophy
In direct and indirect ways, philosophers have reflected on empathy and neighbor
love in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.87 As one example, in Upheavals of
Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions Martha Nussbaum develops a cognitive theory of
emotions and compassion. Nussbaum continues the argument that our emotions not only
play a central role in how we make decisions about what is right and wrong (i.e., Hume)
but also deepen this claim; emotions and compassion have intrapersonal and
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I am going to neglect the line of thinking associated with David Caputo and deconstruction in
his book Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant Reference to
Deconstruction (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993). It is not that I think that postmodernist
ethics have nothing to offer my discussion. While I am providing normative guidelines for communities,
normativity always needs to remain open and flexible for the ways in which it supports injustice and
contributes to a rigid and static worldview.
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interpersonal implications related to the formation of community. Interpreting community
in this way also constructively updates Aristotle’s understanding of friendship as
“something that holds states together” and “stimulates to noble actions.”88 While both
argue for the role that interpersonal relationships play in civic life, Aristotle thought that
the best friendships were between two virtuous people. Nussbaum will argue we ought to
expand our understanding of community and relationship beyond class and cultural
boundaries. In terms of my thesis, her arguments affirm that empathy in ethics consults
fosters neighbor love; not only does empathy foster neighbor love but empathy is
required and pushes one not only to love another as oneself but as the other him- or
herself wants to be loved.
Nussbaum favors the concept of compassion over empathy. Compassion for
Nussbaum has three components: the suffering of another must be judged severe and not
trivial, we decide that the person does not deserve the suffering, and we see ourselves in
the goals, values, and beliefs of the person suffering. This last element might seem
selfish, but she frames it as related to vulnerability. One sees the other person as
vulnerable and in need and reaches out with compassion because one knows one’s own
neediness and vulnerability. She defines compassion as “a painful emotion occasioned by
the awareness of another person’s undeserved suffering.”89 Empathy falls short of this in
her interpretation, and relates only to the imaginative reconstruction in the self of
another’s good, bad, or neutral experience; one does this all the while maintaining the
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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VIII. 1155a 1-25.

Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 301, 315-319.
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distinction between the self and the other. Given this reduced definition of empathy, she
acknowledges its contribution to compassion, but prefers the concept of compassion to
empathy. Her definition of empathy is limiting. My interpretation and practice of
empathy includes a response to the distress of another through care. That is to say, my
definition of empathy is closer to how she defines compassion.
First, Nussbaum highlights the development of emotion. The development of
emotion relates to the struggle between the good-bad and shame-joy dynamic within the
self and the history of emotion in one’s life in connection to one’s caregivers.90 The
good-bad and shame-joy struggle refer to the ways in which people experience the world
as they grow and develop. Is the world a trustworthy place (good) or is it not to be trusted
(bad)? Does one feel a sense of shame or joy around their identity and their aspirations?
Second, the expansion of empathy, emotion, and compassion impacts the public sphere in
terms of the ways it contributes to building a community. Simply put, empathy and
compassion cultivate relationship and relationships help build community. For a western
liberal democracy, the dynamics of empathy (and compassion for Nussbaum) and
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These struggles and joys are what form morality, as we saw with the sentimentalists in the early
modern period. Jesse Prinz, already mentioned in the introduction, is a contemporary sentimentalist and
updates Hume’s theory in Emotional Construction of Morals (ch.1, n. 22). Per Prinz, because the basis of
moral philosophy lies in the sentiments and emotions, moral facts require the response of disapprobation or
approbation. As a critique of the categorical imperative, there is no universal law separate from human
experiences that one can call moral (Right does not exist separate from one’s response). These two
presuppositions lead Prinz to make three claims about the relationship between emotions and moral
judgments: emotions co-occur with moral judgments, emotions influence moral judgments, and emotions
are necessary for moral judgments. Though Prinz clearly favors the passions side of the reason-passion
debate carried forward from the Enlightenment period, he mentions very little about intersubjectivity and
the role of community in the moral reasoning process. He focuses his arguments on how the moral
decision-making process happens within individual bodies, brains, and minds. This lack of focus on
intersubjectivity and community are a deficit in his theory; the very argument he makes against the ability
of reason and rationality to independently guide someone through the moral decision making process could
be leveled against him for not giving credence to the communal nature of such decisions.
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interpersonal relationships contribute to a flourishing society.91 In order for our emotional
life to fully develop and for communities to flourish, empathy is necessary to bridge the
gap between people so that people can truly care for each other and help each other
flourish.
Theology
Hoffman highlighted how empathy helps us respond to the distress of our
neighbor through the lens of the neighbor and not our own, and Nussbaum argued that
emotions impact the development of our entire worldview and explained how empathy
(i.e., compassion) can create a flourishing society. We now move to theology. There are
many great theologians in the twentieth century: Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, Margaret
Farley, Jürgen Moltmann, and Emilie Townes, to name a few. Many of these authors
have focused on justice, ethics, and neighbor love in their writings. I will be focusing on
the thought of one theologian in particular: Wolfhart Pannenberg. He moves the
discussion into an area only briefly explored in the introduction, that is, how I think about
God’s presence and action in the midst of empathy. He elucidates and provides a
theological perspective on empathy that occurs in the dialogue of care between and
within the staff, families, and patients at the hospital where we can think of God as
present, moving people to love others as they want to be loved in the midst of diverse
ethical worldviews.

Benhabib states it in the following way: “Individuals do not have to view themselves as
encumbered selves. It is not necessary for them to define themselves independently either of the ends they
cherish or of the constitutive attachments, which make them what they are. In entering practical discourses
individuals are not entering the original position [of John Rawls]. They are not being asked to define
themselves in ways that are counterfactual to there every day identities, and individuals do not stand behind
a veil of ignorance.” Benhabib, Situating the Self, 73.
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When thinking theologically about empathy, it is important to be in dialogue with
the human sciences. Wolfhart Pannenberg’s methodology reflects this approach,
especially in his Anthropology in Theological Perspective. Pannenberg develops his
anthropology through the concepts of human becoming, exocentricity, centrality, and
basic trust of social relationships. Social relationships and the accompanying emotions
are central to the interpretation of the imago dei for Pannenberg. The core of his
anthropology addresses loving oneself, loving the neighbor, and loving God as part of
being human and the imago dei; this is grounded in the premise that “the existence of
human individuals is determined by social relations.”92
I will briefly summarize how he arrives at this claim and expand on it later. He
begins with a “methodological abstraction” in order to clearly articulate “the main
structural features of the human form of existence with its centrality and exocentricity.”93
This is how God the creator created humans. Centrality is the inability of humans to step
outside of themselves and reflect on their feelings, thoughts, and actions; people remain
focused only on themselves. Exocentricity is the ability to be open to the experiences of
others and to step outside of oneself and one’s experience. These two concepts are at the
heart of how people relate to, and thus empathize with each other. It is in moments of
exocentricity that we are able to love our neighbor honestly, truly, and as a unique
person. I will argue that centrality illuminates the struggle for empathy and exocentricity
illuminates the possibility of empathy in EOL situations. Pannenberg then turns his
attention more explicitly to a consideration of centrality and exocentricity in light of the
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“social context of human behavior.” The social context and its relationships is a place
where people experience God and their full personhood. He particularly wonders, “is the
social world perhaps the place where [humans] exocentric destiny is achieved and
therefore also the place where their identity as subjects and persons is established?”94
Pannenberg boldly pushes forward to make the case that “the I, or ego, does not simply
stand as an independent entity over against the Thou . . . rather, the ego proves to be
dependent on its social context for the determination of its identity.”95 God created
humans to be in relationship and one’s identity is only fully realized in relationship with
others.
In, under, and through this social context—for us the family, the medical team,
and the hospital—we can think of God as present calling us to greater empathy with those
in distress. Pannenberg’s ideas will help illuminate why it is that people struggle to
empathize and why empathy is a natural part of being human, our struggle with centrality
and exocentricity.96 It is the dynamic of centrality and exocentricity within all of us that
hinders us and allows us to be open to the needs and distress of another and cloud that
distress—love our neighbor as they want to be loved and not love them as ourselves.
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Mark Maddix also places the psychology of Martin Hoffman in conversation with theology. He
makes a theological claim about the relationship between empathy and justice. Drawing on the theology of
Charles Wesley in the Wesleyan tradition, Maddix claims that God transforms in the inner affections as the
means of moral formation. I note him here to shed light on another theologian that found theological
resonance in the psychology of Hoffman. See Mark Maddix, “Unite the Pair so Long Disjoined: Empathy
and Justice in Moral Development Theory,” Christian Education Journal 8, no. 1 (2011): 46-63.
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Looking Ahead
Hoffman, Nussbaum, and Pannenberg develop their paradigms as part of a long
history of thinking on empathy and emotions. Hoffman provides insight into the ways in
which people care for one another during times of distress, Nussbaum highlights how
emotion is part of the fabric of our society and how it can contribute to human
flourishing, and Pannenberg both stresses that God created us in such a way that we are
determined by our social relationships and that we experience God’s love through these
relationships. Though all three share a great deal with Aristotle, Aquinas, Hume, and
Schopenhauer, these three will be the focus from this point forward.
These contemporary thinkers have continued arguments from the past on the
importance of emotion, and added new flavors with the ways in which they support the
need for empathy. First, the emotions and the affective life provide a foundation for how
we respond to the distress of others and how we develop our worldview as a place of trust
or mistrust. Second, emotions and empathy are not only part of how we develop a
worldview, but they are also part of how we develop relationship and build community.
Third, loving our neighbor in such a way that honors their unique and distinct personhood
is how I define loving the neighbor as they want to be loved. We cannot assume the other
is another version of ourselves; not only is it important to understand others as distinct
from ourselves, but also empathy is required to bridge this divide. Fourth, we can think of
empathy and loving the neighbor as they want to be loved as the presence of God. From
his theological vantage point, Pannenberg states that we are created by God and created
in such a way that we are determined by our social relationships. Not only are we
determined by these relationships, but the trust, love, and care we experience in these
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relationships is God working through and within creation. Further, because we are
determined by these relationships God also calls us to this life of empathy. As we are
empathized with so to we must empathize with others.
Hoffman’s, Nussbaum’s, and Pannenberg’s insights into empathy and neighbor
love will be the heart of the practical moral reasoning move. In the practical moral
reasoning move, I will be interpreting these insights and then defining empathy so as to
construct normative guidelines for hospitals in difficult EOL ethics situations that
overemphasize empathy. As the reader can imagine, this is because of what I interpret to
be a lack of empathy in clinical ethics and EOL care.
Before arriving at that move, we first need to make a couple of stops:
methodology and the descriptive move. The methodology proposed in the next chapter
will act as a template for interpreting the rich paradigms of our three aforementioned
thinkers. The methodology may add another layer onto an already dense group of
theorists, but it is necessary that we take a journey through method because it is how I
will be interpreting the thinkers in the practical moral reasoning move. I want the reader
to be aware of my methodology. There is indeed a method to my madness, at least this
time. If the reader takes nothing else away from the following chapter on methodology,
the reader should heed the section titled “intercultural practical moral reasoning” (IPMR).
My methodological musings on practical moral reasoning are the heart of the template I
will use in chapters five through seven aptly named the intercultural practical moral
reasoning move chapters.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY: REVISED FUNDAMENTAL PRACTICAL THEOLOGY
My methodology, revised fundamental practical theology, is made up of Don
Browning’s fundamental practical theology tempered with Emmanuel Lartey’s
intercultural pastoral theology. The structure of Browning’s fundamental practical
theology is four-fold: descriptive theology, historical theology, systematic theology, and
strategic theology with practical wisdom influencing each part of the process. Within this
structure, there is a strong emphasis on theological ethics in the middle two sections.
Browning’s focus on ethics and his movement from description, to reflection, and lastly
to strategy is well suited for my purposes of exploring empathy and an ethic of neighbor
love in order to provide normative guidelines of practice for communities. Lartey’s focus,
as I hinted at in the introduction, is on intercultural pastoral theology. He takes into
account the global context in which theologians do their work and how, in the midst of
this global context, purveyors of care need to account for the Other and listen to the needs
of the Other. Browning’s practical moral reasoning is sometimes detached from lived
reality, and Lartey’s attention to the Other will help connect Browning’s practical moral
reasoning to a lived reality such as the case study of the following chapter.
Practical Theology
There are many methodologies from which one could choose when analyzing the
ways in which empathy cultivates neighbor love in EOL ethics consults. Why did I
70
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choose practical theology? EOL ethics consults and clinical ethics are inherently
practical: the medical team and family work through a decision making process, there is
attention to the day to day observations of the patient’s condition, and the lifestyle and
quality of life implications of particular plans of care are considered. As a chaplain
concerned with empathy’s role in EOL ethics consults, I find that practical theology
provides a framework to explore this. Practical theology focuses on a rich description of
practices, relationships, beliefs, and values. We will see this in the descriptive move of
chapter four’s composite case about an EOL situation in a hospital.
Given that practical theology provides good scaffolding, what must practical
theology accomplish in this dissertation? In answering this question, we will begin to
understand some of my revisions to Don Browning’s practical theology. First, practical
theology must begin with the practice of people and communities; practices and the lives
of people must be a starting place for theological reflection. Not only does there need to
be a framework that favors practices, but there needs to be a rich description of
practice—in my case, an EOL ethics consult or patient story. Narrative detail of people’s
lives is important and any methodology that does not attend to narrative detail is not
adequate. The description of practices is not the place to include sociological,
philosophical, or theological interpretations of what one is describing because these can
place a pre-existing framework on the narrative of a community. Second, practical
theologies must incorporate the divine reality along with the social sciences. I adhere to
an interdisciplinary model of the revised critical correlational method. 97 I will say more
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Historically in the United States there has been a division in practical theology between
correlational and transformative methodologies. The former, to which I adhere, sees the dialogue between
theology and the social sciences as a mutual dialogue. The latter views the dialogue as one of asymmetrical
unity with theology having ultimate influence. For a good summary see Richard Osmer, Practical
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about this method below in the IPMR move. For now it is important to note that in
correlational methodology, when approaching a question such as “how does empathy
play a role in EOL ethics consults?” one turns to the social sciences and theology for
understanding the issue or question and treats these disciplines as equals. I will
incorporate the questions and answers of the social sciences and theology equally as I
explore this question. My Lutheran theology provides some insight into what I mean by
“the divine reality.” Lutheran Eucharistic theology focuses on the real presence of God in
the elements of bread and wine. Neither are the bread and wine transformed into the body
and blood of Christ, nor is there a mere spiritual presence with the bread and wine. The
bread and wine remain bread and wine, and they are the body and blood. In all of my
practical theological or social scientific musings, I understand God as presence. I see the
social sciences and theology as description, interpretation, and exploration of God’s
world. In all of these descriptions, interpretations, and explorations God is present. The
experiences and interpretations of those experiences are not transformed into the divine
nor are they merely materialist. They are inherently sacred and God is present because
God is part of, connected to, and reflected in creation.98 Third, normativity has a place in

Theology: An Introduction (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdman’s Publishing Company, 2008), 160173.
98
My theological claim comes from many sources but primarily from my interpretation of natural
law supported by Pannenberg. Parenthetical citations refer to the volume and page number of Pannenberg’s
systematic theology. First, Thomas Aquinas is the father, so to speak, of natural theology. Natural law is
part of the divine providence since it is given by God. There is an internal law of the universe, and this
eternal law is what rationally orders creation and the world. It is this the turn a law that rationally orders
creation that is natural law. Humans participate in this eternal law by which God rationally orders the
universe. Because of humankind’s participation in the eternal law, natural law is part of practical rational
thinking. Given this, humans are both bound by natural law and natural law can be known by all humans.
Humans are bound by natural law because we participate in the eternal law that rationally orders creation
and naturally directs humans’ pursuit of the good and the trajectory towards the good. Second, Pannenberg
wants to rework the traditional understanding of natural law. “By nature, from creation, God, the God of
the apostolic gospel (Rom 1:19-20), is known to all people” (1:107). For Pannenberg, this is a statement
made about us in light of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. He is trying to reinterpret one of the
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foundational natural theology biblical texts as a combination of revelation and echoes of stoic natural law—
a both/and approach; natural law is imputed to us externally and internally. Aquinas felt God was mediated
by the things of the world via the senses and we are implanted innately with such knowledge; Luther and
Melanchthon emphasized that there is an inborn rather than acquired knowledge of God because of their
mistrust of human reason. And though Paul’s text has space for an innate and acquired (experience and
rational reflection) knowledge of God, the Romans passage seems to show a preference for the innate.
Given this innate knowledge, how does one explain human action and choices? Pannenberg says it in the
following way: “From the life of feeling in which it is rooted there develops in the conscience a
nonthematic relation to the totality of life in which subject and object—world, God, and self—are as yet
undifferentiated. This type of feeling and feelings corresponds to the estatic rootage of the early individual
development of the child in a symbiotic sphere which in the first weeks of life binds the child to its mother
(and the world at large) without any conscious distinction from the mother. In the emotional life the
symbiotic relation to the world in the early stages of individual life finds a kind of continuation.
Differentiation of the at first undistinguished dimensions of God, world, and self is a product of the
cognitive development of the child, of experience of the world and reflection on it, though a nonthematic
self-relation is present already in the quality of feelings as desire or non-desire. … Only with the process of
cognitive development and differentiation may objects of trust be distinguished, and choice becomes
possible (1:112-113). Pannenberg believes that once we are able to differentiate between subject and
object—world, God, and self—we can become aware of God: “Only in the process of experience, as we
achieve distinct knowledge of finite things and the finitude of the self, do we attain to an express awareness
of the gods and God” (1:114). In terms of Luther’s exposition of the first commandment, only with
experience do we learn what true objects of trust are, i.e., what it means to have a God. The non-thematic
awareness of God can lead to “false gods,” but experience thematizes the non-thematic and we can make a
proper distinction. Through the non-thematic and thematic experience of creation, all people know God;
this is both innate in a non-thematic way and becomes thematized because this sense is ultimately “the
religious experience of God by means of a sense of the working and being of God in creation” (1:117).
Pannenberg is, therefore, afraid that natural law, because natural law was equated with the eternal triune
God that orders creation rationally, will limit God and denies freedom to the gospel message and the gospel
itself. Thinking of God at work in creation is crucial, but we cannot limit the workings of God to our
understanding of the natural order. The essence of God for Pannenberg is Trinity, and the Trinity is love, a
love resonating in the relationship of the son, father, and Holy Spirit. Thus, when it comes to natural law
and God’s will for the world, Pannenberg sees this as love. God’s will and essence are love. Love is what
spontaneously breaks open the world to creative potentialities and new possibilities. The natural law of the
universe for Pannenberg is love, and not a rationally ordered creation in which humans participate based on
their pursuit of the good. One should pursue the good through the spontaneous fruits of the spirit, the
spontaneity with which God enlivens creation (3:80-95). God’s enlivening, so to speak, of creation takes
place via a process of dual causation. I am positing the existence of God as the energy and/or substance of
our universe on both micro- and macroscopic levels. Using a theory of bottom-up and top-down causation,
one can think of God as enlivening the universe with love. God is active on the particle level up to the
whole person and community in such a way that breaks open the world to the possibilities of love (2:115116, 193-197). The reverse is also true. God is part of larger systems that cascade from the top down to
immerse people and communities in love. Enlivening creation is the dual causation process that pushes
people to love the neighbor. See Nancey Murphy and Warren S. Brown, Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?:
Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2007); Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, trans. Geoffry Bromiley, 3
vols. (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdman’s Publishing Company, 1991-1997); and Mark Murphy,
"The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/natural-law-ethics/.
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practical theology. Practical theologies cannot stop at description and interpretation.
These moves must point to what should be or ought to be the case in a given context. In
this dissertation, I will not stop at a description of an EOL case and my interpretation of
empathy’s role in that case. I have already stated that empathy should be part of EOL
consults, and I will push this further and provide normative guidelines for making
empathy a regular practice in EOL consults.
The methodology in this chapter addresses these three accomplishments, so to
speak, for practical theology. I will parse out my methodology in the following way.
First, I will summarize Lartey’s intercultural model that will soften, in my interpretation,
the rationalism of Browning’s model. I present Lartey first so that the reader will carry
his focus on the Other into my revisions of Browning’s model that I call “revised
fundamental practical theology.” Second, I will describe this revised model. My revised
model will carry Lartey’s focus on the Other and will have descriptive, intercultural
practical moral reasoning, and strategic moves. The reader should focus her or his energy
on the intercultural practical moral reasoning move, because it is with this move that I
will interpret Hoffman, Nussbaum, and Pannenberg in chapter five.
Lartey’s Intercultural Model
Lartey draws on the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas to bring attention to the
Other and adds his own interpretation of context. For Lartey contexts are always a
melding of experience and inherited philosophies. The latter speaks to how people are
molded and shaped by the worldview, social norms, and relationship patterns of place
into which they are born. The former speaks to how experience can reframe and alter the
norms of a given context. Lartey adds a focus on the voice and experience of the Other to
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Browning’s model. In focusing on the Other, we can let the Other’s feelings and thoughts
stand on their own—in my words, love them as they want to be loved by walking
alongside them. With these thoughts in mind I will explain Lartey’s intercultural
paradigm as he describes it in Pastoral Theology in an Intercultural World.
Pastoral Theology as Contextual Theology
At the outset, Lartey claims, “Contextual analysis can be understood as a way of
discerning and seeking to hear what God may be saying out of the different exigencies of
the human condition in different contexts.”99 The accent is on hearing or listening to
another voice or context and not speaking at or to that context so as to silence it. Though
he describes what pastoral theology is in Western and non-Western contexts, various
contexts of pastoral theology that are non-Western are explored to highlight what God
might be saying in different contexts.100 Cultural, political, economic, and religious
factors are considered in individual, communal, contemporary, and historical ways as
well as how the former factors interact in diverse ways through the latter.
According to Lartey, there are three different processes at work as one explores
pastoral theology in different contexts: globalization, internationalization, and
indigenization. These terms represent a continuum moving from very little to greater
acknowledgement of the value of non-Western pastoral theologies. Globalization is an
economic term, but theological globalization occurs when models and practices of
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The Western and non-Western is a dichotomy practical theology, and all other fields of
religious and non-religious inquiry, can do without. Defining various practical theologies as non-Western
always defines them in relation to a Western worldview instead, as Lartey seeks to accomplish, letting them
speak on their own terms. I would prefer Anglo- and European American to Western.
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Western pastoral theology are “imported” into other countries with little or no change in
their function.101 Internationalization takes places when Western and non-Western
theologies are in conversation with each other while pastors and theologians try to
develop a pastoral theology that is more authentic for a particular context. There is equal
regard for both types of pastoral theology as creative approaches are sought for the nonWestern context.102 Indigenization, as the last item in the continuum, attends to the nonWestern context to the greatest degree. Western theological and social scientific
paradigms are jettisoned in favor of local practices focused on healing for individuals and
communities. As contextual pastoral theology is sought, theologians need to be aware of
the Western influence (globalization and internationalization) and at the same time “to
press forward to touch those beliefs and practices that originate within the culture they
work.”103 Briefly—though Lartey elaborates in detail on Asian, African, Western, and
the Latin American contexts—some of the practices and beliefs in non-Western contexts
to which one needs to attend are as follows: Asian understandings of community, the self,
and goodness (i.e., hiya, jen, li); African spiritual ontology and relationality; and Latin
American colonization by and reinterpretations of Protestant and Roman Catholic
theology.104 The local and the global interact in any context, and as pastoral theology is
practiced in any context, it is embedded in and requires responses based on the political,
religious, and cultural context.
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Highlighting different cultural contexts of pastoral practice does not preclude
making claims about common human experience. Human experience, no matter what
context in which it takes place, has some commonalities and can speak across cultures.105
There is a balance in Lartey’s model between the otherness of another culture and the
common human experience: “However, the best way to do [contextual pastoral theology]
is to listen deeply, and with empathy and interpathy106, to the experiences of others from
distinctly different contexts without seeking to subsume them into their own.”107 As we
listen to the Other in their otherness, there is an intersubjective connection in our
common humanity across different cultures. It is to the concept of otherness to which we
now turn—a way to hold onto our common humanity in encounters with another but to
honor and let another culture speak at the same time.
Attention to context will be in the background as we move through the case study
and the three thinkers in the following two chapters. Lartey’s focus on context pushes the
medical team to attend to the context of the family, whatever it may be. What sort of
worldview is operative for the family? What is the story of their family up to this point?
When the medical team asks these sorts of questions of themselves, it will help them
empathize with the family.
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Lartey provides the following definition of interpathy: “David Augsburger coined the term
interpathy to refer to ‘an intentional cognitive envisioning and affective experiencing of another’s thoughts
and feelings, even though the thoughts rise from another process of knowing, the values grow from another
frame of moral reasoning, and the feelings spring from another basis of assumptions.’ (Pastoral Counseling
Across Cultures, Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1986, p. 29). This ‘other’ comes from another
culture, has a different worldview, and operates often with a different epistemology.” Ibid., 152. I do not
think it is necessary to come up with a different word than empathy when describing deep listening in
intercultural encounters.
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Pastoral Theology at Work in the World
Within the various contexts there are different models of pastoral theology at
work: classical-clerical, clinical-pastoral, and communal-contextual.108 To these three
Lartey adds a fourth newly emergent model: intercultural. Similar to the communalcontextual model, the intercultural model expands the community to the global
community. In the global intercultural community, there are many voices speaking and
needing to be heard. More important, however, is resisting totalizing pastoral theology
models and favoring plurality, fragmentation, and pluriformity. This approach involves
listening to and speaking from many different voices; it rejects both complete relativism
and utter absolutism.109 It is in the intercultural model and its pension for plurality that
Lartey finds a place to focus on the Other.
Lartey draws on Emmanuel Levinas to develop a philosophy of relationship in the
encounter with the Other. Levinas uses the terms Self and Other to define his paradigm.
Per Levinas, rather than trying desperately to know the Other like one knows the Self,
one should accept that one cannot and should not know the other.110 In fact, one desires to
protect the Other from the appropriation of the Self. Some sense of cultural distance and
epistemological humility are important in encounters with others. Lartey quotes Levinas:
The Other is in no way another myself participating with me in common
existence. The relationship with the other is not idyllic and harmonious
relationship of communion or sympathy through which we put ourselves in the
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Lartey provides a good summary of each of these models, but for a more complete summary,
one should look at David Patton, Pastoral Care in Context: An Introduction to Pastoral Care (Knoxville:
Westminster David Knox, 1993).
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other’s place; we recognize the other as resembling us, but exterior to us; the
relationship with the other is a relationship of Mystery.111
Lartey does not elaborate on the “resemblance,” but resemblances could be things
like recognizing the other as human, learning about cultural similarities or life
experiences, or maybe sharing a spiritual or religious tradition. Even though the Other
resembles the self, it is still an encounter of mystery. Encountering the mystery of the
Other puts the Self’s freedom and power into question, but it is the limiting of one’s
freedom that provides for experiences of truth and what Levinas calls ethics. Ethics
begins in an open dialogue with the other as one limits the Self and opens to one’s
obligation to the Other. Obligations are entertained because one is not trying to subsume
the other into the self.112 In dialogue grounded in ethics—ethics defined as obligation
and openness to the Other—one experiences truth. Experiencing truth as a dialogue with
the other acts against notions of truth discovered in isolation from others.
The medical team and family enter these dialogues of truth discovery—difficult
dialogues when people do not agree on what should be done. The medical team has and
feels an obligation to the family and their loved one. I would add an obligation of
openness to the Other. As a chaplain, for me it is important that the family is not
subsumed into the medical team and the family is allowed to stand on their own. The
medical team, including the chaplain, must seek to hear the values and beliefs of the
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This model seems to require a strong sense of self as well. Letting the Other be Other is not
merely about overly egoistic models of aggression directed at the Other. Without a strong sense of self, a
strong sense of the ego, one will not be able to treat another as Other for one will be too weak. There is just
as much danger as one becoming the Other as imposing the Self on the Other, both of which could happen
due to a lack of ego strength.
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family without molding those values and beliefs in the image of the medical team. As we
move into my revisions to Browning’s paradigm, Lartey’s focus on the Other will impact
not only how I revise his overall paradigm but also how I shape each of my moves.
Revised Fundamental Practical Theology
Theoretical Framework
Before we get to the specifics of my descriptive, IPMR, and strategic moves, we
need to frame Browning’s model and his reliance on practical moral reasoning. Three
central ideas drive Browning’s championing of practical moral reason: hermeneutics and
the overall dynamic of phronesis (practical moral reasoning)113; the outer envelope of the
visional dimension; and the inner core of the obligational and tendency-need
dimensions.114 First, hermeneutics constitutes the overall dynamic of the process, as
phronesis entails reinterpretation(s) of practice; I will say more about this in the section
below. Second, composing the outer envelope and the inner core, his process of practical
moral reason interprets the “fund of inherited narratives and practices. . . . Mediates
between our theories of the pre-moral good…[and] provides implicit or explicit theories

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI 7: “Prudence [phronesis] on the other hand is concerned
with the affairs of men, and with things that can be the object of deliberation. For we say that to deliberate
well is the most characteristic function of the prudent man; but no one deliberates about things that cannot
vary nor yet about variable things that are not a means to some end, and that end a good attainable by
action; and a good deliberator in general is a man who can arrive by calculation at the best of the goods
attainable by man. [7] Nor is Prudence a knowledge of general principles only: it must also take account of
particular facts, since it is concerned with action, and action deals with particular things. … And Prudence
is concerned with action, so one requires both forms of it, or indeed knowledge of particular facts even
more than knowledge of general principles. Though here too there must be some supreme directing
faculty.”
113
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and hierarchies about the pre-moral goods of life that must be morally organized.”115 The
outer envelope comprised of the visional dimension speaks to the core values of various
cultures and communities—the principles that define life and what are the goods of life.
The inner core of the obligational and tendency need dimension looks at how a
community decides what they are obligated to do in light of their principles and
definitions of the good. I will parse out the envelope and core in greater detail below. The
overall dynamic, outer envelope, and inner core can be seen as concentric circles moving
toward the inner core of practical reason. I will move through these in that order, but the
latter two will be elaborated in my IPMR.

Overall Dynamic: Hermeneutics
The overall dynamic of Browning’s phronesis relates to hermeneutics. There are
two main features to Browning’s hermeneutical paradigm: his use of Hans-Georg
Gadamer’s method and his revisions to this with revised correlational method of
interpretation (inherited from Paul Tillich and David Tracy). The revised critical
correlational method is part of his practical moral reasoning. As Browning applies moral
reasoning to each step of his practical theology paradigm, hermeneutics is at work within
each phase of the reasoning process and within each step of his practical paradigms.
Hermeneutics is a process of interpretation. There are, however, many
hermeneutical models espousing different processes of interpretation. Per Browning,
hermeneutics is a conversation, and it is the idea of hermeneutics as conversation that is
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embedded in each level of the practical moral reasoning process.116 The Enlightenment
stressed the improvement of society through an increase in objective knowledge, which
was applied to the human experience in order to achieve understanding. Hans-Georg
Gadamer’s philosophy questioned this model and emphasized the importance of
experience in making philosophical propositions or truth claims. All disciplines are
structured as a dialogue between our commitments (pre-understandings developed
through experience) and the process of understanding any kind of human action.117 Preunderstandings or commitments are, in fact, an important part of the process of
understanding, as one can only understand something in relation to oneself. The self
includes the experiences and beliefs one brings to the task of understanding and
interpretation. The conversation takes place by taking our pre-understandings to the task
of trying to understand any human action. The human action or experience then “speaks
to” and changes our pre-understandings. Understanding as a conversation has moral
implications for Browning and Gadamer:
The hermeneutic process aimed at understanding any kind of human action—a
classic text, work of art, letter, sermon, or political act—is like a moral
conversation, when the word moral is understood in the broadest sense. . . .
Understanding is a moral conversation shaped throughout by practical concerns
about application that emerge from our current situation.118
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Browning is acknowledging that the process of answering the primary question is
a hermeneutical process. Practical moral reasoning involves allowing one’s moral
commitments to speak to, but not rigidly determine, the process of interpretation and
understanding. Experience and pre-commitments shape the moral reasoning process as
much as one’s understanding of theory does.
One can see how Browning begins to develop his moral hermeneutical
paradigm—never allowing either human experience or philosophical theories to
completely control the process of moral understanding. In light of his understanding of
Gadamer, Browning’s hermeneutics includes a revised correlational method of theology.
A revised correlational method creates a conversation between Christian theology and
experience, never allowing there to be a pure uninterrupted human event or theological
statement.119 Christian thought and experience provide the answers and questions for
each other. Browning’s model is a reshaping of Paul Tillich’s correlational method and
David Tracy’s critical correlational method.120 Broadly speaking, Tillich’s model states
that the church’s answers must correlate with the questions arising out of individual and
communal experiences. Tracy grants that Christians bring the primary question and other
understandings to the Christian classics. In this respect Tracy is following Tillich. Tracy
sees a richer correlation taking place, however. There is a critical correlation and
conversation between the questions and answers of the Christian classics and the
questions and answers of human experience and culture. Theology, in the paradigms of
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David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology (Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press, 1996) 43-56; and Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 1951), 59-66.
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Tillich and Tracy refers to the history of theological writings and biblical texts. Finally,
Browning revises this by making practice (not texts) the fundamental starting point of
theology. If we place the revised critical correlational approach in a moral hermeneutical
process, then one would say the primary question that arises out of practice guides the
moral questions and answers of Christian thought that are in conversation with the moral
questions and answers of culture and human experience. For example, in a difficult EOL
ethics case, Tillich’s method would provide theological answers to the questions of the
medical team and family; Tracy’s method would include a conversation between the
theological questions and answers that address difficult EOL cases, and the questions and
answers about EOL from the experiences of medical team and family; and Browning’s
method would say that the questions and answers of theology, the medical team, and the
family are not two separate camps divided between theology and the experiences of the
medical team and family. Theology’s role in difficult EOL ethics cases is intertwined
with the experiences and practices of the medical team and family, as well as providing
insight from the history of theology and biblical texts.

Intercultural Practical Moral Reasoning and Empathy
One may be wondering how all of this relates to our case and empathy. I will
describe Browning’s revised correlational approach and its dependence on hermeneutics
to guide each step of the practical moral reasoning process tempered with Lartey’s
pastoral theology from earlier, all the while pointing to the case in the next chapter.
Browning’s complex method and way of interpreting theology lay the foundation for his
praxis-theory-praxis thinking and his use of practical reason. The hermeneutical process
and revised correlational method explained above are the overall dynamic of practical
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moral reason. What follows relates to the outer envelope (the visional/metaphorical level)
and the inner core (obligational and tendency need levels) of my practical reason move.
The concepts of the outer envelope and inner core need more explanation. The outer
envelope relates to the metaphors that arise out of a community’s worldview that shape
what they think to be right. The inner core needs this outer envelope to surround it, so to
speak, to provide a framework for how obligations as well as human tendencies/needs are
defined.
Browning has two more levels to his moral reasoning (environmental-social/ego
development and rule-role) but gives them minimal treatment in either of his works under
consideration. In the concluding chapters of my dissertation, I will address the outer
envelope and inner core in the context of providing guidance for communities facing
ethical dilemmas.

Visional/Metaphorical Dimension
Narrativist approaches to ethics lead to Browning’s development of the visional
dimension of his practical moral paradigm. The types of reasoning and rationality
espousing universal principles, such as Kant’s categorical imperative, are rejected. In
narrative ethics, the stories and narratives shaping a community’s or individual’s life and
values receive pride of place. Out of the narrative tradition in ethics, there arises a
visional/metaphorical dimension. When trying to decide what should be done in a
particular case, as in our EOL case in the following chapter, the values and beliefs
articulated within the paradigmatic stories of our lives shape how we make decisions.
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The visional and metaphorical level is the outer envelope of practical reason and
is driven by the question: how do religious-cultural and metaphors support and cohere
with moral intuitions and what people think to be morally right?121 I will direct this
question at Hoffman, Nussbaum, and Pannenberg; the visional/metaphorical level will
reflect on how their respective religious-cultural metaphors shape their understanding of
neighbor love and empathy. The insights gleaned from this interpretive level will help
shape elements of my guidelines that argue for the necessity of empathy from the medical
team at the EOL. The religious and cultural metaphors of our thinkers, and many
members of the medical team I imagine, cohere with an intuition that empathy in EOL
situations is right.
We think from a foundation of metaphors, and these metaphors have a moral
quality to them as they impact thought processes and one’s actions.122 The metaphors we
use to represent the ultimate context of experience function to orient us toward that
context. While we explore the metaphors of Hoffman, Nussbaum, and Pannenberg,
Lartey’s stress on preserving the otherness of the Other and listening to the Other will
help us to question the Other’s presence within their respective paradigms. No matter
what religious and/or cultural tradition percolates within and around the Other, the Other
can carry different ultimate metaphors.
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Obligational Dimension
For Browning, the next two levels represent the inner core of practical moral
reason. This inner core arises out of two main threads of ethical thinking in the history of
Western ethics.123 First, in teleological ethics one is obligated to follow a rule that
produces at least as much good over evil as any alternative. Good is defined in a nonmoral (or possibly pre-moral) way such as food, shelter, transportation, human
potentialities, or intimacy. There are two main threads within teleological ethics: ethical
egoist and utilitarian (act and rule). Ethical egoists are concerned about the most good for
the self. Utilitarians are concerned about the community, and can be divided into those
who focus on performing the act that leads to the most good or on following the rule that
does. The second main strand in western ethics is deontological ethics. Per this model, an
act is morally right because of its nature independent of a drive toward the most good or
happiness. Teleological approaches, in Kant’s paradigm, are too enmeshed with human
wants and desires to be trustworthy. Teleological and deontological ethics are the two
main threads on which Browning draws to develop his second movement in practical
moral reasoning.
The teleological and deontological threads relate to the obligational level by
helping to define how the visional metaphors become obligations. An obligation can be
coupled with any number of visional metaphors, and in this sense the obligational and the
visional dimensions are in a conversation. For example, Jesus’ dual love commands are
examples of moral obligations—visional metaphors given moral substance. In Jesus’ dual
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love commands, Browning sees a version of Kant’s categorical imperative: all involved
in the wrestling with the primary question ought not to make claims on someone else that
they are unwilling for someone else to make of them.124 However, obligations do not
automatically oblige. According to Browning, individuals move through a moral
development process with the highest stage taking on a deontological character when one
adheres to universal ethical principles. An individual needs to arrive at what he or she
thinks to be moral, and this is evidenced in different ways depending on the level of
moral development.
We will look at how Hoffman, Pannenberg, and Nussbaum define maxims in
terms of empathy and neighbor love—what their visional metaphors look like when given
moral substance in the form of a maxim. In whatever way the authors frame their
obligations to the neighbor, in our difficult EOL case it is important for the medical team
to focus these obligations in such a way that coalesces around the needs and concerns of
the family’s obligations to their loved one. One will see how the obligations of the family
differ from the medical team because of their beliefs about what their loved one would
want and what they believe constitutes the end of life.
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Browning, Fundamental Practical Theology, 197 and Religious Ethics, 65. Browning takes the
Golden Rule and a Kantian interpretation of that rule to be the central obligation. He then applies his
interpretation of the obligational level to a case study with which he has been working, which seems to
contradict the argument Browning tries to make for practice informing theory. The proper use for the
obligational level would be to discover how someone defines his or her obligations, which he does with the
case study as well, but he seems to indicate his Kantian Jesus should take lead.
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Tendency-Need Dimension
When reflecting on an obligation to others or oneself, one ought to think about the
physical and emotional needs of the people involved in the deliberation about the primary
question. How is one to follow the command to love the neighbor as the self in light of
one’s own needs and tendencies as well as the needs and tendencies of another?
We get our information on human tendencies and needs from intuitive experience,
religious and cultural traditions, and human sciences.125 The human sciences of
anthropology, sociology, and psychology provide insights into what the pre-moral goods
(unreflective responses and needs of people) are for humans. Features of animal and
human behavior need consideration as the primary question is digested. Browning terms
these pre-moral goods, which relate to humans’ basic biological needs. Some of his
examples are food, intimacy, shelter, and others necessary for human life. Basic
creaturely needs are also negotiated within communities and groups of kin, something
that has been observed by primatologists.126
Deep listening to the Other and treating them as Other creates space for their
tendencies and needs to be made known. Creating this space is central for loving the
neighbor as they want to be loved in a true, honest, and holistic way. Especially in
difficult EOL ethics cases, the medical team needs to be focused on the thoughts and
feelings of the family; the family members are the Other in this case.
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Browning’s approach to tendency-need is disembodied. He reflects on Niebuhr’s
paradigms for our relationship with God and how God has created us.127 Are these
categories with which the Other wrestles? Complete openness to discerning human needs
would require a shedding of, as much as possible, one’s pre-developed paradigms about
what ought to be the case in a situation. By letting Niebuhr’s theology set up parameters
for human tendencies and needs, Browning seems to advocate for using Niebuhr to define
the Other’s needs and tendencies. A true intercultural paradigm at the tendency-need
level would heed the Other to a greater degree instead of defining the issue from the
perspective of the self. In the categories from the introduction, the needs of the self
eclipse the needs of the Other when one loves the neighbor as thyself, but the needs of the
Other have space to blossom when the neighbor is loved as they want to be loved.
Descriptive Move
With Browning’s theoretical framework outlined above, I will briefly describe my
revisions to his model and my three moves. Browning’s model is designed to address
crises, questions, and tensions within a community. Descriptive theology is the first
response to this situation. When a community asks a question about a practice, they take
time to reflect on their practices and they may even describe their current practices to
fully understand the questions they are asking. What will guide the descriptive process
that forms Browning’s model is the focus on a primary question. In this dissertation, the
primary question is as follows: how can the medical team embody neighbor love and
empathize with the family in the midst of divergent ethical worldviews when trying to
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answer the question “what should we do in this situation?” I have already provided my
answer to this question: empathy occurs in the dialogue of care between and within
people and communities in which we can think of God as present moving people to love
others as they want to be loved. However, we need to build up to this conclusion.
My descriptive move will follow a composite end of life case in the intensive care
unit. In the descriptive move, Browning includes five levels of practical moral reasoning
with its accompanying hermeneutics because he wants to emphasize that pure objective
description is not possible; description must always acknowledge the interpretive moves
of the describer and the describer’s own history.128 The levels of reasoning were
discussed above: visional/metaphorical, obligational, tendency-need, socialenvironmental, and rule-role.
I disagree with including the levels of practical moral reasoning in the descriptive
move. First, the descriptive move, as I noted above, is not the place to include
philosophical and sociological interpretations. These cloud the narrative of a particular
community and space needs to be spent on providing rich detail. If “an inquiry [is to be]
practical throughout,”129 as Browning desires, then attention to more narrative detail is
important. Second, I think one can acknowledge one’s own interpretive lens in the
descriptive process without moving through five levels of practical moral reasoning. In
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describing the end of life case, I will walk the reader through a brief family history and
the patient’s clinical picture in the hospital; the psychosocial dynamics within the family,
within the medical team, and between the family and the medical team; and the ethics
committee consult process while the patient was in the hospital. I will acknowledge my
own interpretive lens prior to providing narrative detail of the case.
Intercultural Practical Moral Reasoning Move
The five levels of practical moral reasoning will serve as the lens for my
conceptual analysis of empathy’s role in an ethic of neighbor love. Browning sets up the
five levels listed above as an interpretive paradigm—to interpret the experiences of a
community and the theoretical and theological frameworks that drive a community’s
practices. My version of this will be to use the first three levels—visional/metaphorical,
obligational, and tendency/need—as an interpretive framework for Hoffman, Nussbaum,
and Pannenberg: what are the ultimate metaphors these authors use to frame their
arguments, what do they say are our obligations to each other and to ourselves, and how
do they define peoples’ tendencies and needs? This move could also be a place where we
interpret the visional metaphors, obligations, and tendencies and needs of the various
players in the chapter four case study. However, I am using Browning’s method to
interpret the role of empathy in difficult EOL cases. Because I have a specific goal in
mind, even a goal that arises out of concrete situation of practice, I will use the
interpretive levels to interpret empathy instead of the worldview, actions, and needs of
the various players in the case.
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Strategic Move
Here we have arrived at the third move in my paradigm. According to Browning,
after describing and reflecting on practical moral reason, a community will arrive at new
meanings and understandings of the particular practice that brought about the question in
the first place. These new meanings and understandings arise out of the primary question
and drive praxis in light of the descriptive and practical moral reasoning moves. There
are four questions that drive the strategic move:130 how do we understand this concrete
situation in which we must act, what should be our praxis in this concrete situation, how
do we critically defend the norms of our practice in this concrete situation? Four, what
means, strategies, and rhetoric should we use to communicate to our community, in this
case the hospital? As I address these questions in in light of our primary questions on
empathy, neighbor love, and diverse ethical worldviews, I will focus first on normative
guidelines for empathy as a sacred ethic aimed at the members of hospital ethics
committees, those invested in clinical ethics, and direct care providers in healthcare
contexts. The fourth question, in particular, will aid in determining how to bring these
guidelines to life in a hospital.
Looking Ahead
We have now seen how I will proceed to interpret the case of an ICU patient, sift
through the three interdisciplinary partners on empathy, and construct my normative
guidelines for hospital to practice empathy in difficult EOL ethics situations. Browning’s
revised practical theology, with the addition of Lartey, served as a good foundation from
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which to build my revised fundamental practical theology. The first move, the descriptive
move, will follow in the next chapter and describe an ICU brain injury case in rich
narrative detail.
The second move, IPMR, will follow in chapters five and six. Using intercultural
practical moral reasoning as a foil, again, my interdisciplinary analysis will include
Martin Hoffman’s psychology of empathy and working toward justice, Martha
Nussbaum’s philosophy of emotion and compassion in public life, and Wolfhart
Pannenberg’s theological anthropology. Hoffman’s rich understanding of moral
development wrestles with the role that empathy plays in creating caring relationships
and strong principles of justice within people; he also treats compassion fatigue and the
limits of empathy. Nussbaum dissects the role of empathy in compassion and how
compassion cultivates more loving and healthy public life; she also notes the limits of
empathy in that one can become, to use my own words, overly sentimental when trying to
help one’s neighbor. Pannenberg’s anthropology incorporates the imago dei and, in my
interpretation, the presence of God in caring relationships.
The third and final move, the strategic move, will close the dissertation and
provide hospital with normative guidelines. The normative guidelines may sound vague
and detached from the concrete details of the day-to-day work at a patient’s bedside, so I
will also provide some guidance on how to bring these guidelines to life based on my
experience working on medical teams.

PART TWO
REVISED FUNDAMENTAL PRACTICAL THEOLOGY
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CHAPTER FOUR
DESCRIPTIVE MOVE: COMPOSITE CASE
Introduction
We arrive at the first of our three moves. The descriptive move grounds the
intercultural practical moral reasoning and strategic moves and ties them to a specific
situation. I have elected to do a composite case study. Again, I will focus on narrative
detail in my descriptive move. Narrative provides us with more intersubjective depth and
detail in the descriptive process: we will learn more about the relationships between the
various people in the case study, we will shed light on the internal struggle within each of
the people, and we will not get bogged down in thick interpretive work, at least not until
the next chapter.
The following case is an example of an end of life ethics case from my seven
years working as an inter-faith staff chaplain in a variety of clinical settings: trauma
hospitals, hospice, and long-term acute care. This particular case takes place at a trauma
hospital.131 The danger of a composite case study is in its constructed character. People
and cultures can become molded and divided to fit the specific point one is trying to
make. One can also mold groups and individuals to fit into one’s idea of a specific
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culture, as well as put them into ideological boxes. In this case study, for example, the
risk would be both putting the family and medical team into specific cultural and ethical
boxes. Not only does a single composite case fail to represent the ethos of a particular
culture, but it also bypasses the ethical nuance of a particular family or medical team in a
specific context. After all, loving one’s neighbor is about people loving each other and
caring for each other, not composite and artificially constructed people artificially
responding to and caring for another.
In light of these concerns, my composite case strives to do the very thing against
which I caution. I want the family and the medical team to fit into particular ethical
worldview boxes. I want to demonstrate how there are diverse ethical worldviews within
communities, and in order to do so, the medical team and family will act as placeholders
for the combination of a variety of values and practices. I do this knowing that, even
though the family and medical team are composite in nature, they arise out of my clinical
experience. I do this understanding its limitations. For example, the medical team will
represent contemporary western medicine as I have experienced it. No one healthcare
team or medical staff person will espouse all the values that the team does in the case
study, nor will one patient and family adhere to all the values of the family.
When deciding between a composite and a real case, a composite case study does
more work, so to speak. It illustrates my larger point of empathy’s importance in difficult
EOL cases more than any one particular real case could do. Another strategy would have
been to refer to instances of em(a)pathy in my hospital experience as I moved through my
interpretive work—em(a)pathy not as apathy, per se, but cases where there was either a
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conscious or unconscious lack of empathy. I decided to lump all of these instances into
one composite case. End of life ethics cases in hospitals are just one example of this.
If I do not use an actual case study or data on case studies, how am I sure there are
ethical disagreements and cultural trends with the characteristics I will describe? Isn’t this
simply anecdotal evidence from one person’s perspective and someone who is
constructing a straw person to prove his point? The short answer is no. First, all hospitals
in the Twin Cities metro area have ethics committees, and all of these committees get
consulted throughout the year to deal with ethical disagreements in a patient’s care. These
consults are the result of the medical team and family’s inability to agree on what should
be done. Beyond ethics committee consultations, there are frequent disagreements
between medical teams and surrogate decision makers (i.e., anyone not designated as a
health care agent).132 Second, whether or not hospitals deal with end of life situations
exactly as I describe this case does not matter; the larger point I am making is that
empathy is effective for cultivating neighbor love and loving the other as they want to be
loved when there are ethical disagreements.
Cases such as these are often stressful for the family and the medical staff because
of the tension around the dissimilar ethical worldviews. Both the family and the medical
staff care deeply about the patient and are concerned with his or her well-being. Both the
family and the medical staff have the best interests of the patient in mind. As I indicated
in my discussion of clinical ethics, attempts to resolve these cases often work through the
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three topics in combination with certain principles of medical ethics. These principles
often fall short in cases like the one summarized below, however. The failure is not
because end of life deliberations lack affect or love-of-neighbor. The difficulty is that the
family and medical team may not agree on the prognosis or what a quality of life would
be for the patient.
What about the experience of the family? There needs to be empathy. Both the
feelings of the family about the trauma they have gone through and their ethics about
such end of life decisions are central when deciding what should be done. Again,
empathy is a practice that can help bridge the divide in ethical disagreements so that all
involved can compassionately arrive at a resolution as to what to do in a particular
situation. In this case, I claim the medical team must empathize with the family.
Case: Brain Injury in the ICU
David is a forty-year-old man in the intensive care unit (ICU) with a brain injury
in a minimally conscious state. David will need a tracheostomy in order to continue
breathing on the ventilator, a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy tube (PEG tube) to
continue getting nutrition, and eventually to be transferred to a skilled nursing facility
with a permanent tracheostomy where he will be completely dependent on the staff for
his cares. What does the medical team, David, and David’s family think should be done?
Before the ICU
When David was walking across the street one evening with his family, a car
struck him and threw him twenty feet and he hit his head on the asphalt. The driver of the
car sped away, but his family called 911. Nobody else in his family was physically
injured when the car hit David. They were crying and screaming in the street in utter
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disbelief and shock over what happened. David’s wife fell to her knees and was shaking
with tears. One of the family members had the wherewithal to call the paramedics, and
other family members helped the wife off the street and to the curb for her safety. David
was pulled to the curb and family tried to revive him until the paramedics arrived.
David initially appeared somewhat alert: he was moaning and clearly in pain.
However, he soon became unresponsive, and when the paramedics arrived just a few
minutes later they started CPR. After about twenty minutes of CPR they got a sustainable
heart rhythm back, but because of the loss of consciousness and concern about the change
in mentation, the paramedics intubated David en route to the hospital. In the state of
chaos, the family was able to make it to the emergency room and was escorted to the
waiting area while the ER staff stabilized him. They were told that the physicians would
give them an update in the waiting room when David was stable enough.
Upon arrival to the trauma room at the hospital, the emergency room (ER) staff
stabilized David and fully assessed him for other injuries. Besides the head trauma, there
were four rib fractures, bilateral femur fractures, and a few lacerations and scrapes that
were not concerning. After he was stabilized, David was immediately taken to get a
computed tomography (CT) scan of his head to check for brain bleeding. The CT scan
revealed a large diffuse subarachnoid hemorrhage in the temporal lobe with twelve
millimeters of mid-line shift. This, combined with the twenty minutes of CPR that left
David’s brain without adequate oxygen, led some of the care team to believe David was
suffering from a non-survivable head bleed—non-survivable in the sense that he would
likely never be able to verbally interact with his family or friends and would likely need a
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skilled nursing facility to take care of him. This was the best-case scenario in their minds
after seeing the CT scan.
The doctors were also concerned that David would eventually herniate.
Herniation occurs when the brain swells from damage to such an extent that it pushes
down through the base of the skull and damages the brain stem, where the key automatic
responses are controlled (e.g., heart beat and breathing). David was taken to the ICU for
further monitoring of his brain bleed and injuries.
After the CT scan, the physicians were able to update the family. Karna was
David’s wife. They had been married for twenty years and had one son named Steve and
two daughters named Ann and Sarah. Karna worked at home by taking care of the
children. They had their oldest, Ann (21), who was away at college, and then Steve (18)
and Sarah (16), who were both present at the hospital. The family heard the words “large
brain bleed” and “without oxygen to the brain,” and felt overwhelmed and panicky. “He
is dying,” they thought to themselves, and the description the care team gave of “critical
but stable” did not make any sense to them. “Stable” stood out to them, but how could
someone be critical and stable at the same time?
The physicians also said that David may not survive his injuries, and that the
family should think about what David would want in this situation. The wife thought,
“Survive how? Will his heart stop beating? I thought they said his heart was okay since
they got it back beating, and he is connected to the breathing machine, so he should be
okay, right? As long as he is breathing and his heart is beating, we will feel okay. That is
what David would want.” Steve interpreted the update as it was a matter of time before
the brain bleed got worse or that he would simply never wake up. The physicians
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explained the treatment protocol for brain bleeds: they would continue to monitor his
vitals, his inter-cranial pressure (ICP), tend to the other injuries as possible, and would
have to wait a few weeks to see how the lack of oxygen impacted his brain and cognition.
Week One
There was not much change in his condition the first few days. David was in the
ICU on the ventilator hooked up to telemetry and his ICP was somewhat stable. Near the
end of the first week his ICP went up and the surgeons had to put in a ventricular drain to
keep his ICP in the acceptable range. The need for a drain indicated his brain was
continuing to swell, and the physicians were getting concerned about herniation. The
whole family was distressed from the addition of the drain. Seeing David in the ICU was
hard enough—the slow hiss of the ventilator, the IVs for hydration, the suction container
for his lungs full of bloody mucus, and the facial swelling—and now they added a drain
that had bloody fluid coming from his head. Karna and Sarah were taking it the hardest.
Since the drain was distressing to the family, David’s nurse asked the chaplain to
come and see Karna to offer further support. During the day, Karna was at the hospital
with David’s parents and needed support. The chaplain had visited them initially when
David was first admitted to the ICU, but another visit was appropriate at this time due to
the added distress of the drain. Chaplains will often offer support when a patient or
family’s distress level changes.
During the second visit, the chaplain learned that while both David and Karna had
grown up in Christian homes, their religious beliefs were more permeable while
maintaining identification with their childhood religious traditions. Karna said both felt
comfortable incorporating elements of many religious traditions into their current belief
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system. Karna requested prayer with the chaplain. After the visit the chaplain consulted
with the social worker and noted that David’s parents had also been in the visit with
Karna. The social worker had learned that since David and Karna had Ann in their last
year of college, David’s parents helped them take care of Ann for the first year so the two
of them could graduate. They were in the hospital because of their love for and support of
David and his family.
At the end of the first week, neurology came to do another clinical exam at the
bedside to check for David’s level of brain activity. The primary team had consulted
neurology from the outset, but neither Karna nor any of her other family members had
been present. The family had heard the results of these exams when the interdisciplinary
team briefly stopped by the room each day. The results of the most recent exam were not
good and showed very little activity besides David’s brain stem (the part that controls the
automatic body functions like heartbeat and breathing) and he did not have pupil or
corneal reflexes.133 The neurologists agreed with what the primary care team had told the
family, which was that the outlook was not good for David, but they also added that they
ultimately did not know what the outcome would be. It was unlikely that he would wake
up and know who they were, or that he would be able to survive off the ventilator, but
they couldn’t say for sure. Each time the family heard this it felt like new information.
“How can this be happening?!? Why are you saying these things? It has only been one
week,” were some of the phrases the family expressed to the neurologists and primary

G. Bryan Young, “Neurologic Prognosis after Cardiac Arrest,” New England Journal of
Medicine 361, no. 6 (2009): 605-611. The absence of pupil or corneal reflexes on day three, per Dr. Bryan
Young, means that the patient will likely be in a minimally conscious state and/or totally dependent for the
rest of their life.
133
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care team. The term “non-survivable” was also odd for the family to keep hearing. Karna
and Sarah especially didn’t understand how David would die if the ventilator and other
treatments were helping to keep his heart beating; for them, non-survivable would be the
cessation of a heart rhythm, otherwise David would be clearly surviving.
The first week was overwhelming for the family as they went through the initial
trauma and crisis on the day of the accident, the shock of seeing David in the ICU, and
the difficult prognosis they kept hearing of “non-survivable head bleed.” Nurses and
physicians gave them updates on David’s situation day-to-day as well as larger
predictions related to prognosis. David’s prognosis had not changed very much and the
family was wondering what to do at this point. The medical team was also wondering
what the plan of care would look like in the coming week. Many of them wondered if the
family understood the patient’s poor prognosis. After all, some of them thought, if this
was a non-survivable head bleed, then there would be a point when the extensive care he
was getting would not make sense. David would not live a meaningful life, there were
wasted resources going to his care, and they were simply doing things to him and not for
him.
Weeks Two and Three
The second week continued mostly along the same lines as the first, except for the
family care conference at the end of the week. There were no major changes in David’s
condition and the neurology team continued to do daily bedside exams to look for
changes in their prognosis. The surgeons were able to remove the ventricular drain midway through the second week. In addition to the daily bedside quick updates, the ICU
team wanted to have the family get together with all the care teams to talk about a plan of
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care for David. The surgery and neurosurgery attendings had been talking amongst
themselves and were wondering why the family wanted to keep going with such
aggressive and curative care when the patient was not going to have a meaningful life—
in a nursing home, on the ventilator with a tracheostomy, prone to infections and bed
sores, and fully dependent on the nursing home staff for cares.134 The neurology
attending physician, however, did not completely share the views of the other attending
physicians. She was near retirement and had seen people recover in ways she never
thought possible. Though these patients were never fully who they were before their
injuries, some were able to recognize and interact with their families and be at home. She
still felt this case had a poor prognosis, but she was not so quick to claim certainty. She
was also wondering what the family and patient thought a meaningful quality of life
would be. She had heard a variety of opinions from patients and families on what counts
as a life worth living.
In preparation for the care conference, the chaplain, social worker, and a staff
member called the clinical coordinator, worked to get the conference scheduled, and
reached out to all family members. The chaplain continued visits with the family in the
ICU, learning about their spirituality, praying with them, and providing emotional
support to Karna, Steve, Sarah, and David’s parents. The chaplain, clinical coordinator,
and the social worker learned over the course of the week that Karna was someone who
worked very hard at home to make sure that the children were taken care of and the house

134
The lack of oxygen to the brain (anoxic brain injury) is a central part of the physician’s poor
prognosis for David. Anoxic brain injuries (ABI) have poorer outcomes than traumatic brain injuries (TBI).
The lack of oxygen to the brain is very damaging to its potential for healing, as compared to blunt trauma to
the brain in the case of a TBI. See Alasdiar Fitzgerald et al., “Anoxic Brain Injury: Clinical patterns and
functional outcomes. A study of 93 cases,” Brain Injury 24, no. 11 (2010): 1311-1323.
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was maintained. David worked as an environmental lawyer for a large urban law firm.
David’s commitment to preserving the environment and God’s creation was something
that attracted Karna to David, as well as his sharp intellect. He was always such a hard
worker and never gave up on the people impacted by environmental injustice. Karna and
the family hoped that David had a strong desire to live and would fight to overcome his
injuries. Near the end of this week before the care conference, the family expressed to the
clinical coordinator and the chaplain they were beginning to feel that some of the medical
team disagreed with how the family wanted the care plan to unfold.
The care conference happened on a Friday afternoon around 2:30pm. The family
hesitantly gathered in the conference room just prior to the meeting. Ann was able to
come back from college for the care conference, so all of the family members were
present, including David’s parents. The hospital staff in attendance included the
following: social worker, clinical care coordinator, chaplain, ICU resident physician,
neurosurgery resident, neurology attending, and ICU attending. The family and staff
members introduced themselves, and the ICU resident started by asking the family what
their understanding of David’s condition was and how they were doing. The family
talked about how overwhelming everything has been for them—the sudden trauma and
terrifying accident, and seeing David with IVs and a breathing tube, seemed like
something from a nightmare. They just did not know what to do or think. But, they
believed that David was a fighter so they hoped he would eventually respond to them in
some way. They knew he had a brain bleed, that his ICP was down, and that the chance
of recovery was small.
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After the family had a chance to talk and express themselves, the ICU resident
and neurosurgery resident started filling in the story of David’s hospital course with more
detail. They talked about the size of the brain bleed and damage—not just how much was
damaged, but also the location of the damage: the temporal lobe. The neurologist
elaborated on why the specific area of damage was significant. Many of the personality
traits and capacity for memory are located in the frontal lobe. So, not only was it hard to
tell if David would end up responding to the family in any way, it was hard to know if he
would have any of his personality traits or to what extent he would have memory.
The resident physicians also went over the hospital course from the beginning.
They stated it was good that David’s swelling had gone down, because they were worried
about the swelling continuing to grow and eventually the brain herniating, which would
lead to brain death. Even though his swelling had gone down, they had not seen any
changes in his response level over the course of two weeks. Given that his neurological
exam had not changed (the neurologist confirmed this), they did not expect him to
become more responsive than he was at the present time. He would continue to be in a
minimally conscious state. The team asked the family what they thought David would
want. Karna’s answer at this time was the same one she had when David first arrived at
the hospital. She felt he would want to keep fighting.
The family asked questions about his minimally conscious state, what that meant
for his survival, how long it takes the brain to heal from an injury, and what the next steps
were. The family’s affect was varied as they asked these questions. Karna’s face was
concerned and nervous as she waited to hear the physicians explain what she assumed
was bad news; when she was not asking a question she was wringing her hands under the
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table. Steve and Ann were withdrawn and appeared numb—resigned, in their minds, to
the inevitable bad news of their father being stuck as a “vegetable” for the rest of his life.
Sarah was next to her mom with her arm around her providing comfort, and was tearful
over the lack of hope in the medical staff’s voice and communication. The neurosurgeon
and the neurologist explained how David had a small chance of “coming out of” his
minimally conscious state, and that even if he did, again, he would not be the David they
knew. The best-case scenario they saw for him would be living in a nursing home
dependent on others for his daily cares and unable to respond to his environment, except
through facial expressions if he was in pain. However, the neurologist added that it was
ultimately impossible to know what would happen for David, though the scenario they
described was the most likely outcome.
In answer to the family’s question about what the next steps were in the ICU, the
medical staff started talking about plan of care from this point forward. There were
essentially two options for the family. They would not need to decide between these two
options right away, but the time would be coming, if nothing changed in David’s
condition, when the family would need to decide. One, given the extent of his brain
damage, the medical staff would recommend moving David to comfort care, which meant
removing life sustaining treatment. They reminded the family they had told them this was
a non-survivable brain injury. The ventilator would come out, the IVs would be taken
away (except access for pain medication), lab draws would stop, pain and anxiety
medication would be given, and David’s care would focus totally on his comfort until he
died. The family was silent and overwhelmed at hearing this. Ann got up and left the
room. The chaplain and social worker asked the family how this was for them to hear all
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of this. Karna and David’s parents started crying and they said, “We just can’t believe it.
We don’t know… David wouldn’t want us to stop trying to help him. He is such a
resilient person and is a fighter.” They also could not imagine simply not feeding him or
giving him water when he needed it, even if he was in a minimally conscious state. The
non-survivable part of their recommendation also did not make any sense. How could this
be non-survivable if he was currently alive, heart beating, machine breathing for him, and
other vital signs stable? Hearing this option was overwhelming and the family did not
want to pursue it.
The team explained that they knew this was a lot to hear right then and they had
one more option to talk about. The second option was to elect to do a tracheostomy and
PEG tube. They did not recommend this, but it was one of the options they could pursue.
David would need to go to a long-term acute care hospital and then to a skilled nursing
facility where he would likely remain. Given he would have a tracheostomy, he would be
prone to infections and likely bounce back and forth from the nursing home to the
hospital. The process of eventually getting to a skilled nursing facility would take two
months. In order to pursue this path, the ICU team would continue to follow the current
plan of care, try to resuscitate him if he suffered a cardiac arrest, and eventually get him
stable enough to be transferred. Though this was also hard for them to imagine, the
family wanted to pursue this plan of care. David was alive and survived the accident, and
they wanted to do everything they could for him. The medical team repeated the
information about his recovery potential and what his life would be like, but the family
was committed to doing what they could despite the recommendation of the medical
team.
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After the care conference the medical team had a separate meeting amongst
themselves to debrief about the family meeting. The ICU and neurosurgery physicians
were irritated with the family’s insistence on continuing to provide aggressive care for
the patient, knowing he would never be the same person the family knew and cared
about. The patient was simply laying in the bed—only a whisper compared to the
environmental lawyer the family described to them briefly during rounds one day. This
was not living in their mind—sitting in a hospital or nursing home bed, not doing
anything. The chaplain and social worker offered up how hard it was for the family to be
making these kinds of decisions after only two weeks of adjusting to the traumatic event,
though it was hard to say if the family would make a different choice a few months from
now after they had time to adjust. The physicians said they knew how hard it was, but
that it was a choice the family had to make right then; nobody would be able to adjust to
such a hard choice, but it was what they were facing in life. “They can’t just run away
from their grief and delay the inevitable,” the ICU resident said.
The neurologist and clinical care coordinator were not as opposed to what the
family wanted to do at that time. While they did not ultimately agree with the family’s
plan because it would cause David distress from the pain, continued infections from the
ventilator, and possibly existential suffering from laying in bed all day, they were more
accepting of the plan for their own reasons. The neurologist, as previously noted, had
cared for many different patients in her career and had seen some patients recover more
than she ever thought they would. The clinical care coordinator found herself trying to
understand the situation from the family’s perspective. She could not do this completely,
but she wondered what it would be like for her, or any of the members of the medical

111
team for that matter, to have their loved one in that situation and have to make those
choices.
Weeks Four and Five: Ethics Consult and Discharge
There were not many changes in the fourth week of David’s ICU stay—changes
in his condition, the team’s prognosis, or the family’s plan of care. The medical team
continued their updates with the family when they rounded, and every now and then
would remind them of the poor prognosis and their recommendations. The family heard
them but did not change what they wanted to do; they also felt more distance between
themselves and the medical team. Knowledge of the case spread amongst the ICU
residents, nurses, and other staff. It became known as the case where the family was in
denial or “weren’t quite getting it.” Staff wondered why the family was deciding to keep
going when the patient’s condition was so grim. Karna and the children had been keeping
family and friends up to date in terms of David’s condition on a Caring Bridge web page,
but now family and friends were hearing more and more about how the medical team
wanted the family to make different choices. There were, in a sense, two vaguely defined
sides in the case that disagreed on what was best for David. The chaplain, social worker,
and, in some ways, the neurologist and clinical care coordinator tried to occupy a middle
ground.
Towards the end of the fourth week, the staff and family were still in the same
place, even after another mini-family care conference that went over the severity of
David’s prognosis. The ICU attending decided to consult the ethics committee about
having a formal consult. He felt this would help the family see how serious the medical
staff felt about David’s prognosis and help the family feel better about moving to an end
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of life care plan. Many of the medical staff were getting very frustrated with the plan of
care and the family, and an ethics consult seemed to be the only course of action left to
take. The team informed the family that the next meeting would involve an ethics consult.
At first, Karna and David’s parents were taken aback. Was this simply to coerce them
into agreeing with the team or to actually come up with an agreed upon plan of care? An
ethics consult sounded very intense, but the medical staff explained it was because of the
disagreement over the plan of care, and this made some sense to the family. The ethics
consultant contacted the family on the phone to explain more about the consult and to
pick a time to meet. The consultant explained this was not a high pressure meeting; it was
to further explore the medical indications, David’s and the family’s preferences, quality
of life issues, and any other contextual features (legal, religious, cultural, etc.) in order to
reach a consensus about the plan of care. The ethics consultant would not be pressuring
the family to make a particular choice.
Prior to the ethics consult, the chaplain and social worker continued to provide
spiritual and emotional support to the family. The chaplain discovered that Karna and
David had met in college in their second year of school in one of the extra-curricular
religious student groups that met on Fridays. This was an inter-faith group. Their shared
passion for the law, religion, and their intellect were some of the things that drew them
together, along with their shared sense of humor. After they graduated college, they made
the decision that Karna would stay home with Ann and David would continue on to law
school. Throughout all of this, and as their children had grown up, their marriage had
gone through some tense times, but they were overall lovingly committed to each other.
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The social worker spent some time talking to the children. He learned that, of the
three children, Ann was the most distant from her father. He remembered her walking out
of the first family care conference and wondered if this history of distance was part of the
dis-ease she felt in the meeting. Ann remembered the most about the early years of law
school and David’s late hours of study, interning, and eventually work. When he was
home, he was present to her and demonstrated his care and love for her. This pattern of
feeling distant and close to her dad continued throughout her growing up. But she was
now in her third year of college, and she had experienced more of the distance—distance
in miles, time, and shared interest. Ann wanted to make a living in theatre and this was
frustrating for her father.
Steve and Sarah had different experiences of their parents. They were born later
and did not remember their parents working hard while David was in law school and
interning. They were born three and five years after Ann, respectively, so by that time
David had a job and both parents seemed less stressed overall. While there were times
when they felt distance from their father and mother, they could not put words to it and
these feelings were not the dominant part of their narrative with their parents. In terms of
sibling relations, Sarah knew that Steve was closer to Ann than she was. However, as the
youngest, she was clearly “daddy’s girl,” as people sometimes called it.
The chaplain also learned that David did not approve of Ann’s move away from
religion. While their parents had raised them in their religious tradition, Ann did not
identify with this tradition or some of the ideological commitments it required: sacred
texts as paradigmatic for life, the reality of God’s relationship with the world, and God’s
role in human life. These commitments seemed silly and irrational to her. After all, she
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had never experienced anything that she would equate with God. She felt that people
should love each other, but that did not require anything close to religious commitments.
Steve and Sarah, on the other hand, were still part of and valued their religious
community. Sarah was still in high school and Steve was about ready to go to college.
They found hope and meaning in participating in a religious community. When Ann had
moved away to go to college, home life had changed. Steve was closer to Ann than
Sarah. They were both interested in the theater and performance, and had been in
productions together. He missed this shared interest and the intimacy it led to with Ann.
Sarah, though she found purpose in participating in a religious community, admired
Ann’s ability to find purpose outside of a religious community.
The ethics consult happened on a Friday afternoon, like the last major family care
conference. The consultant led the meeting this time. The ICU and neurology teams from
the medical staff, the core members of David’s family (Karna, his parents, and the
children), and the chaplain were all present for the meeting. Given that David’s condition
had not changed very much, save for a few fluctuations in his vitals, the family and
medical team quickly gave their account of what was happening medically for David.
The core of the ethics consult revolved around the patient/family preferences for David’s
care and the quality of life David would have.
In terms of patient and family preferences, the chaplain thought it pertinent that
the family express what they told him early on in David’s hospitalization. When the
physicians had told the family they were worried about herniation, Karna didn’t
understand how David would die if the ventilator and other treatments were helping to
keep his heart beating; for them, non-survivable would be the cessation of a heart rhythm,
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otherwise David would be clearly surviving. In this case, even though David would be in
a nursing home with a tracheostomy, they felt he would still be surviving and alive.
Religiously, this was a belief of theirs: cessation of cardiac rhythm was the death of an
individual. Religious adherence was an important value for the family.
The physicians and others present did not agree with this definition of an
individual being alive or dead. A person, though physiologically sustained, is not
necessarily alive in this condition of minimal responsiveness. One of the physicians
described this as “alive, but not living and thriving the way in which someone might find
joy.” The clinical coordinator had stressed for the team to imagine themselves as the
family, so the physicians asked the family to try and imagine what David would want,
imagine how life would be for him. Ann, and to some degree Steve, understood the point
of the physician. Ann thought the distinction her mom was making in terms of what
makes a person alive was a little odd, but wanted her mom to be the final voice in what
happened for her dad.
This discussion naturally moved on to quality of life, and again, the family and
medical team could not come to an agreement. Though living in a nursing home was not
ideal and not something David would necessarily choose, Karna and David’s parents felt
he would be willing to endure it if he knew it is what Karna and the family wanted. He
was always a strong person and a fighter, so he would be strong and be okay with a
nursing home, even after the medical team re-explained how he would be prone to
infections, bedsores, and general myopathy. The one place the family and medical team
agreed was on David’s code status. The medical team thought David should be NO
CODE; the team did not want to do cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) if David’s heart
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stopped. Given the amount of life support he was already receiving, if all of this could not
prevent a cardiac arrest, then his arrest would be an indication of his body dying. On top
of this, CPR would damage his body and decrease the likelihood of a meaningful
recovery even more. Up to this point he had been full code, but the family agreed that
they would seriously consider changing this down the road. Karna and the children
seemed to understand the perspective of the medical team in this situation. David would
have further injury and lower quality of life if he had another cardiac arrest. The family
was not ready to make this decision right then, but they were open to it later down the
road.
The ethics consult ended with the following care plan for David: David would
leave the ICU, get a tracheostomy in order to continue breathing on the ventilator, get a
PEG tube to continue getting nutrition, and would eventually be transferred to a skilled
nursing facility with a permanent tracheostomy. Unless his brain injury dramatically
healed, he would remain in the nursing home for the rest of his life. David was
discharged from the hospital after four weeks. Two months later the hospital held
hospital-wide “care and compassion rounds” to address the distress of the medical
providers in providing the type of care they did for David. The attending physicians were
still unsettled by having to provide medical treatment that allowed David to go to a
skilled nursing facility. It was pointless and futile in their eyes, and they were still upset.
Case Study and Empathy
The goal of this case study is to provide an example of a disagreement in ethical
worldview around a particular situation: making medical decisions in the face of a poor
medical prognosis. I believe that empathy can play a role in creating neighbor love in this
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situation.135 Empathy occurs in the dialogue of care between and within people and
communities in which God is truly present, moving people to love others as they want to
be loved in the midst of diverse ethical worldviews.
There were many places in this case where medical staff and family had different
moral worldviews and could not agree on a general plan of care. It is not that this case
lacked neighbor love of any sort or there was no similarity whatsoever in their
worldviews, but that there was disagreement about “what should we do?” in a particular
case. The family was okay with David being in a skilled nursing facility; the medical
team disagreed and was so distressed by this that some of them were still unsettled two
months after David left the hospital. There were also more specific disagreements in
worldview. First, they disagreed on how to define living or being alive. The family
thought that the cessation of heartbeat meant David was dead and no longer alive, and the
medical staff thought that the extensive brain damage meant David was no longer able to
live. Second, the family did not want to make David “do not resuscitate” (i.e., if his heart
stops do not attempt to resuscitate him) until they had thought about it more; the medical
staff wanted to make David DNR right away. Third, the family thought that David was a
fighter and would be able to tolerate a less-than-ideal life in a minimally conscious state;
the medical staff felt this was not an acceptable quality of life, and the treatment to get
David to that point was non-beneficial. Fourth, the family had religious reasons for

One could make the argument that the medical team’s anger and dis-ease is actually neighbor
love. If they did not care about the patient, then they would not be angry. Neighbor love does not have to be
warm fuzzy butterflies where everyone gets along and feels happy. Their anger could be part of not
wanting David to go through such suffering, and this sentiment stems from care and love for the patient, so
the argument might go. However, even though the presence of anger may indicate the presence of love,
neighbor love as I have defined it is about making space for the needs, cares, concerns, and worldview of
the Other and not raging against it from one’s position of authority and power. Those in power must
empathize with those who are suffering and respond with compassion.
135
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justifying some of the care plan decisions; if the medical staff had any religious beliefs,
they did not bring them up with the family.
These are just some of the examples of the ways in which ethical worldviews
differed between the family and medical staff. There were also glimpses of
understanding, empathy, and mystery-that-did-not-claim-all-the-answers between the
family and the medical team—times when those with more authority and power in the
situation attempted to enter the experience of those who were suffering. The clinical
coordinator and the neurologist whispered of a different way to approach the family and a
different way of trying to decide what to do in this case. It is not to say these two staff
members empathized and the other members of the team did not. I am not suggesting
there are only two ways of relating to the family: empathy and lack of empathy. The
neurologist and clinical coordinator demonstrated humility and an interest in taking the
family’s perspective. The neurologist claimed mystery; she was open to the unknown of
being wrong about David’s prognosis, and while she disagreed with their decisions, she
understood why they were making the choices they made. The clinical coordinator in her
own subtle ways tried to get the various members of the medical team to imagine
themselves in the place of the family—what the family was feeling, thinking, and going
through as they tried to make these very difficult decisions.
Taking the perspective of those with whom one disagrees cultivates neighbor
love, and empathy is one way to begin to take the perspective of another. What follows
will use the thinking of Martin Hoffman, Martha Nussbaum, and Wolfhart Pannenberg to
provide a rich interdisciplinary understanding of empathy grounded in the case study of
this chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE
INTERCULTURAL PRACTICAL MORAL REASONING MOVE
Introduction
We have arrived at the intercultural practical moral reasoning move (IPMR). The
case study of David’s ICU experience is a few paces behind us and will help ground the
interpretation of empathy that follows in this chapter. As we enter this interdisciplinary
conversation, I want to repeat my thesis: Cultivating empathy in ethics consults fosters
neighbor love; not only does empathy foster neighbor love but it is required in difficult
EOL cases from the medical team. It nurtures a love that coalesces around the thoughts,
feelings, relationships, and beliefs of the family—loving the family as they want to be
loved. Cultivating empathy, in my interpretation, occurs in a specific way. Empathy
occurs in the dialogue of care between and within people in which we can think of God
as present, moving people to love others as they want to be loved in the midst of diverse
ethical worldviews. I will use IPMR as a guide through Hoffman’s empathy and moral
development, Nussbaum’s philosophy of emotion, and Pannenberg’s anthropology. If the
reader remembers from chapter three, IPMR consists of three main levels of
interpretation: visional/metaphorical, obligational, and tendency-need. Each of these
interpretive lenses will help define empathy and how it plays a role in helping the
medical team and family deciding what they should do in difficult end of life ethics cases.
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Visional/Metaphorical Level
Recall that for Browning, out of the narrative tradition in ethics, there arises a
visional/metaphorical dimension. The question, “how do religious-cultural and individual
metaphors support and cohere with our moral intuitions and what we think to be morally
right?” drives the visional and metaphorical level of IPMR. What are the religiousphilosophical-cultural metaphors that help us understand how Hoffman’s empathy and
prosocial action, how Pannenberg’s affective life and culture, and how Nussbaum’s
philosophy of emotion all play a role in understanding how empathy cultivates neighbor
love and nurtures a love that coalesces around the thoughts, feelings, and beliefs of the
family? Answering this question will help us understand how the medical team can love
the family as they want to be loved. The visions of our three authors cover a wide
territory but coalesce around the idea that people need to be open to the needs of its
members in distress. This is morally right. Through the concepts of care, compassion,
vulnerability, and openness to the world we will begin to see a vision for communities in
which people are open to the needs of others beyond themselves who are in distress—a
vision for how empathy can cultivate neighbor love and how God is present in the
distress of others.
Hoffman’s Moral Development
I want to focus on the vision of care Hoffman lays out in his work and how this
will help us understand empathy. Care is a goal towards which Hoffman wants people to
strive; a caring society is Hoffman’s ultimate vision for society and how I interpret what
he would define is morally right. This vision fits well with our case study that takes place
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in the context of a hospital, a place that, ideally, wants to care for all people who are
suffering and in need of help.
Care is made of up empathy and prosocial action for Hoffman. As previously
stated, empathy for Hoffman is the “involvement of psychological processes that make a
person have feelings that are more congruent with another’s situation than one’s own.”136
Care is stepping out of oneself as much as possible and having feelings that are more like
those of someone else in distress. Without going into the long history of empathy, he
defines this history as consisting of two camps: empathy as cognitive appraisal of
another’s mental state and empathy as affective response to another person.137 He
focuses on the latter, as we can see from the above definition “…a person have feelings
that are more congruent.” Focusing on affective components of empathy is important for
how empathy will play a role in responding to someone’s distress and igniting one’s
passion for justice and caring (in the next section). The cognitive component and the
affective component of empathy are not mutually exclusive, as both require elements of
the other to be truly effective, but Hoffman chooses to focus on the affective elements. I
agree with Hoffman’s focus even while I recognize a place for cognitive appraisal within
the affective response components of empathy. Affective empathy is also more important
for situations like our composite ICU case. It is not enough to understand someone’s
distress and situation. Cognitive appraisals alone do not move people to truly enter the
situation of another; this can lead to a detached objectivity that does not take the
subjectivity of the distressed Other seriously.
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Hoffman is not merely interested in defining empathy but wants to explore how
this contributes to prosocial action, the second element of care. Prosocial action issues
from one’s internalized principles (caring and justice principles), behavioral norms, rules,
a sense of right and wrong, and how one interprets how they have helped or hurts others.
In my simple definition, prosocial action is the ability of an individual to care for those in
need, and empathy plays a crucial role in this ability of an individual to care for those in
need. An important piece of the prosocial moral structure is empathic distress. Empathic
distress involves responding to the feelings of distress aroused in the self because of
another’s distress. Empathic distress is associated with helping: “There are countless
studies showing that when people witness others in distress, they typically respond
empathically or with an overt helpful act.”138 Here we can see the foundation of how
Hoffman will describe the dialogue of care. He elaborates further on this distress and
draws conclusions about caring, community, and justice. Empathic distress goes through
a series of stages drawing mostly on object-relations theory. Tracing empathic distress
from preverbal forms through sophisticated attention to subtle emotions allows Hoffman
to show how empathy contributes to prosocial action.
Caring, therefore, arises from empathic distress and its role in one’s prosocial
moral structure. Hoffman continues to play with the concept of caring throughout his
work—caring out of guilt, care and anger, and care and principles. He also acknowledges
the mixed and sometimes conflicted reasons people care for those in distress; reasons for
caring for someone are not always completely altruistic and may be out of feelings of
guilt, distress within the self, and anger towards the object (i.e., person or system) that
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harmed the victim in distress.139 These are good reasons to care for someone in distress,
but they are not completely about the needs of the distressed individual.
Distressed individuals of David’s family are our Others in the case study. He
acknowledges that the empathic distress and caring for those in need cannot be
completely about the distress of the Other—to love them as they want to be loved. At the
visional level, Hoffman’s concept of care resonates well with the stress on the Other. By
illuminating the ways in which one’s own motives or struggles drive how one responds to
distress, in an indirect way, Hoffman’s understanding of care makes more space for the
voice and needs of the Other in the caregiving relationship. The Other’s voice, in
Hoffman, may get silenced and colonized to some extent, but on a visional level,
Hoffman acknowledges how the mixed motives of the self can impact how one responds
to people in need. Despite the mixed motives that are inevitable as one provides care,
when David’s family is in distress and reeling from the traumatic events, how could the
medical team have looked beyond their goals for David’s care and reflected on how the
family envisioned David’s care? I will address these questions later in chapter seven.
Martha Nussbaum’s Philosophy of Emotion
Nussbaum’s vision of what is morally right focuses on compassion and public
life. A large of part this vision for public life includes compassion (empathy) for our
loved ones and people we do not even know.140 These two features lead to an expansion
of our circles of care. Such an expansion is healthy for a society and promotes
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flourishing. Grounded in the dialogue of care that occurs between child and caregivers,
friends and friends, the intimacy developed in these relationships reaches out to the
community and creates an empathic public framework. The expansion of empathy
impacts the public sphere in terms of building a community. In our medical case from the
ICU, heeding Nussbaum’s concepts of interpersonal depth and expansion of empathy can
create a loving community between the medical team and family.
The dialogue of care between caregivers in communities is where the seeds for
empathy and expansion are planted. There are many communities, and Nussbaum notes
how the process of moral development depends on the society in which it occurs.
Different societies cultivate different contexts for emotional development based on the
physical conditions, religious/metaphysical beliefs, language, and social practices and
norms.141 How one understands love, care, and friendship depends on the context in
which the loving, caring, and friendship take place. For a western liberal democracy, the
dynamics of empathy (i.e., compassion for Nussbaum) and interpersonal relationships
contribute to a flourishing society. She characterizes this in terms of Sophoclean tragedy:
“Tragedy asks us … to acknowledge that life’s miseries strike deep, to the very heart of
human agency itself. And yet we are to insist they do not remove humanity, the capacity
for goodness remains when all else has been removed.”142 When a society stresses the
importance of empathy and compassion, citizens are able to empathize with the joys and
the sorrows of human life and experience. Rather than creating a bunch of pathologically
narcissistic megalomaniacs, compassion opens societies up as a whole to vulnerability.
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Vulnerability and compassion are the glue that hold society together and allow other
people to flourish. Vulnerability requires familiarity with one’s inner feeling states and
having these states heard and accepted by another; then one is able to share one’s
vulnerability with others.
However, compassion, per Nussbaum, must be coupled with an ethical theory.
We cannot all walk around empathizing with each other’s sorrows and expect the world’s
problems to be healed. An empathic and compassionate society coupled with an ethical
theory leads to the blossoming of moral imagination—the ability to imagine the
sufferings and joys of others and respond to them in order to facilitate healing and repair.
Nussbaum supplies a moral theory to do just that, which we will explore in the
obligational level of IPMR.
Pannenberg’s Anthropology
There are many threads about what is morally right in Pannenberg’s thought, but
I will focus on his ultimate vision of being human and what this means for being in
relationship with each other. After all, clinical ethics encounters at the EOL are between
people, and I am concerned with how empathy functions between the family members
and the medical team. Overall, Pannenberg is a dialogical theologian in the sense he
engages the disciplines of biology, philosophy, and psychology as he develops his
anthropology. His anthropology is rooted in the idea of human becoming. Humans are
always in a process of becoming the image of God. He builds this argument by beginning
with a discussion of humanity from the perspective of biology and psychology and then
constructs an overall vision of being human as “openness to the world.” Our openness—
Pannenberg’s ideas on self-transcendence, egoism and the self, and social relationships—
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impacts how we are able to empathize with each other, how we love our neighbor as they
want to be loved. In difficult and stressful EOL cases like the composite case study, there
can be a tendency in the medical team to be caught up in their own interpretation of the
situation. Openness to the family and patient can help both parties figure out what they
should do for David.
Let us start at the beginning and build to Pannenberg’s understanding of
openness. Prior to his argument on our openness to the world, he makes a claim about
human uniqueness. Like many contemporary theorists in other disciplines, he argues that
humans are different than animals in their ability to reflect on their instinctual reactions
and exhibit some sort of control over themselves and their environment. He quotes Max
Scheler’s ideas, “Human perception does not function primarily as releaser of reactions
that are imprinted in an innate behavioral schemata. What is characteristic of human
beings is, rather, that they can dwell on the contents of ideas and intuitions.”143 Claiming
humans are able to dwell on the contents of their ideas gets Pannenberg to his claim about
the image of God and human nature. Since humans are able to step outside their natural
(i.e., biological) inclinations as distinct from animals and exhibit reflexive behavior,
humans are not dependent on their environment. Humans are, therefore, “open to the
world and not dependent on their environment.”144
I think Pannenberg’s distinction between humans and animals is simplistic and
binary. There is a great deal of contemporary research around animal behavior, and I
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doubt the primatologist Frans De Waal, for example, would not agree with Pannenberg’s
simplistic distinction.145 Primates demonstrate helping and caregiving behaviors that
seem to be more than instinctual responses to their environment. Even though
Pannenberg’s distinction between humans and animals is too simplistic, we can still
accept his concepts of being open to the world and bound by the world as indicative of
human nature.
Openness to the world instead of bound by the world allows Pannenberg to claim
that humans are in a process of becoming human, and it is in this process of becoming
where one finds the image of God. One can speak of becoming in the absence of being
bound; one can speak of becoming human as different from being bound by nature.
Humans are able to reflect on the content of their ideas and become “more than” or “other
than” their environment in their quest for becoming human. This quest begins from birth
as humans only posses potentialities at first. Such a quest, nonetheless, is not totally of
one’s own volition: “And the harmonious working of all these factors is guaranteed
solely by the fact that in all of them God himself, the origin and goal of our destiny to
communion with him, is influencing us.”146 The divine created intention is not solely
within humans or solely external to humans.147 The image of God, for Pannenberg, is the
goal of human life, the goal of becoming, and it is a goal with which humans and God are
involved. As humans, we are grounded in God and touched by grace.
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Pannenberg continues to develop his understanding of the human being as the
“becoming image of God” in terms of centrality and exocentricity. Humans are in the
process of becoming and characterized by both centrality and exocentricity. Centrality
and exocentricity are particularly related to his understanding of human nature, but he
will continue to elaborate on nature when he touches on the concepts of the ego, self, and
how relationships and needs define the former two categories. In my interpretation of
Pannenberg, centrality is having a center within the self; the center of one’s motivations,
desires, and volition is characterized by a lack of openness to the world.148 Humans are
centric but have an ability to achieve exocentricity through self-reflection.149 He
acknowledges there are different understandings of human reflexivity or selftranscendence, but in its essence it relates to the distinction between subject and object.150
Openness to the world does not mean, that one is only open to a divine reality beyond the
world but is also open to the reality of this world as well. Exocentricity is characterized
by a “presence to the other as the other. … Grasping of an object as an object distinct
from the self one becomes aware of its otherness.”151 If one is able to name something as
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an object, then one understands oneself as separate form or a perceiver of the object, and
going further, one can then reflect on an “object” reaching beyond the possibility of all
objects of perception to an absolute Other.152
Empathy and the Visional/Metaphorical Level
We have and can cultivate a God-given capacity to empathize with each other.
Part of chaplaincy work is openness to the variety of people and beliefs encountered in a
clinical setting. As a chaplain, I make every attempt to begin my encounters with patients
and families with empathy and openness. Openness to the world and exocentricity are
part of the human capacity to empathize with another—empathize with another as a
distinct subject from the self with his or her own feelings, needs, and concerns. This type
of empathy—type of love and care—are an example of loving the neighbor as they want
to be loved. The other is distinct from the self; the other is not to be loved as thyself but
as an Other distinct from the self. Pannenberg pushes us to open ourselves up to the other
and embody exocentricity; listen to the other and do not be bound by centrality. We can
also see this line of thinking in Hoffman and Nussbaum. Hoffman’s vision of care
included having feelings that are more congruent with another’s feelings than with one’s
own, and caring actions that respond to the needs of the other’s state of emotional
distress. Nussbaum too wants us to strive for openness towards each other—an openness
that recognizes that life’s tragedies and joys strike deep within us and are part of each of
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us. We must be open to the vicissitudes in our own lives and in others’ lives. We will
now dive a little deeper into the obligations to our neighbors inherent each of their
respective frameworks.
Obligational Level
What kinds of obligations do we have to our neighbor? When we think about the
role that empathy plays in cultivating neighbor love and the beliefs and vision that shape
our worldview, our vision of the world has obligations that go along with it—maxims
that shape how we relate to others and what motivates us to relate in a particular way. It
is not necessarily a movement from the visional to the obligational, however. A maxim
can be coupled with any number of visional metaphors, and in this sense the obligational
and the visional are in a conversation. This conversation is so tightly knit that it can be
hard to tell the difference between these two interpretive lenses. For example, Hoffman’s
vision of care or Pannenberg’s concept of openness to the world both shape and are
shaped by how they each understand our obligations to our neighbor. Given the
intertwined nature of these two levels, what will follow will continue to elaborate on how
empathy can cultivate neighbor love and how we need to look beyond the needs of
ourselves to the needs of others from the visional level. However, it will have a
normative edge to it. We should or ought to empathize with our neighbor and we should
or ought to look beyond ourselves to the needs of others. Empathy is required and
nurtures a love that coalesces around the thoughts, feelings, and beliefs of the family. We
can think of the obligational edge in these statements as God’s presence in the needs and
distress of our neighbors calling us to empathize and love them as they want to be loved
in the visceral moments of EOL decision-making.
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Hoffman’s Moral Development
Hoffman’s obligations are clearly stated in his discussion of his caring and justice
principles. Understanding empathy through Hoffman’s obligations of caring and justice
adds depth to the psychological motivations of responding to empathic distress. In order
to understand the relationship between caring and justice, we first need to know how
Hoffman understands the interaction and bonding of empathy and moral principles. For
Hoffman, people come to distressed situations with moral principles, which influence the
ways they respond to empathic distress. When we see someone in distress, we may feel
immediately called to care for them because their distress and their identity resonate with
our principles. There are also distressed people with whom it is hard to empathize, either
because empathizing seems too draining or we do not identify with their distress. Our
principles, however, can transform the victim into a representation of a larger category of
injustice thus catalyzing our empathic distress and an ability to perform a prosocial act.153
In our EOL case, the principle of caring can push the medical team to empathize with the
family in their difficult situation.
Caring and justice are Hoffman’s moral principles. Caring is concern for the wellbeing of others—their need for food, shelter, avoidance of pain, and self-respect—and
helping those in need or distress. Justice includes the following: fairness when there are
competing claims, people be treated in a manner consistent with their rights, and people
(in general) get their due in treatment.154 Given his definition of “caring,” we can clearly
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see how the principle of caring drives empathy and empathic distress for Hoffman. We
must help and care for others who are in distress/need. For those with whom we have a
hard time empathizing, we may respond to them with prosocial actions because we
adhere to the caring principle that drives us to reimagine or reinterpret the distress of the
person/people. For Hoffman, it is right and good to care for those in need or in distress.155
Empathy also connects with the principle of justice. Hoffman briefly discusses
punitive justice, but we will leave this aside since he focuses mostly on distributive
justice and empathy. Simply put, distributive justice relates to the ways in which a
society’s resources are distributed among its people. For Hoffman, distribution can be
divided into three general areas: productivity (more work equals more pay), need (receive
resources regardless of productivity), and equality (everyone gets the same amount). He
sees empathy as more active in the latter two categories, but empathy overall can move
one to take another’s situation into consideration when deciding about distribution of
resources.156 Empathy constrains self-interest in real life contexts. Therefore, empathy
contributes to an equal distribution of resources. Drawing on John Rawl’s concept of the
veil of ignorance, only empathy can provide the motive and rationale for creating
institutions and a society where resources are equally distributed.157 Empathy makes the
participants in a game like Rawl’s choose equal distribution.
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Empathy and the principles of caring and justice work together to create prosocial
action, action that is helpful to the persons in distress. These principles help us to love the
neighbor as they want to be loved. Principles can, in Hoffman’s words, de-center the
caregivers from being consumed by the distress of the situation and help the caregiver to
understand the breadth of the needs of the distressed person. When one encounters
someone in distress, both one’s cognitive and affective principles as well as one’s
empathic distress are activated.158 Hoffman sees the principles of caring and justice as
helping to neutralize over arousal or catalyze under-arousal in one’s empathic distress.159
If one is experiencing empathic over-arousal, the cognitive components of one’s
principles can help one detach, so to speak, oneself from the actual distress of the
distressed person and provide more helpful care; getting consumed by another’s distress
does not allow for prosocial action because one is overwhelmed while trying to provide
care. If one is experiencing empathic under-arousal, then drawing on one’s moral
principles as they relate to the situation can intensify one’s empathic distress and catalyze
prosocial action.
What of the Other in Hoffman’s obligations of care and justice? If the medical
team is to love the family as they want to be loved, whose definition of care and justice
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does the family and medical team follow? Tying empathy and justice directly to Rawls’
veil of ignorance, for example, gives Hoffman’s obligation of justice a univocal voice of
individualistic western moral philosophy and psychology. Rawls’ veil of ignorance
isolates individuals behind a veil as an individual makes decisions about society.
Hoffman attempts to address this issue in one of his final chapters on “the universality
and culture issue.” Citing the biological substrate in the brain’s limbic system, the seat of
emotional experience, he makes the universal argument that responding to others in
distress is part of our brains.160 Hoffman thinks the biological and cognitive mechanisms
allow for universal empathy: people sense their own bodies, sense their own emotions,
and can represent themselves and others. These primitive arousal methods are universal
based on facial recognition and central nervous system responses. Humans do share
neurophysiological features with each other, but that hardly provides evidence for
constructing principles of caring and justice based solely on more individualistic
paradigms. These principles can look very different in different cultures and different,
even down to different families in the same community. For difficult EOL cases,
individualistic conceptions of care and justice are not helpful. Each member of the
medical team should not stand behind the veil of ignorance and ask what only he or she
would want for David. Humans do not construct their life detached from their friends,
family, or other relationships. The medical team needs to be in relationship with the
family and empathize with them as a way to figure out what should be done.
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Martha Nussbaum’s Philosophy of Emotion
Because her obligations were discussed in the visional level and will be in the
following level on human tendencies and needs, I will not spend much time in this level
for Nussbaum. Nussbaum’s normative claims resonate with much of what I said in the
introduction about neighbor love as it applies to EOL cases. The obligations and norms in
Nussbaum’s work are woven throughout her work; that is to say, her normative theory is
not explicitly argued for in a linear fashion. For Nussbaum, a theory of emotion must
have an adequate normative moral theory to support the role emotions play in morality.
In the case of empathy and EOL, we cannot make a case for the importance of
empathizing with the family without a normative theory about empathy and emotions.
The most direct statement of human obligations comes in her introduction:
In particular, I assume that an adequate [normative] view should make room for
mutual respect and reciprocity; that it should treat people as ends rather than as
means, and as agents rather than simply as passive recipients of benefit; that it
should include an adequate measure of concern for the needs of others, including
those who live at a distance; and it should make room for attachments to
particular people, and for seeing them as qualitatively distinct from one
another.161
Her summary of her flexible normative theory gets expressed in different ways
throughout her reflections, in particular her emphasis on our common humanity.
Motivated by the values of compassion and love that teach us to care for and honor every
person simply because they are human, we are obligated to honor each other’s common
humanity. Compassion may sometimes cause humans to favor their kin, but the value of
compassion also pushes us to consider distant others that we do not know because of their
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common humanity.162 Love too carries this value, and Augustine’s theology is an
inspiration for her: “In loving God, Augustine emphasizes, one loves each and every
human being—not only the good parts but also the flaws and faults, and not only as
stepping stones to one’s own artwork but in themselves.”163 Compassion and love see
each and every person as having value, agency, importance, and worth—worthy of being
cared for not because they are a means to some other end but simply because they are
human.
Pannenberg’s Anthropology
Like Nussbaum, Pannenberg does not explicitly state specific obligations, but we
can infer obligations from his theology. These are obligations born out of how
Pannenberg understands the imago dei. Within his anthropology and understanding of the
image of God, it is clear that humans are to honor and respect the dignity and worth of
each person, which comes from his concept of exocentricity and openness to the world;
we are to care for people in distress, which comes from how he sees human anthropology
working toward a unification of despair and grace; and we are to provide comfort and
care for each other as we seek unity in the midst of despair, which comes from his use his
use of George Mead and Erik Erikson’s thought to argue that caregivers mediate divine
love. I will include my interpretation from the visional/metaphorical section, some
material from his systematic theology, and introduce new concepts that will be fleshed
out more in the following interpretive level of IPMR on human tendencies and needs.
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First, I will focus on Pannenberg’s understanding of exocentricity and openness to
the world that directly speaks to an obligation to respect and honor the worth of each
person. Again, exocentricity is contrasted and with centricity. As biological creatures,
humans have drives and basic needs just like other creatures in God’s creation. However,
these forces in creation do not determine humans because humans are able to step outside
of themselves and reflect on the nature and purpose of those drives and basic needs. This
is why Pannenberg refers to this process as exo–centric; it is a way of becoming external
or on-the-outside-of-oneself. Centricity is the opposite of this and is a focus on the self
that exhibits an inability to step outside of the self. The exocentricity of humans allows
them to be open to the world—open to the world and not bound within the self, which
allows one to participate more fully in the process of becoming. Openness relates to the
process of becoming through the mechanism of stepping outside of oneself. One can
analyze, anticipate, question, and refocus their bodily energy in ways that tend to the
needs and concerns of others. It is in the exocentricity and openness where one finds part
of Pannenberg’s locus of the divine.
Because of one’s exocentricity, one can be open to the voices and experiences of
the other. Because one is able to step outside of oneself one can, ideally, experience a
certain level of empathy and care for another regardless if their values or beliefs in an
EOL situation differ. As a spiritual caregiver in a hospital, for example, one is able to
hear the needs and concerns of the other as separate and different from oneself.
Pannenberg understands this exocentricity and openness as part of being created in the
image of God. God created the world and humans and called it good, therefore, this
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component of the image of God is part of the way in which God wants us to care for
God’s creation. This obligation is built into the fabric of creation.
Second, the way in which Pannenberg sheds light on human misery and love
pushes us to care for people that are in distress. Ultimately for Pannenberg, since God
created the world, humans are determined by and get their meaning from God. God
creates the universe and God, therefore, determines humans. For Pannenberg, being
determined by God means that God’s redeeming grace (through the incarnation) focuses
on redeeming the misery and sin in humanity. God created the world and redeems the
world out of God’s love because of human despair and sin. Pannenberg prefers the word
misery instead of sin. It more accurately captures the experience of humanity’s
brokenness, separation from God, and experience of evil as humanity awaits the
consummation of God’s kingdom for Pannenberg. We are far from God: “the term misery
sums up our detachment from God, our autonomy, and all the resultant consequences
much better than the traditional word of sin.”164
Unity is a response to the separation, isolation, and despair of God’s creation and
people. Pannenberg seeks to understand human unity and wants to move beyond
traditional interpretations of Paul’s simple distinction of body and soul. Pannenberg
would argue that the biblical view and the early church fathers do not make any
distinction in terms of human body and soul as separate entities.165 For Pannenberg, our
unity seems to depend on the working of the Spirit as a way of unifying conscious life
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and subjective freedom. “The being with others as others mediated by perception
awareness seems to include, along with the distinction of objects from one another and
from the “I” of one’s own body, the field of consciousness in which the basic relation of
me and world takes its contours.”166 Interrelatedness of all these elements–– me, the
world, Others––is not the result of a person but the Holy Spirit, the divine Logos. We are
all persons in unity, psychosomatic unity, because of the work of our Creator.
As the Son, in his self distinction from the Father, is united with him by the Spirit
in the unity of the divine life, and as, in his creative activity, he unites what is
distinct by the power of the Spirit, so the differentiating activity of human reason
needs the Spirit who enables it, by mediating the imagination, to name each thing
in its particularity, and in all the distinction to be aware of the unity that holds
together what is different.167
How does Pannenberg’s thinking on the image of God, misery, and unity relate to
our obligation to care for each other? First, despair is an all-encompassing description of
the experiences of crisis and illness of all creation. In the face of despair within a hospital
setting, humans seek unity, comfort, peace, and a reconciliation of their fragmented crisis
of health. Caregivers can, therefore, connect with and care for all peoples through the
common experience of despair and the seeking of unity. Further, since love is the divine
essence, and love and care are the driving force of caregiving regardless of one’s context,
one’s love for creation and the people of the world drives and shapes care.
Lastly, Pannenberg draws on the concept of basic trust in Erik Erickson and
George Mead’s understanding of “I and Me.” For Pannenberg, one is dependent on one’s
social relations for a complete understanding of and experience of personhood. Social
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relations and the experience of care are what contribute to human development and the
process of becoming the image of God, especially in early childhood. Before he gets to
Eric Erickson’s idea of basic trust, he draws on Mead’s understanding of interpersonal
subjectivity. A subject and another subject are distinguished as I and me because of the
process of exocentricity that I outlined above.168 Pannenberg and Mead both espouse the
necessity of community and interpersonal relations. Given the necessity of these
relations, Pannenberg draws on Erickson’s understanding of basic trust. The central
caregivers in one’s life are a symbol of God’s love and the concrete medium through
which one experiences God’s love. Caregivers point beyond themselves to the nature of
the divine love, which is the only “symbol,” so to speak, capable of being a true holding
environment for are the needs of God’s people.169
At a basic level, all humans depend on social relations for their personhood and
being. I want to push Pannenberg’s claim and state that we are obligated to empathize
with people because we are all part of God’s creation. One’s concern for and care for
God’s creation cannot be dependent on the particular framework out of which the caregiver operates and finds meaning. Especially in difficult EOL ethics situations, the
medical team is obligated to empathize with the family. As a caregiver one can provide a
moment of love for the needs and concerns of another as one who mediates the
unconditional love of God—not ultimately as God but as one who simply cares for
another.
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Empathy and Obligational Level
Empathy not only cultivates neighbor love, but also we are obliged to empathize
with our neighbors and love them as ourselves and as they want to be loved. From the
visional level of IPMR we learned that empathy cultivates neighbor love, and now in the
obligational level we learn about our obligation to empathize with our neighbor. First, we
are obligated to care for those in distress out of the principles of care and justice.
However, our care and justice must coalesce around the experience of the family. Second,
we are obligated to strive for exocentricity and openness—in EOL cases, to be open to
the distress of the family. As humans created in the image God, we will struggle with
these two forces that work against each other but ultimately we can strive to focus on the
needs of the other. Third, we have an obligation to love and have compassion for every
human being as people suffer the tragedies and despair of life.
Tendency-Need
When reflecting on an obligation, one ought to think about the physical and
emotional needs of the people involved. Humans have certain tendencies that need
consideration when reflecting on how obligations are or are not put into action. If we
recall chapter three and Browning’s understanding of tendencies and needs, the human
sciences of anthropology, sociology, and psychology provide insights into what these
needs and tendencies are for humans. Browning terms these pre-moral goods, which
relate to human’s basic biological needs. According to the human sciences, there are
many things that fall under the category of pre-moral goods, and Browning is fairly
vague on what pre-moral goods look like in someone’s day-to-day life. Pre-moral goods
are not easy to define. Browning does provide a list of these goods from the Catholic
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theologian Louis Janssens: life, health, pleasure, joy, friendship, education, a good meal,
or a good automobile.170 However, even this list is vague. Pre-moral goods may relate to
David’s case in terms of his prognosis: how much will he be able to enjoy his life and
find it meaningful given his prognosis? More specifically, will David be experiencing “a
good meal,” so to speak, if he is in a minimally conscious state and in a care facility? One
can get food for nutrition and bodily sustenance without enjoying the process of eating.
Does food-as-sustenance count as meaningfully experiencing food if that food comes
through a feeding tube? Will he experience intimacy/friendship and a meaningful way?
Does having a loved one in the room with him reading to him, holding his hand, and
talking to him count as friendship and intimacy? Does David have to let the medical staff
and family know (i.e., communicate verbally or non-verbally) that he has found pleasure
in these activities? One may benefit from intimacy without communicating that one has
benefitted from intimacy. Not only is it difficult to decide what counts as a pre-moral
good (understood as part of our basic biological needs), but also it is also difficult to
decide what counts as experiencing these goods.
The difficulties of naming and defining pre-moral goods aside, I want to focus on
human needs and tendencies as they relate to empathy and care. There are obligations we
have to our neighbor, and some of the concrete details of how we live out the
aforementioned obligations to our neighbor will become evident below. What we will
also see is how the dialogue of care—understanding the mental and emotional states of
others and responding with care in which we can think of God as present—gets lived out
and is a central part of empathy. David’s family has needs related to their distress because
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of David’s hospitalization. The medical team needs to empathize with the family in order
to determine their needs.

Hoffman’s Moral Development
Driven by his ultimate metaphors and how he frames obligations, the core of
Hoffman’s understanding of empathy comes in the tendency-need dimension of IPMR.
As we saw at the beginning of the chapter, his interpretation of empathy focuses on
people’s tendencies in responding to those who are in need—how people care for others
who are in distress. He traces this through his developmental paradigm. 171 These
tendencies and responses are part of the dialogue of care between people and within
communities that is central to cultivating empathy. In difficult EOL cases, the individual
members of the medical team vary in their ability to empathize with the distressed family.
Hoffman’s developmental process outlines why it is important to empathize with people
in distress and some of the reasons why individuals have a hard time doing so. The way
Hoffman details the development of empathy shows how we might develop the ability to
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love in such a way that coalesces around the needs of the family in these cases. There are
four main stages to his developmental paradigm.
First, the newborn automatically cries when hearing the sound of another’s cry,
which Hoffman refers to as the “newborn reactive cry” phase. There is little to no
differentiation between the distresses of either infant. When a secondary infant hears the
cry of the primary infant, the second infant’s cry is almost identical to the spontaneous
cry of the first distressed infant. The cry could be reactive, imitative, or conditioned, but
what one sees in such a cry is the early dynamic of empathy. The emotional state of one
person causes a similar emotional state in another. Because there is no distinction
between self and others, as demonstrated in the automatic cry, there is no dialogue of care
of self and care for others at this point in one’s development.172 The care from the
caregiver has a profound impact on the infant. Experiencing love results in “feeling felt”
and impacts how neural pathways are developed in the brain. The caregiver’s ability to
recognize the emotional states of the child impacts the child’s sense of relationship with
the caregiver.173 “Feeling felt” leads to the development of a more secure sense of self,
thus a greater chance the child will empathize with the emotions of others since it literally
has felt that dynamic before.
Second, near the end of the first year there are hints of the child understanding the
difference between his or her distress and another’s. Hoffman calls this “egocentric
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distress.” Whimpering and watching the other, suggesting some difference, may
accompany the newborn’s cry. The difficulty in distinguishing between the self and the
other, however, still exists because kinesthetic sensations also pervade the infant’s
response to the distress of another.174 What creates the infant’s “core self and gives it
coherence and continuity are the kinesthetic sensations infants receive from their
muscles.”175
Third, infants begin to make helpful advances toward the distressed other early in
the second year of life. These advances may be in the form of touching, patting, hugging,
or kissing. Hoffman refers to this as the “quasi-egocentric” phase of development. Such
actions indicate the child is able to see the other person as a separate person, but children
tend to “use helping strategies that they find comforting.”176 Therefore, there is both
understanding of difference and a lack of difference as the infant responds to the distress
of the other.
The difference between the self and other continues to grow at this stage. The
child physically moves and responds to the distressed other. The care of the parent in the
earliest years of life continues to show forth as the child becomes less and less engrossed
in its own world and begins to open itself up to another. The kissing and hugging are
small acts of love directed toward the distress and hurt of another. Seeing the other as
unique, the child reaches out and responds in the only way s/he knows how—asking himor herself, “what would comfort me?” In light of this question, however, one sees how
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the tendency to care for the other in light of the needs of the self shapes one’s actions.
Though the child responds to the other, s/he is also responding to the other as if the other
is the self.
The fourth and final phase for Hoffman is called “veridical empathy” and is the
longest stage, lasting the rest of our adult lives. Infants recognize themselves in a mirror
for the first time and begin to recognize that others have inner states of feeling.177 These
developments occur in the second year. For example, in the previous stage a child would
soothe a distressed person using methods the child found helpful, whereas in veridical
empathy, the child adjusts and uses methods the distressed finds helpful. Subjective
experience goes through a series of differentiations, and the child is eventually able to
differentiate its own inner feeling states from another’s. Hoffman notes that children
engage in “self-focused and other-focused role taking.”178 The self-other role taking
occurs as the caregivers use induction during the child’s development. Induction occurs
when parents highlight the other’s perspective, point out the other’s distress, and make it
clear that the child’s action caused it. Highlighting the child’s role may be the way to
expand their empathy to understanding how they caused the distress.179 When the
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caregiver points out how one’s actions impact others, one begins to imagine the needs of
other’s and how to respond to a distressed other.
Hoffman’s developmental scheme demonstrates how one moves from a very selffocused world (not necessarily selfish) to empathy focused on another person as separate
from the self. From Hoffman’s observations and survey of studies, it is clear in his work
that this is a human tendency. Humans respond to distress and attempt to soothe it for a
variety of reasons: love, guilt, distressed by the distress, justice, and many others. There
is also a deep need to be cared for when one is in distress. This need is what catalyzes the
empathic distress in the caregivers. People, in early development especially, want to feel
felt and understood and have a sense of a safe and trustworthy caregiver.
The stages of newborn reactive cry and egocentric distress exhibit how a person
remains largely intertwined with her or his world. It is difficult to tell the difference
between distress in the self and distress in others at this point. The care at this point in
development is, therefore, care of the self. On an unconscious level, the person worries
mostly about their needs and less about the needs of others. One’s caregiver, however, is
(hopefully) focused on the needs of the child, thus there is a strong sense of care of the
other on the part of the caregiver. Having the other (i.e., caregiver) care for the self in this
way is important for the mature development of empathy. The stages of quasi-egocentric
and veridical empathy exhibit the point at which a person begins to respond to the other’s
distress and care for him or her. Quasi-egocentric distress demonstrates how the person
still responds out of the self’s needs but applies these to another person. The care of the
other still means care of the self as one applies self-soothing methods to another person.
In veridical empathy, one tends to the other’s distress as the other’s distress.
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The caregiver’s role in this process is important. Caregivers can point out to the
developing person how their actions impact others. Having one’s own needs met (the
other caring for the self), meeting one’s own distress needs (caring for the self), tending
to the distress of another (caring for the other) is the dialogue of care out of which the
ability to empathize grows. All of these processes—having one’s own needs met, feeling
cared for, and understanding another’s distress—create the emotional sensitivity and
social understanding to be able to empathize with and respond to another’s distress in a
supportive way.
Martha Nussbaum’s Philosophy of Emotion
A large part of Nussbaum’s work focuses on the development of emotions and the
needs of people throughout their various stages in life. Nussbaum recognizes the impact
emotions have on the development of the person—not merely how one expresses and
processes emotions in the present, but the history of emotion in one’s life in connection to
one’s caregivers. Nussbaum’s key concepts and terms that address emotions, tendencies,
and needs are as follows: cultivating a map of the world and vulnerability. I will explain
each of these in turn and how they relate to our tendencies and needs. The central thread
in Nussbaum is that people need to experience the world as a trustworthy place—a place
with people that care about them where they can share their emotions and struggles with
others and hear the emotions of struggles of others in return.
First, Nussbaum’s concept of “ a map of the world” is the foundation for
illuminating the aforementioned central thread in her thinking. Within the process of
development and our experience of emotions, she emphasizes how we, in her words,
develop a map of the world as good and bad place. We all interact with the world
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emotionally and in other ways, and as a result of these interactions, we develop an
interpretation of the world as a place that we can trust or not trust. This is our map. To
parse this out a little further, up until the later stages of development, the person goes
through a drama of development—a series of struggles and joys related to developing a
sense of self that is independent of the comfort of the mother’s womb and is in interaction
with an unpredictable environment. Drawing on Lucretius, an Epicurean poet and
philosopher who died around 50 BCE, she states that this drama of development has
everything to do with an infant discovering a relationship to external objects of high
importance.180 These objects of high importance are people and experiences in one’s life,
and they are important because they are either to be trusted or feared:
But in our world, emotions are needed to provide the developing child with a map
of the world. The child’s emotions are recognitions of where important good and
bad things are to be found—and also of the externality of these good and bad
things, therefore also of the boundaries of its own secure control.181
Nussbaum uses the metaphor of a map because our experiences of the world as a
trustworthy or untrustworthy place are placed on our map, so to speak, as part of our
experience, memory, and history.182 Our maps are part of our identity; at the same time
they are rooted in our past and chart a course for the future in our lives. Our maps impact
how we organize our life in the present and how we make decisions about our lives in the
future. In my interpretation, our maps of the world come into play during stressful and
heartbreaking moments in our lives. In difficult EOL situations, it is helpful for the
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medical team to be aware of the subtle interplay of good and bad maps of the world that
are at work within themselves and the family.
Second, mapping the world as a place of trust is related to the concept of
vulnerability. I do not mean vulnerable in the sense of being susceptible to physical or
emotional attack or harm, but in the sense of being able to share and express our
emotions, beliefs, and values with the knowledge that others will respect and honor us.
Again, is the world a trustworthy place (good) or is it not to be trusted (bad)? Will others
respect and honor my emotions, values, and beliefs? If we cannot be vulnerable and open
up to others about what we feel and think, our map of the world will contain points of
mistrust, shame, and fear. Nussbaum cites Winnicott and states that we must feel held, so
to speak, by our environment if we are to feel that our environment is trustworthy:
His idea is that the sense of self, and especially any inner depth or creativity in the
self, require a sense of safety that is not always being reinforced by the physical
holding of a caretaker. In order for this sense of safety to emerge, the child must
be able to feel held even when not being physically held: she must come to feel
that the environment itself holds her.183
Though Nussbaum speaks of children in this quote, she touches on a deep human
need across the life span. We may not trust that others will accept us for who we are and
what we believe, we will be ashamed of how we feel or think, and we might be scared of
particular cultures, experiences, or challenges. Being vulnerable with each other is a
human need. When others share their emotions and beliefs with us, we need to honor and
cherish them. When we are vulnerable with each other—when we are able to honor the
emotions, beliefs, and values of others—we are better able to empathize with each other
and help each other feel as though our environment is holding us.
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Nussbaum touches on the brokenness and suffering of what it means to be human.
It is in the pathos of the vicissitudes of life where we connect with each other, learn what
to value (good and bad), and are taught how to value the world and its people.
Vulnerability related to the self and in the other is an important psychological insight if
one is to see and embrace the other holistically as a unique individual. We are vulnerable
creatures, and it is in this vulnerability where we comfort, connect, and empathize.
Pannenberg’s Anthropology
The earlier discussion of exocentricity and centrality demonstrates the tension in
human nature around the capacity for empathy—a focus on the self or on the other can
dominate one’s map of the world. I have been focusing on intrapersonal dynamics in
Pannenberg, but interpersonal dynamics also impact human nature in his thinking. It is
within the interpersonal dynamics that we can think of God as present calling us to love
our neighbor as they want to be loved in difficult EOL cases. To tease out the ways in
which interpersonal dynamics relate to human nature, Pannenberg addresses the
relationship between the individual and society: individuals shape society and society
shapes individuals. Pannenberg concludes, “The ‘I’ or ego, does not stand as an
independent entity. … Rather, the ego proves to be dependent on its social context for the
determination of its identity.”184 This theory of the self and society has merit, in my
interpretation, because it shows the dependence of the ego on the encounter with a Thou;
the ego is not a sovereign subject.185 David, his children, his wife, the various physicians,
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and other members of the medical team are not completely autonomous subjects. In EOL
situations like this, there is intersubjectivity and it is within this (loving) intersubjectivity
where we can think of God acting.
Pannenberg ultimately draws on G.H. Mead and William James when developing
an understanding of the relationship of the individual to society. Humans are dependent
on the face of another, so to speak, for their identity. For Mead, individuals understand
their relationship to others through the ability to understand language and gestures of
others. When one makes a gesture, one sees how the other reacts to it thus perceiving the
gestures significance; one knows one’s own actions and that one’s actions are something
to which the other reacts. There is, in this scenario, both an ego and a self—an ego with
its own agency and a self-created by how others (i.e., the face of another) react to the
original ego. Pannenberg wonders: What is the true ego or self? Am I the original acting
ego or the socially constituted ego given to me by other’s reactions? William James
provides his answer for him: “The momentary ‘I’ that appears in the form of each
momentary unit of consciousness can exercise its synthetic function of appropriating its
objects to ‘itself’ only indirectly via the ‘self.’”186 The self, for Pannenberg and James, is
the socially mediated sense of self. There is an initial and very brief independent action of
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the individual, but in the end the ego and the self are tied together. The ego is given
vitality only in the reflecting back of itself from the face of another.
It is in the idea of a “face of another,” as I have described it, that Pannenberg sees
God in the socially meditated part of human nature. The child’s ego is dependent on the
caregiver in the early stages of development and develops a sense of basic trust. Humans
inevitably detach from their parents and direct their sense of trust about the world in
another direction. Pannenberg argues this basic need of humans to have an object of trust
shows there is a “‘theme of God’ inseparable from the living of human life.”187 Basic
trust is directed to an agency that is capable of providing limitless safety and trust. There
is, therefore, a religious thematic to all of life and a seeking of “God” in life. 188
The seeking of an agency of trust is the quest for wholeness in one’s life and it
comes back, in my interpretation, to Pannenberg’s idea of human becoming. This
provides a place to summarize Pannenberg’s understanding of human nature and draw in
the visional and obligational levels. Humans are, on the one hand, characterized by the
unique quality of openness to the world and exhibit reflexive thought patterns. Animals
are, on the other hand, bound by the environment, and their actions are solely dictated by
their instinctual behavior. As I said earlier, Pannenberg’s distinction here is too
simplistic, but we can adopt his thinking for looking at human nature.
Exocentricity, defined as self-transcendence, is the way in which humans
distinguish themselves from animals. Centricity is focus only on the self and a lack of
openness to the world. Though humans may be unique in their reflexive thought patterns,
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centrality and exocentricity characterize their human nature. Openness to the world
(exocentricity) creates a place for Pannenberg to talk about the image of God as a
teleological concept, something towards which humans move. Openness to the world is
ultimately being open to the absolute Other beyond the world. The quest of humans to
live into the image of God, however, is also fraught with overt and excessive focus on the
self in centricity. The self is not always focused on the other or God, hence the self is
guilty of the sin of pride and egoism. The process of other-focus and self-focus begins
early in childhood with the trusting relationship of the mother. The caregiver and a
relationship of basic trust mediate the sense of self. Once the child grows up, a new
source of trust is sought in an agency capable of providing a limitless sense of trust. In
this seeking of an agency of trust, sometimes the needs of the self become dominant. One
turns oneself into the agency of trust or puts one’s trust in a principle or agency incapable
of providing limitless trust. Other times one’s trust is directed at the appropriate agency
of trust.
For our purposes in difficult EOL cases, Pannenberg sheds light on the
intersubjectivity of the encounter between the family, medical team, and patient. Humans
become the image of God and get their identity from the socially mediated self. David is
not isolated from his loved ones, and the medical team is not isolated from the family. All
of the people involved in our case are connected to each other and are dependent on each
other for their identity. Pannenberg urges us to see our identity and being as dependent on
forces outside of ourselves: God and other people. Becoming the image of God means we
open ourselves to how we part of each other, and in doing so, we learn to trust each other
and care for each other.
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Empathy and Tendency-Need Level
The tendency need level of IPMR is rich with resources not only for illuminating
how the dialogue of care cultivates empathy and how we can think of God as present in
this dialogue, but also for deepening our understanding of empathy. First, we learn how
important the caregiver’s caring is in the early years of development. In these years,
humans can learn that someone is there to soothe their distress. The seeds are planted for
later development when humans can learn to differentiate between their own distress and
the distress of another, which is what Hoffman refers to as empathic distress. These early
years are also when humans develop a map of the world, what is safe/unsafe and
good/bad. People develop a trust and an ability to respond to the distress of others.
Second, under the auspices of the caregiver, we can think of God’s presence as part of the
dialogue of care. In seeking a symbol to hold our sense of hope, safe/unsafe, love/hate,
joy/despair, and insecurity/security, there is always a God-theme to life. I will flesh this
out more in the last two chapters, but for now, I will say that we can think of caregivers
as the presence of God. Caregivers do not become God, but they are the sacred vessels
through which we experience love and trust, the vessels through which love of neighbor
is shared.
Looking Ahead
The final two chapters will be devoted to bring the insights of this chapter
together into a definition of empathy that we can use to develop normative guidelines for
hospitals in difficult EOL ethics cases. There are many insights into empathy to mine
from the case study and our interdisciplinary thinkers. After I construct my definition of
empathy, the normative guidelines will serve to operationalize the insights of this chapter
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for use in hospitals. These guidelines will heavily emphasize the importance of empathy
in EOL situations. I do not think EOL cases should only be about empathy, but it is not
emphasized enough and it can help these cases reach a resolution.

CHAPTER SIX
INTERCULTURAL PRACTICAL MORAL REASONING: DEFINING EMPATHY
Definition of Empathy
The final step in the IPMR move is to bring together the reflections of the
previous interdisciplinary chapter. The authors ideas on development, emotion, God’s
presence, and relationships provided insights into empathy which can help us to
understand how practicing empathy cultivates neighbor love and facilitates resolution to
difficult end of life cases. Before moving into the strategic move of IPMR, I want to
make sure that the richness and depth of the last chapter are not lost. Here I will unpack
my interpretation of empathy based on my experience as a hospital chaplain, the case
study, and the insights from the last chapter.
Empathy is a practice that develops out of the developmental antecedents in early
childhood experiences with the caregiver as a result of the dialogue of care with
one’s caregivers and feeling felt. In adults, this results in the ability to understand
the mental and emotional states of others and a desire to respond to their distress
with compassion, in which we can think of God as present calling us to love the
neighbor as they want to be loved.189
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My definition of empathy comes primarily from the psychology of Martin Hoffman, the
theology Wolfhart Pannenberg, and the philosophy of Martha Nussbaum, but there are also influences from
the primatologist Frans De Waal, the psychiatrist Daniel Siegel, and the political philosopher Michael
Morrell. First, my definition eschews understanding empathy as a cognitive process between caregiver and
care receiver. Mid-twentieth century psychotherapy tended to understand empathy in this way. Carl Rogers
and Heinz Kohut, for example, speak of empathy in the psychotherapeutic relationship, respectively, as
“entering the private perceptual world of the other and becoming thoroughly at home in it …
communicating your sensings of his/her inner world,” and “empathy is a mode of cognition which is
specifically attuned to the perception of complex psychological phenomena.” One can see Rogers and
Kohut’s focus is on understanding the feeling and mental state of the other with very little emotional
resonance or congruence with the other. Carl Rogers, “Empathic: A Unappreciated Way of Being,”
Counseling Psychologist 5, no. 2 (1975): 3. Heinz Kohut, The Analysis of the Self (New York: International
Universities Press, 1971), 300. I side more with the social and developmental psychologists Nancy
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In order to unpack this definition and bring in the interdisciplinary thinkers from
the previous chapter, each of the italicized phrases will be parsed out below. Each
subsection will bring in elements of the case study and the interpretations from the
previous chapter. I will close the chapter with a section on the limits of empathy. It is
important to know the strengths and weaknesses of empathy. It is not a magic pill that
will fix all that ails difficult EOL cases.
God as Present Calling Us to Love
I am going to start with the last element in my definition of empathy. From my
perspective as a chaplain, this is part of every element of my definition. I say this because
for Pannenberg humans are always in the process of becoming, becoming the image of
God towards which a loving God is calling them. As we develop, God is present calling
us to love; as we experience a dialogue of care with others throughout life, God is present

Eisenberg and Janet Strayer who define empathy as “an emotional response that stems from another’s
emotional state or condition and that is congruent with the other’s emotional state or situation.” Nancy
Eisenberg and Janet Strayer, “Critical Issues in the Study of Empathy,” in Empathy and Its Development,
eds. Nancy Eisenberg and Janet Strayer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 5. However, even
though Eisenberg and Strayer highlight that empathy is an emotional and affective congruence, I favor
defining empathy as containing both emotional and cognitive elements. I think this more multifaceted
definition captures everything involved in empathizing with another person. Pannenberg, Nussbaum, and
Hoffman will be extensively discussed in this chapter, so I will briefly describe the others’ influence on my
multifaceted definition here. Drawing on Morrell, empathy is process or dynamic between people.
Empathy is not an emotion in and of itself, though emotions are experienced in the process of empathy.
One should say one had an empathic interaction with another person as the result of the proper pathways
for the flow of emotions to take place. Second, drawing on Siegel and neuroscience, empathy is the
presence of resonance or attunement in the developmental process. Attunement or resonance is important
because feeling felt is the central element of an empathic dynamic between people. For Siegel, feeling felt
results in the development of neural pathways of emotional connection. Third, similar to the way that
Siegel describes in his comments on the development of neural pathways, De Waal speaks of a mechanism
in the brain, which grants the ability to read the emotional states of others and responding accordingly. The
brain needs a place to experience emotional contagion of another. But, and leading into one of key
elements of Morrell’s argument on reactive intrapersonal outcome, De Waal requires a response or action
from the observer. This is a response to the felt internal empathic dynamic. See Morrell, Empathy and
Democracy; Frans De Waal, Primates and Philosophers; and Daniel Siegel, The Developing Mind.
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calling us to love; and as we try to understand other’s thoughts and feelings, and respond
to their distress, God is present calling us to love. For Pannenberg love is God’s essence,
God’s action, and the totality of God’s being. The anthropology that we explored in the
visional, obligational, and tendency need levels were all part of how this loving God acts
within God’s creation. The openness to the world made possible by humans exocentricity
is part of this radical and reckless love that allows us to step outside of ourselves to
embrace others; the need for and dependence on social relations is God’s love working in
and through each other; and God’s love calls us to care for each other in times of
suffering and in times of need. Love is the radical force that breaks open and breaks into
the brokenness of creation and works within the tissue and sinews of God’s people and
God’s world. I am focusing on a very small part of this call to love, empathy, but
empathy is necessary in difficult end of life situations if we are to heed God’s call to love
our neighbor.
Love is present in the visional level of Pannenberg’s thinking. I see love as
present and part of his emphasis on exocentricity and openness to the world. Our ability
to reflect on ourselves—as connected to each other yet distinct from each other, as we
saw in Hoffman’s psychology—is one of the ways that we can think of God working
within us to love our neighbor, a love that moves to penetrate and touch suffering in order
to understand the nuances of that suffering. I will say more about how this is an ideal way
for love to function in the following section on the limits of empathy, but this is an
important part of empathy’s gift.190

190

Is love only present when an entity has the ability to be open to the world and exocentric, to
use Pannenberg’s terms? Since Pannenberg states that animals are centric, what do we do with centric
creatures that can show love? When I use Pannenberg’s distinction between humans as open to the world
and animals or nonhumans ask closed off to the world in this way makes it seem like there is only Love
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Love is also present in our obligations to others. Given our ability to be open to
the world, there is an obligation to love others. Given the brokenness of creation and the
suffering of creation that touches everyone and everything, which Pannenberg defines as
despair, we are called to love each other as we suffer together. Being present with and
caring for those who are suffering brings a measure of hope and grace to situations of
despair and brokenness. Given that we are who we are because of our social relations and
loved ones, we are called to love each other and care for each other.
Love is present in meeting the needs of others. Each of us has a need for a basic
trust in the world, and this is often mediated through the caregivers in our life. Caring for
another and helping them cultivate a basic trust in the world is an act of love. If someone
has this trust, their map of the world is one of goodness—or at least good enough so the
badness, so to speak, is met with goodness of care and love.
The Case Study
“God calling us to love” is not necessarily a different part or layer of David’s
case. Just as I see God’s call to love in each part of the definition of empathy, I see the
parts of the case explicated so far as part of the ways in which God’s love plays a role in
this case. We can think of God as present in each of the lives of the family and the
medical team as they developed and grew into the people that they are now in the
particular moment of the ICU. We can think of God as present in the dialogue of care

when an entity has the ability to be open to the world. I do not believe in such a rigid hierarchy. There are
many types of love and humans or animals are still caring for and tending to each others needs even if they
live a more biological life and not a biographical life, biographical in that they can think about their
thinking and situate themselves in history. However, for the purposes of interpreting and defining empathy,
I do think the capacity to be open to the world and exocentric is necessary. Empathy is a practice that
requires complex cognitive and emotional mechanisms.
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between the medical team and David, David and the family, and the family in the medical
team; care is present in each of these relationships as God pulling the medical team to
love the family as they want to be loved. We can think of God is present calling the
medical team to love in the moments where they understand the mental and emotional
state of the family; when neurologist understands the family’s desire to go to another
hospital to keep trying for recovery, when the clinical coordinator asks the members of
the team to try and imagine if they were in this family the exact situation, and when
members of the family don’t agree with the wife’s decision and still support her. These
are all examples of places we can think of God’s presence calling each of those people to
love through empathizing with those in distress in this case study. The medical team
cannot “love the family as ourselves.” The love required in this case is the love that
focuses on the other, the needs and suffering of the family.
Developmental Antecedents
We can see the developmental antecedents of empathy in all three of the thinkers
from the last chapter. We touched on these mostly in the tendency-need level of the last
chapter. Pannenberg and Nussbaum emphasize the importance of development in the
early years of life. In these early years, the relationship between the child and caregiver
cultivates a basic sense of trust in the world and the child’s sense of identity. Trust in the
goodness and/or badness of the world, to use Nussbaum’s words, depend heavily on the
dynamics between children and their early caregivers. Empathic interactions with the
caregiver will help this face become trustworthy, thus helping the child, but the face may
not always be trustworthy and can cause distress. As we will see in the closing section of
this chapter on empathy’s limits, humans can have multiple motives when empathizing
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with each other that are part of complex human behaviors. Caregivers will not always
embody God’s love—empathizing with their children and loving them holistically as
unique beings worthy of honor and respect. Despite this potential absence of love, to be
human, created in the image of God, is to experience despair and long for unity. Humans
continue to seek love, care, trust, and unity It is in this face of the caregiver that humans
may experience God’s love in, through, and under the auspices of the love of the
caregiver. It is in the face of the caregiver that humans can experience empathy and learn
how to empathize with others.
Hoffman lays out the descriptive account of how empathy develops, and it is
within this descriptive account that we can think of God’s presence. Hoffman’s
development process in the tendency need level is the most concrete example of
developmental antecedents. Again, there are four main stages. An important element of
the first stages is the empathy of the caregivers with the child as growth occurs. These
empathic interactions help the children understand their own inner feeling states and in
turn begin to see others as having their own unique feeling states. Hoffman’s veridical
empathy, stage four, is where the developmental process arrives at what we would call
empathy—the process of seeing the other’s feelings and needs as separate from one’s
own. For example, in the previous stage a child would soothe a distressed person using
methods the child found helpful, whereas in veridical empathy, the child adjusts and uses
methods the distressed finds helpful. The child makes connections between their own
feelings and the feelings of others, understands the same event can cause opposed
feelings, draws on another’s reaction to a situation when constructing their own feelings,
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and are able to make assessments about what one would normally feel in a situation and
what a specific person actually feels.
The Case Study
In the composite case study, each of the people involved have their own
developmental history with their respective caregivers. This element of empathy plays a
role to the extent that the developmental history of each of the people impacts how they
respond to the EOL situation under consideration. However, simply because someone in
the case was not able to exhibit empathy in this situation, it is not an indication of
distorted or dysfunctional developmental antecedents. There are many factors at work in
the case study such as professional role and identity, the emotions of being in crisis, the
values and beliefs of the medical team and family, and power dynamics between medical
team and family, to name a few. No person can or should empathize with others at all
times. However, the developmental history of each of the participants—to what extent
they experienced trust, mistrust, joy, love, and despair—does impact how they respond to
others in the case. As I have said, it is the medical team’s job is to care for and to
empathize with people who are suffering, but the suffering are not required to empathize
with the care team.

Dialogue of Care and Feeling Felt
The dialogue of care and feeling felt is a core component of the developmental
antecedents mentioned in the previous section. The dialogue of care refers to not only the
way in which the caregiver interacts with the child, but also to the ways in which the
child interacts with the caregiver, and the ways in which the child, caregiver, and social
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communal relationships interact with each other. Feeling felt is important for empathy
because as a child is empathized with so they may be able to empathize with others.
This element of my definition may seem like a repeat of the previous section, but
the dialogue of care and how people feel felt is a specific part of the developmental
process and the human experience in general. We depend on others not only for care but
also for our identity: people are dependent on their context and become who they are
because of their social relationships. This is part of the image of God, part of how
humans are created.191 Feeling God’s love through the love and presence of caregivers is
crucial at the beginning of life, but people need the love and presence of others
throughout their life; as we grow, the caring becomes more complex as we give and
receive care, but we are created to need this throughout life. Caregiver and child are the
major players in the dialogue at an early age, but it is crucial not only for people to give
and receive care throughout their lives, but also that people feel felt throughout life.192
Nussbaum reminds us of the deleterious effects that an absence of this emotional
resonance has on the life of children and adults. Hoffman also reminds us of the
importance of emotional resonance, and though he focuses a great deal on the early years
of life, his focus is also on adulthood. The caregiving and caring relationship is important
for people at every stage of their lives.
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David Hogue supports this claim from a theological perspective: “We are born in relationship
and we are nourished by human connections throughout life. There is a very real sense in which the soul
exists only in its connection with other souls.” See David Hogue, “Brain Matters: Neuroscience, Empathy,
and Pastoral Theology,” The Journal of Pastoral Theology 20, no. 2 (2010): 25-55.
192

Alan Sroufe, “Attachment and Development.” (chp. 1, n. 13).
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The Case Study
Combining our three thinkers, the dialogue of care is present in larger ways in the
case study: the relationships between the family members, the family’s relationship with
David, the relationships among the members of the medical team, the medical team’s
relationship to David, and the relationship between the medical team and the family
members. We can see how complex and difficult it can be to make a decision about what
should be done for David given all the variables present in these relationships. If we
reduce the above list to the core relationships, then I think we end up with the
relationship of the family and the medical team, the family and David, and the medical
team and David. First, the medical team is taking care of the family as they are taking
care of David. Some members of the team both emotionally and physically (i.e.,
hospitality for the family and/or medical procedures for David) take care of the family,
and other members of the team focus on the former or latter. When the medical team
feels conflict in these dual relationships—when what the family wants for David goes
against their conscience as medical professional—caring for the family becomes difficult.
Second, as part of the family, David has taken care of his family members in various
ways over the course of their history. All of the family members have their own feelings
about the care (or lack thereof) that David gave them. The family has also taken care of
David. Now, they are especially attuned to how they can take care of him in the midst of
the crisis. Third, and mentioned a little bit in the first point, the medical team is taking
care of David. This is both a personal and a professional care. Professionally, David was
brought to the hospital in an emergency situation and it is their duty and obligation to
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take care of David. Personally, most members of the medical team got into the practice of
medicine because they want to take care of people; they want to take care of David.
These three relationships of caring demonstrate the ways that people are
determined by their relationships with each other. For Pannenberg, community is part of
the image of God; because we are, therefore I am. We are not autonomous individuals but
a community of people caring for each other. We care for each other in the midst of
brokenness and suffering in the hope that we feel the presence of Love that unites us
together and casts out despair. For Nussbaum, compassion, joy, invulnerability are the
words she puts to this kind of love that unites. When people experience shame, distress,
and badness, as it were, it is Love that casts out despair.
Understand Mental and Emotional States of Others
This component of the definition depends in large part on the previous two
components of the definition. First, we can draw on Pannenberg’s understanding of
exocentricity and the image of God. Humans are created with a capacity for
exocentricity, which includes the ability to reflect on the self and differentiate the self
from others, and in turn to understand someone else as a separate self with separate needs
and concerns. Exocentricity is characterized by a “presence to the other as the other. …
Grasping of an object as an object distinct from the self, one becomes aware of its
otherness.”193 If one is able to name something as an object, then one understands
oneself as separate from or a perceiver of the object, and going further, one can then
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Pannenberg, Anthropology, 66-67.
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reflect on an “object” reaching beyond the possibility of all objects of perception to an
absolute Other.194
Again, we can see this openness to another and a reaching beyond the self in the
development of empathy. Ideally, because of the empathy they received in childhood and
their own growing awareness as they matured. As adults, children will be able to
understand and differentiate the mental and emotional states of others from their own.
Caring for those in distress (i.e., Hoffman’s principles) requires these capacities—to see
another’s need and distress as separate (e.g., exocentricity) and not focus on our own
needs exclusively (i.e., centrality). Our map of the world—whether the world is place we
can trust, and what the good and bad parts of the world are—depends on how well we
understand other’s thoughts/feelings and how well people understand ours.
The Case Study
In our case about David, there are moments when the people involved both
understand and do not understand the thoughts and feelings of each other. For our
purposes, the relationship between the two main units—medical team and family—is the
most important. Because the family members were the ones in the most distress, as well
as the fact that the medical team members were the default professional caregivers and
had the power in this situation, I will focus on the needs of the family. There are many
relationships within these two units, but we do not have enough space to address all the
nuances in these relationships. Hoffman’s concept of empathic distress helps illuminate
the emotions that are present.
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Ibid., 68.
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Each of the family members had a variety of needs—needs stemming from their
unique distress. Ann was feeling complex emotions from her strained relationship with
her dad, and even though she deferred to her mom, didn’t understand why her mom
would want to send her dad to a nursing home; Karna was overwhelmed, sad, and in
disbelief over the suggestion of comfort care; Sarah was upset at the suggestion of
comfort care and overwhelmed that her dad was in the ICU; and Steve occupied a place
between being upset at the suggestion of comfort care and confused why his mom would
want his dad to go to a nursing home.
There are members of the medical team who empathize with the family better
than other members. The neurologist and clinical care coordinator, for example, seem to
understand why the family wants to have David go to a long-term acute care hospital and
continue waiting to see if he can recover more. While they do not agree with this plan of
care, they are able to empathize with the family. Some of the other members of the team
struggle with empathy; this is not to say that they should feel and think the same way as
the members of the team who are able to empathize, I am only highlighting that there are
differences. These members care deeply for David and struggle to empathize with the
family because of this care; they do not want to see David condemned to a life of a
minimally conscious state in a long-term care facility, making trips to the hospital for
treatment of infections.
The medical team responded to the needs of the distressed family in a variety of
ways. In the day-to-day care, the entire team cared for David and provided the love and
hospitality the family needed. As the case wore on, however, some of the members of the
team became less patient with the family. The attending ICU physician was angry with
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the family, was overall distant from the family, and remained angry months after David
had been discharged from the ICU; the resident ICU physician could also not understand
why the family would want David to go through suffering, and eventually pulled away
from the family somewhat save for daily short updates; the clinical care coordinator
sided, so to speak, more with the family in that she understood the distress of the family
and tried to imagine herself in the distressed situation of the family; and the neurologist’s
tendencies were more nuanced as she occupied a middle ground between some of her
physician colleagues and the clinical coordinator—understanding the poor prognosis but
also reaching out to the family.
Understanding the emotions and mental state of the family is an important part of
the medical team’s role. If the family feels the care (i.e., care in the emotional sense) that
goes into taking the time and energy to understand what they are feeling, even on a basic
level this dynamic leads to trust––trust of the medical team by the family and trust that
they are being cared for. Being cared for, however, does not mean the family will agree
with the medical team’s recommendations. If the medical team cares for the family, it
also does not mean the medical team will agree with the family’s wishes. Remember that
I think empathy will help the case reach a resolution, not convince one group to agree
with the other. A resolution is one in which there is a care plan in place and there is
mutual respect and love between the medical team and family.
There is a clear benefit to empathizing with the emotions of the family, a clear
benefit that Hoffman captures in his developmental theory and in the studies that he cites.
Emotionally attuning with the family also creates a basic trust that is at the core of how
Nussbaum described the human condition. Basic trust in the world is how we can think of
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God being present in love through the caregivers. Emotionally connecting to the family
can touch on this deep in primal sense of hope and trust in the world. Emotionally
connecting to the family can help them develop a map of the world, a map of the hospital
that is good and sees the care that the team in the hospital gives them as good. We can see
how combining the insights of our three thinkers––Hoffman’s understanding of emotions
in development, Pannenberg and the cultivating of basic trust through caregivers, and
Nussbaum’s understanding of how we develop a map of the world—enriches this
component of empathy.
Respond to Their Distress with Compassion
We find the impetus to respond to the distress of others primarily in the
obligational level of reasoning in the last chapter. Out of love, compassion, and a sense of
care, each of our authors stress how we must respond to others’ distress. Such a response
may come from a desire to care for those in need, it may come from one’s overarching
principles, or it may be a combination of both. In a difficult EOL situation in the hospital,
the medical team may feel a desire to care for the family in need or may not want to help,
for some of the reasons highlighted in the case study, but help anyway. Not only does the
medical team have an obligation to care for the family, but they also have an obligation to
empathize and have compassion for the family.
Theologically speaking, the obligations I pulled out of Pannenberg’s anthropology
provide a firm foundation to make the argument for this obligation of compassion.
Because we are all created in the image of God with the capacity for openness to the
world, we are to honor each person and have compassion for them in their time of
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need.195 The exocentricity of humans allows them to be open to the world, open to the
world and not bound within the self. Openness to the world because of one’s ability to
step outside of the self allows one to participate more fully in the process of becoming.
Openness to the world allows us to be open to the needs of others when they are in
distress. We can step outside of ourselves to empathize and have compassion for the
suffering. Because we all experience the suffering and joys of being human, we have an
obligation to care for the suffering out of our common humanity. When people are
suffering and in despair, empathy helps, as much as possible, to understand and enter into
that moment of distress and bring some hope and unity to people. Because we are
dependent on our social relationships and the basic trust of the world that can be
cultivated in those relationships for our being, we have an obligation to have compassion
for and a love for those in distress that resonates with a basic trust in the world.
Continuing on to psychology, the basic premise of Martin Hoffman’s empathy
and moral development is the ability of a subject to respond to the distress of another.
Some definitions of empathy stop at the understanding of the mental and emotional
experiences of others. For Hoffman, however, empathy requires that one respond to the
distress of others out of the principles of caring and justice. In this way empathy
contributes to justice, for in one’s ability to understand, recognize, and feel the distress of
persons and communities, one will be able to respond more specifically to their needs.
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There are obviously non-theistic paradigms that support compassion for people. For a nontheistic yet spiritual perspective see Hans Alma, “Self-Development as a Spiritual Process: The Role of
Empathy and Imagination in Finding Spiritual Orientation,” Pastoral Psychology 57 (2008): 59-63. In
place of God language and concepts, and drawing on the philosophy of Charles Taylor, Alma speaks of
spirituality as “what is of crucial importance to us,” thus connecting spirituality to values about the world.
In empathizing with others, our spiritual orientations qua values are confronted with other values. The
results of this confrontation are to help people to understand and respect others.
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Martha Nussbaum, in terms of philosophy, draws on compassion and
vulnerability as contributors to the public good and healthy communities. Compassion
stems from emotional development. In the process of development, emotions are crucial
to naming what is good and bad about the self and the world. Especially in the naming
and experiencing of what is “bad” about the self, one can experience shame and guilt.
Caregivers, hopefully secure and comfortable with what is good and bad within
themselves, ought to respond to feelings of shame and guilt in children with compassion
and embody a vulnerability about their own “goodness and badness” for the child. For
Martha Nussbaum, the dynamics of compassion and vulnerability are important for
creating whole and healthy communities and are necessary if we ever hope to be able to
come together as a community and care for each other working toward flourishing
communities.
The Case Study
I think insights of all three of our thinkers can be captured by a principle of caring
within the case study. Pannenberg’s anthropology provides us with obligations to care for
people who are suffering; Nussbaum stresses compassion for others throughout her
philosophy; and Hoffman’s principle of care addresses many issues in the case. The
principle of caring encapsulates each thread from above that relates to responding to the
distress of others with compassion. The family and the medical team disagreed about
what such a response would look like, however. Even within the groups of the medical
team and the family there was disagreement over what the response (i.e., the plan of care)
should be for David.
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The principle of caring took different shapes within the case study. The family of
David and Karna had different understandings of caring than some members of the
medical team, and within those two broadly drawn camps there were different
understandings of caring. Karna wanted to care for David in such a way that aligned with
their beliefs about what constitutes death and a life worth living: his heart was still
beating and he would accept the quality of life he would have in a nursing home. She
loved him and wanted to honor him in this way. Ann, Sarah, and Steve did not share the
same outlook on their dad’s situation. Ann leaned toward the beliefs of the medical team
but wanted her mom to make the final decision; Sarah sided more with her mom and her
grandparents; and Steve occupied a middle ground between Ann and Sarah. All of the
family members wanted to care for David—care for him because they saw him in
distress, in pain, and in need of help—even though they had slight variations of what this
meant.
The medical team also had different interpretations of the caring principle when
applied to David. The attending and resident ICU physicians did not understand why the
family would want David to go to a nursing home; the neurologist attending would not
have made the decision the family made but felt okay with their decision because of her
past experiences and embrace of the unknown; and the clinical coordinator, chaplain, and
social worker focused more on trying to get the medical team to understand the
perspective of the family. These are all different interpretations of David’s case, but each
of the members is trying to care for him. However, for the medical team, I think the
principle of care should focus more on the experience of the family. One may wonder
how I can ask so much of the medical team in terms of empathy and care. After all, the
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medical team members are not detached observers with no stake in the decisions the
family makes; they are charged with putting together a plan of care and a possible
discharge plan for the family. Frustration with the family could make it difficult to
empathize. I recognize this reality and will say more about it in the final chapter.
Limits in Our Ability to Empathize
We have almost arrived at providing normative guidelines for hospitals. Before
getting to that, however, we need to touch on the limits of empathy in order to present a
more complex picture of how it might work in end-of-life ethics disagreements in the
hospital. When I present my normative guidelines for hospitals, we must present a
complete picture of empathy for those guidelines to have any real significance and impact
for hospitals. I briefly mentioned empathy’s limits in the introduction so as to plant the
seed in the readers mind that empathy is not a magic pill that will fix all difficult end-oflife situations.
We generally think of empathy as a good thing. However, even our thinkers are
aware of its shortcomings—some explicitly comment on empathy and others provide
insights into empathy’s limits via their anthropology. Theologically speaking, we have
seen in Pannenberg how humans can exhibit openness to the world but they can also be
closed off to the world, what he calls centrality. Philosophically speaking, Nussbaum
does not fully support empathy and prefers the concept of compassion; for her, at its best
empathy is only able to understand another’s situation and is a cognitive exercise that
does not enter into another’s suffering. Psychologically speaking, Hoffman acknowledges
the mixed motives of empathy and psychological biases that can take place in our
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attempts to empathize with others. We will start with the theological limits, move to the
psychological limits, and conclude with the philosophical limits.
Theology
Within discussions of openness to the world and exocentricity, we have already
heard a little bit about how humans are closed off to the world, a force that struggles
against being open to the world. Part of the human process of becoming the image of God
as Pannenberg defines it is centrality. We could call this a variety of things: selfcenteredness, egoism, or self-love. These concepts do not touch on exactly how
Pannenberg defines centrality, but these terms may reverberate in the reader’s mind and
help the reader generally understand the concept.
Pannenberg first defines the centrality (as distinct from openness) as a state of
being dependent on one’s environment and simply reacting to it.196 He defines centrality
in this way to show how we are bound by the world, bound in that people are sometimes
unable to step outside of themselves and their context and are simply reacting to it. Our
inability mentally to step outside of ourselves and reflect on our thoughts and actions is
centrality. If we are simply reacting to and bound by the world, then we are not open to
the needs and concerns of others who are in distress. In moments of centrality, we have a
center within ourselves––the center that is not open to the world and keeps our
motivations, desires, emotions, and actions within ourselves. One can see how in these
moments of centrality it is difficult to empathize in such a way that focuses on the person
in distress. I do not think empathy is impossible in these moments, but the intersubjective
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encounter becomes clouded with the caregiver’s thoughts, feelings, and experiences more
than with the care receiver’s.197
In end-of-life situations, we can see how centrality could impact the exchange
between the family and medical team. Each of the people involved in this difficult
decision are part of the struggle between openness to the world and centrality. The wife,
the primary physician, the chaplain, and the patient’s children embody this struggle at
various points in the case. The wife and the children struggle within the family
relationships to empathize with each other. More importantly, the medical team struggles
to empathize with the family. Their empathy, or lack there of, was characterized by
centrality. Some of the members had a hard time stepping out of their own understanding
of David’s case and trying to experience it from the perspective of the family. This
dynamic or tendency is not something that we can ever completely overcome. It is simply
part of being human as we wrestle and struggle in our becoming the image of God. I do
not fault the medical team for this in our case study, but it is important to be aware of this
tendency as well.
This core limit of empathy is part of the psychological and philosophical limits
that follow as well. Each of the limits that our thinkers address is part of this over all
tendency and humans in ability to step outside of themselves. Whether we think about
that philosophically (i.e., treat empathy as a mere cognitive exercise) or psychologically
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(i.e., the biases and mixed motives) they both speak to what Pannenberg calls
centrality.198
Philosophy
Nussbaum speaks of empathy’s limits in a way that resonates with what
Pannenberg said about centrality. Her primary concern with empathy is that it does not go
far enough if we are actually trying to think of and respond to people that are in distress.
She does not deny the importance of empathy but she does not find it useful in and of
itself. Empathy fails to actually enter into and respond to pain in the world. She says all
of this because she understands empathy as follows: an imaginative reconstruction in an
individual’s mind of another’s good or bad experience. In this line of thinking, empathy
is more of a cognitive understanding of a good or bad experience; empathy is not about
responding to that experience. Because of this, she sees empathy as something that
creates a boundary or distance between the caregiver and the one who is suffering. 199 We
can see how this is similar to what Pannenberg said about centrality. In a sense she is
saying that one stays cognitively and emotionally trapped inside their own mind if they
only empathize with someone in distress. Empathy opens us up to the world and the
needs of others—since we are able to and interested in mentally reconstructing other’s
experience in her paradigm—but it keeps us mentally and emotionally bound.

I am reminded here of Don Browning’s claim in Religious Thought and the Modern
Psychologies of how modern intellectual disciplines have a “religious horizon” that shapes how they frame
the questions they attempt to answer and how they explore those questions. Browning makes the claim that
the modern psychologies, while they may not speak of theology or use explicitly religious terms, they
depend on the theological and religious metaphors to frame and structure their conclusions about what it
means to be human. Don Browning, Religious Thought and the Modern Psychologies (Minneapolis, MN:
Augsburg Fortress Press, 2000).
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Like centrality, I agree that empathy can be tainted with the cognitive needs and
concerns of the caregiver, but I do not think empathy is merely the imaginative
reconstruction that fails to move us to respond to others’ experiences. Empathy includes
an entering into and a response to suffering. I am not alone in seeing empathy as
including a response to distress of another and attempting to address, and therefore care
for whatever those needs are.200 I think this response is important because we cannot
simply make our way through life by imagining others suffering. This would either lead
to apathy or overload, different responses to just simply imagining others suffering. We
achieve a resolution, so to speak, if we actually respond to and attempt to help those who
are suffering. I am not sure why she cannot expand her understanding of empathy to what
she calls compassion. Thus, not only is Nussbaum’s definition of empathy reductionist,
understood in this way it will not be helpful for the caregivers in my normative
guidelines. My definition of empathy encompasses what Nussbaum says about
compassion.
Jesse Prinz has noted other limits to empathy in his philosophical perspective that
elaborate on Nussbaum’s understanding of empathy.201 First he does not see empathy as
very motivating since it is simply imagining what somebody else feels or thinks. Not only
is it simply imagining what somebody else feels, we tend to do this more with people that
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are relationally close to us;202 empathy is biased towards those we love and care about,
and we may not want to or be able to show the same concern for more distant persons. He
elaborates more but these are mostly variations of how empathy can be biased towards
certain people: cuteness or attractiveness of the other person impacts empathy, ability to
empathize with someone is connected to relational and geographical proximity, and
empathy can be manipulated by someone else’s perspective.
Nussbaum and Prinz’s comments on the limits of empathy help us further to see
what the struggles in our end-of-life case might be. If we take Nussbaum’s primary
objection to empathy and place it over our case, then we can see how empathy might
create distance between the medical team and the family. Is the medical team simply
imaginatively trying to understand the family’s situation as some sort of cognitive
exercise? Possibly, but I do not think it is because they see empathy as merely a mental
exercise for the mind to try to understand someone else’s situation. The medical team
may be drawing boundaries between themselves and the family, and I think these
boundaries are more likely part of the overall dynamic that Pannenberg sees as part of
being human. If the medical team and any of its members are only cognitively
empathizing, then that is because of the condition that he names. That is to say,
Nussbaum’s understanding of empathy may be correct if taken with Pannenberg’s
understanding of centrality. If there is the human tendency to focus only on the self, then
our ability to empathize may be a mere imaginative reconstruction of another’s suffering

We are also not obligated to empathize with every person. Galia Patt-Shamir, “The Limits of
Empathy: A Mengzian Perspective,” Comparative and Continental Philosophy 2, no. 2 (2010): 253-274.
Here Patt-Shamir makes the case for not empathizing with a Nazi general who shows no remorse for the
atrocious acts committed during the Holocaust.
202
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without actually entering into and responding to that suffering. Both Nussbaum and
Pannenberg show us how empathy can be limited by the human tendency to focus on the
self and not entering into another’s pain.
Psychology
Hoffman acknowledges two main limits of empathy, though these are not unique
to Hoffman. First, he highlights what he calls empathic over-arousal: “One’s empathic
response to the distressed individual becomes so distressing that it becomes personal
distress, which moves someone out of the empathic mode.”203 When the caregiver’s
distress becomes strong enough, it is no longer possible to empathize with and provide
helpful support for the person in need. This mental state is linked to what Hoffman calls
“egoistic drift” in that one stops empathizing and focuses more on one’s own distress
than the other’s. Compassion fatigue, in caregiving professions, is also a symptom of
over arousal and is made manifest because of the cumulative effect of caring for people.
This fatigue is more commonly referred to as burnout or secondary traumatic stress in
healthcare.204 People end up developing defenses such as hardening or indifference to the
situation of distress. There are a variety of individual differences leading to over arousal:
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There is no agreement on the relationship or hierarchy of compassion fatigue, burnout, and
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more empathic individuals, one’s sense of one’s helplessness or helpfulness, and inability
to regulate one’s emotions.205
Second, there are a variety of relationships that may bias our ability to empathize.
There is in-group bias where people empathize with individuals they interpret to be
similar to themselves and part of the same culture.206 There are three sub categories for
in-group bias. First, friendship bias is empathizing more with one’s friends. A study
involving four to five year olds showed more empathy toward friends than
acquaintances.207 Friendship bias distorts empathy and care because one empathizes more
with people they know and love. For example, if a member of the medical team was a
friend of David’s family, that member might empathize more with David’s family than if
they were strangers. Second, similarity bias is a relational bias that relates to more
concrete (like in-group) aspects of a person (skin color, sex, gender, age, etc.), and works
less with more abstract ideas like personal interests. For example, as a cisgendered
Caucasian male, it may be easier for me to empathize with people that also fit those
criteria. This distorts the caregiving relationship if I empathize less with someone simply
because they do not look like me, so to speak. Third, here and now bias favors victims in
the immediate situation more than in a situation perceived to be distant. The here and
now bias can result from any connection made with an individual that makes one feel
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closer to that person.208 Our case does not involve geographical distance. The medical
team and family are in very close relationship. However, there may be relational distance
resulting from the friendship and similarity biases.
Looking to the Final Chapter
This chapter served to reframe Pannenberg, Nussbaum, and Hoffman’s insights
from chapter five into definition of empathy to be used for the normative guidelines of
the following chapter. It was also important to acknowledge the limits of the practice of
empathy between people. So, what did we learn in this chapter?
First, the emotional dynamic and relationship with our caregivers in the early
years of our development play a crucial role in our ability to empathize with others; if we
are empathized with and feel cared for, then we might be able to empathize more easily
with others. It is important for us as we develop to feel as though our caregivers know
how we feel—to feel felt, as described above in the developmental antecedents section.
However, our ability to empathize is not set in stone by our early psychosocial
development. While feeling felt and experiencing empathy from our caregivers early on
is important for our ability to empathize, we can learn how to practice empathy later in
life as well.
Second, in order to empathize with others, we must be able to separate the
thoughts and feelings of others from our own. We must be able to understand the nuances
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of others’ thoughts and feelings, and to distinguish those from the nuances of our own.
As we saw in the case study, this is very difficult to do for the medical team. Pannenberg,
Nussbaum, and Hoffman demonstrate that we are prone to empathize more with people
that we know and feel close to in some way; there are also times when we cannot care for
and empathize with another because we are only worried about our own feelings and
thoughts.
Third, we need to respond to other’s distress with compassion. Responding with
compassion requires understanding the mental and emotional states of others, and being
able to separate our own thoughts and feelings from the thoughts and feelings of others.
Responding to distress with compassion contributes to the distressed persons feeling felt.
Responding to distress with compassion is part of loving the neighbor as they want to be
loved—loving them in a holistic way that honors and respects them as unique people.
The neighbor (i.e., the family in our case) could experience this sort of love as their
specific feelings, thoughts, and beliefs are honored. Compassionate responses to those in
distress, is not always easy, however. As humans, we are wrapped up in our own
thoughts and desires, and we can have a hard time responding compassionately to those
whom we see as different from ourselves in some way.
The definition of empathy in this chapter will help inform the guidelines in the
last chapter. As we explore these guidelines, it will be important to remember the limits
of empathy. No matter how much we understand the importance of and practice empathy,
there will be limits in our ability to empathize with others. Nonetheless, empathy is
important in the context of healthcare and especially in difficult EOL cases.

CHAPTER SEVEN
STRATEGIC MOVE: NORMATIVE GUIDELINES FOR HOSPITALS
Introduction
We have arrived at the final chapter. The last chapter ended with a nod to the
limits of empathy. The heart of the previous chapter, and the reason I spent so much time
exploring and defining empathy, is because the definition of empathy in the previous
chapter will serve as the foundation for the normative guidelines in this chapter.
There are many strands that need to be brought together in this chapter, and the
strands need to point to normative guidelines for hospitals, specifically medical teams, as
they try to practice and embody empathy with families in these difficult end-of-life
situations. All involved are trying to decide what should be done in a particular case. I
have used the example of David’s brain injury and admission to the ICU as an example of
such a case. Continuing to use this case as an example, we will return to various
arguments brought forth in previous chapters and use the normative guidelines to help
answer any lingering questions the reader might have about the ultimate trajectory of my
argument. Some of the threads that will be tied off are as follows: the ways in which
empathy and emotion are central to making moral claims and important at the end of life
when there are disagreements, the nature of loving our neighbor as they want to be loved
and the role that empathy plays, and my vision for making the ideal of empathy a reality
in end-of-life situations. I am sure there are others that the reader might find important—
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theological, philosophical, medical, or psychological—but alas I cannot attend to all
unanswered questions.
Looking Back
However, before I do that, I want to provide a quick summary of where we have
been so far. Part one included my introduction, my argument for empathy in clinical
ethics, and my methodology. I began in chapter one by saying that we are facing a unique
cultural phenomenon. We live in an increasing intercultural world, and by intercultural I
don’t mean there haven’t been diverse cultures up until this point, but that these cultures
are interacting in unprecedented ways; there are many more points of contact and more
fluidity and flexibility present between cultures then there has been in history. This
reality is present in hospitals particularly in end-of-life situations. Because of this intercultural reality, empathy is needed in these difficult situations. Empathy is needed
because values and beliefs can differ to a large degree and the emotions are central to
deciding what should be done in the end-of-life situations. Empathy helps the medical
team connect with family and help them feel cared for so that a resolution is possible.
The composite case highlights that better reasoning will not necessarily bring the medical
team and family to the “right” conclusion.
Following the claim that empathy is important, in chapter two, I demonstrated not
only how emotions are central to making moral claims but also that empathy is necessary
given the intercultural reality and the inability of “loving our neighbor as ourselves” to
truly meet the needs of the family in distress. Loving the neighbor as ourselves arose out
of a cultural climate when it seemed possible to assume that loving our neighbor was
essentially loving another version of ourselves. One’s neighbor generally (but not
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specifically) looked like, talked like, and believed like ourselves. I ended this chapter
with a short summary of the three thinkers that would take up the rest of the dissertation
while highlighting empathy’s importance.
Chapter three consisted of laying out an interpretive paradigm that I called revised
fundamental practical theology. I selected this interpretive paradigm to help provide a foil
for exploring empathy’s role in difficult end-of-life situations and the dense thinking of
Pannenberg, Hoffman, and Nussbaum. A practical theology that focused on the practical
moral reasoning of Don Browning seemed an apt companion for clinical ethics at the end
of life. I will not detail the methodology again here. The various levels of my interpretive
paradigm guided the majority of the dissertation: descriptive move, intercultural practical
moral reasoning move, and this final chapter, the strategic move.
Part two consisted of chapters four through seven, the final chapter. These
chapters contained my revised fundamental practical theology. Chapter four was the
descriptive move and included an in-depth description of the case in the ICU, which
served as a fertile ground to explore empathy. Chapter five was the IPMR move and
stepped away from the case study using the paradigms of our three thinkers to reflect on
and provide insights into the concept of empathy so as to arrive at a definition. The case,
though in the background, was never very far from the IPMR move. Chapter six, also part
of IMPR, put the insights into empathy from the previous chapter together in a definition
of empathy, grounded in the case study, that will serve as the foundation for the
normative guidelines proposed in this chapter.
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Normative Guidelines
These guidelines arise out of everything that has come before them. They are the
heart of the dissertation and focus on my goal of exploring the role that empathy plays in
difficult EOL ethics cases. The guidelines will address how important emotions and
empathy are at the end of life, what it is precisely that I mean when I say “love your
neighbor as they want to be loved,” and how hospitals and ethics committees can practice
empathy and bring these guidelines to life in their context. Answering these threads
within the normative guidelines will help to demonstrate why I think empathy is a major
part of the answer to difficult end-of-life cases instead of some other answer. To put my
thoughts more colloquially, medical teams have to show the family they care before the
family will care what they say. The hospitals and medical team need to embody greater
affectivity to help these cases not only be less distressing for the medical team but also to
help the medical team embody empathy for the family so a resolution is reached.
The Medical Team is Required to Empathize with the Family
This first guideline comes out of the over-arching vision that each of our three
thinkers cast and the nature of the relationship between the medical team, the family, and
the patient. From this case and the vision of care that our authors cast, I interpret a
mandate to care for the suffering. In the context of my argument, I extend this to propose
a mandate for the medical team to empathize with the family in their suffering. The
dynamic between the medical team and the family is such that medical care providers are
charged to take care of sick and they have the expertise, the resources, and power in their
encounters with family. The family came to the hospital in the state of anxiety and chaos,
and they look to the medical team to help them. I am not proposing this mandate because
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I think medical staff would treat the family poorly by default, but because in situations
like our ICU case it can be very difficult to empathize with the family when the values
differ and each would decide on a different plan of care for David.
Connection in Life’s Tragedies
We know that tragedy is part of life, or at least we ought to know this. Humans
experience times of distress and loss. In these moments of tragedy, it is part of our call as
God’s children to reach out to others who are suffering tragedy. Pannenberg, in response
to the common theme of misery in the human condition, calls us to reach out and care for
those who are suffering. Nussbaum provides the most explicit directives in the midst of
life’s tragedies. Out of the recognition of our own vulnerability, tragedy strikes to the
heart of being human and we are called to have compassion for those who are suffering.
The overall thrust of Nussbaum’s theory of emotion is that a society that practices
empathy and compassion is able to flourish and live more complete lives. Again, her
perspective comes from a realization that tragedy strikes all of us and societies need to be
able to have compassion for those that go through such tragedy: “Tragedy asks us … to
acknowledge that life’s miseries strike deep, to the very heart of human agency itself.
And yet we are to insist they do not remove humanity, the capacity for goodness remains
when all else has been removed.”209 When a society stresses the importance of empathy
and compassion, citizens are able to empathize with the joys and the sorrows of human
life and experience. Communities must respond to people in distress with empathy and
compassion; medical teams must respond to families in distress with empathy and
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compassion even when they do not agree with the family’s decision about what should be
done.
There are many places in Pannenberg where we could make the argument for a
mandate to empathize with the family. However, since we are focusing on the dynamic
between the medical team and family and why there is a mandate to empathize with a
family in distress, Pannenberg’s interpretation of sin, despair, and suffering provides
more fertile ground for this guideline. Our mandate arises from the fact that, knowing our
own true nature, we respond to the same dynamics in others. Here the other might not be
suffering exactly as I am (i.e., they are not another self) but has similar vulnerabilities.
The family is in a state of suffering and despair over David’s brain injury and what this
will mean for his life and their life. Because all of us are part of creation and experience
brokenness in a variety of ways––broken and sick bodies, broken social relationships, and
broken systems where the powerful benefit from the poor––we have a mandate to take
care of those who are suffering.
Because of our true nature as humans who experience illness, fractured
relationships, and unjust systems, we have a mandate to empathize and respond to other’s
distress through love. This is God’s essence and what God calls us to in the process of
becoming human. Nussbaum’s interpretation of tragedy and the human condition
resonates with the idea of brokenness; both necessitate a response to that suffering with
love. The medical team, via the pathway of empathy, can begin to respond to the family’s
distress with compassion and love. In this response to the brokenness of the world, we
can think of God as present calling us, in the concrete moment of end-of-life decisionmaking, to love the family. This is a concrete moment in the life of the world when the
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grand theological speculations on God’s relationship with the world and what it means to
love the neighbor can become a reality. Neighbor love is not some antiquated abstract
religious dictate from a bygone era. The people of God can become the flesh of their
words and beliefs. There are many times when God’s people talk about neighbor love and
believing we are called to help people in distress. We must use our ears to listen
empathically to people in need; we must use our arms to embrace those who are crying;
and we must use our legs to walk toward people who are in pain. We must use our flesh
to love people who are crying out for help.
Care as Normative Frame for Life
Like the mandate to care for those who are suffering tragedy, there is an argument
to make caregiving a normative frame for one’s life.210 Pannenberg, Nussbaum, and
Hoffman’s arguments for caring for others are the core of this guideline. We are to be
open to the needs of others, take care of those who are in pain, help others flourish
through compassion. All of these are part of why I think the medical team must
empathize with the family in difficult EOL situations.
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There are many researchers who study the relationship between care and justice. Martin
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For Pannenberg, I would argue the process of becoming a child of God
necessitates caring as a frame for one’s life. In moments of brokenness, we are to be open
to others and reach out to them to help. Though Hoffman doesn’t emphasize tragedy and
brokenness like Pannenberg, his psychology and principle of caring contain a similar
response to the pain and suffering of the world. The principle of caring is something that
calls us to care for those who are suffering. Caring is concern for the well-being of
others—their need for food, shelter, avoidance of pain, and self-respect—and helping
those in need or distress. Here again we see that there is a mandate to help those in need.
Especially for Hoffman, this principle of caring catalyzes caregivers to empathize with
people in distress. If someone holds to the caring principle strongly enough, it can even
pull someone out of the state of indifference and apathy to reach out to those who are in
need of our help.
I would argue that regardless how any particular member of the medical team
feels about David’s family, the caring principle in Hoffman, based on his review of
numerous psychological studies, provides the mandate for the medical team to empathize
with the family. This is not to say the medical team lacks care in David’s case. As
medical professionals, there is a great amount of care and concern for the family and
David. Not only do they care for the family through their actions as medical professionals
(i.e., care as receive medical care), but they also exhibit care in the emotional sense for
the family. Again, one of the reasons some of the team members are distressed by the
family’s decisions is that the team members care about (i.e., are concerned about)
David’s suffering. But the mental and emotional framework of their care may not focus
on the family, the people who have less power and control in this situation. Empathy with

192
the family helps shift the dynamic between the team and family so that family feels cared
for, honored, and respected.
Medical Team’s Empathy and End of Life
This first guideline partially addresses of the way in which empathy helps the
medical team love the family as the family wants to be loved. On the one hand, I do not
interpret this to mean that the medical team is required to do absolutely everything that
the family asks of them; hospitals are not like an à la carte cafeteria where families
simply pick whatever they want. On the other hand, the medical team cannot practice
paternalistic medicine by drowning out the voices of the family. Loving the family as
they want to be loved is more about shifting the perspective of the medical team to enter
into the thoughts, perspective, and feelings of the family instead of loving the family
from the team’s perspective. This guideline speaks to the overall dynamic between the
medical team and the family in an effort to shift the focus to the family’s experience.
Requiring empathy from the medical team will push the team to focus their care,
compassion, and insight through the hopes and values of the family. Empathy will not
only help the medical team to get a sense of the family’s experience on a superficial
level, but also will change the intersubjective experience of the encounter. The more that
the medical team can embody what it means to be human—their own emotions, their
ability to take care of people, and their desire to help people who are in distress—the
family and the medical team will experience the relationship differently. When the family
feels felt by the medical team, trust and comfort may enter the intersubjective encounter.
Having worked with many different medical teams in my time as a chaplain, I
understand how difficult this guideline could be for the medical team. I also struggle with
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this at times as a chaplain for a variety of reasons. There are times when I completely
disagree with a family and cannot fathom why they want to keep their loved one full
code, for example, or why they want to send their loved one to a skill nursing facility
given the likelihood that their loved one will likely only minimally recover
neurologically—never knowing who they are or who they are with. Overall, it can be
hard to empathize with people that we have just met, do not agree with, and are not part
of our intimate relationship circles. As we were reminded multiple times in the limits of
empathy, empathizing with distant others for people that aren’t our kin is difficult to do.
As a chaplain, starting with empathy, even in the face of its limits, helps me to embody
neighbor love and overcome some of the obstacles. These moments of difficulty are
opportunities to become the flesh of my words. Chaplains are responsible for providing
spiritual care to people of all belief systems, and in these moments of difficulty I can use
my flesh and body to provide spiritual care to people with whom I disagree. I can enter
the room and sit beside someone; I can listen to their distress and help them process what
this means for their life; and I can help them sort through end of life decisions in light of
their belief system.
The Medical Team Must Attune to the Family’s Emotional State
This guideline comes from numerous threads throughout my argument:
Hoffman’s human development and its implications for emotional awareness, the concept
of basic trust in Pannenberg, and Nussbaum’s concept of a moral “map of the world.”
The second guideline will help address how the medical team is to love the family as they
want to be loved, and how emotions and empathy play a role in resolving intractable end
of life cases. First, the reader will note the onus is placed on the medical team to attune to
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the emotional state of the family, a position I espoused in the first mandate when
addressing “loving the family as they want to be loved.” The family of David is
experiencing suffering and it is the role of the medical team to attune with their emotional
state. The medical team can obviously care for David and the family without bothering
with the emotions of the family, but this is incomplete care. It has been demonstrated, not
only by Hoffman’s developmental paradigm but also in the research cited in chapter four,
that empathizing with the emotions of the family helps their healing and helps build trust
with the medical team. Second, connecting with the family on an emotional level is
central to providing care for the family and empathizing with them. As I showed in
chapter two, it is a well-known historical and philosophical fact that emotions play not
only a vital role in healing and building community, but also in making moral claims and
the decision making process. Aristotle, Aquinas, Hume, Schopenhauer, and our three
thinkers illustrate the importance of emotions in the moral life and in the decision-making
process. Given these historical and contemporary realities, a guideline for attuning to the
emotions seems necessary.
Emotional Map of the World
Understanding the mental and emotional state of the family is part of empathy. I
will not reiterate the details of Hoffman paradigm. Emotion is at the heart of his concept
of empathic distress and the cultivation of principles. Emotions are part of the dialogue
care and how we respond to people in distress. For the nebulous emotional world of a
young child, it aids their growth and well-being to have their emotions soothed and
responded to so that young child feels loved and validated. In adulthood, this takes on
more nuanced forms but the need remains throughout life especially in situations of
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extreme distress and uncertainty, similar to what David’s family experienced in the
hospital. It is vital for the medical team to empathize with the emotions of the family and
try to understand their emotions so that the family can begin to integrate this devastating
experience into their understanding of the world, but more importantly so the family feels
the love and care of a medical team.
We already know about the importance of emotion and its role in helping society
flourish, but more specifically related to the feelings of care and trust are Nussbaum’s
views on how we develop a map of the world. Developing a map of the world depends on
the ways in which one has experienced shame, guilt, despair, joy, hope, and love. The
map of the world can operate within us on a conscious and unconscious level. We can see
specific things in the world as good or bad, trustworthy or untrustworthy, and/or it can be
a general sense or expectation about the world and our life. A “good” map of the world is
not a complete absence of “badness.” A map of the world that is good will be one in
which we have felt shame, guilt, and mistrust, but when we experience these they need to
be met with the forces of love, care, and hope. Regardless of how the family has
constructed their map of the world, it is important for the medical team to validate and
hear the intense emotional experience of the family of David. This will help the family’s
experience in the hospital and in this pivotal moment in their life. They will hopefully
feel cared for and be able to have a good map the world in this specific situation. The
distress of the family needs to be met with the forces of empathy and love from the
medical team. The family members will bring their maps of the world along with them to
the hospital, but the medical team can help the family see the hospital as a place of
goodness, trust, and care on the family’s respective maps.
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Basic Trust and God’s Love
Basic trust resonates with how Nussbaum develops a map of the world. Like a
“good” map of the world, cultivating basic trust with the family may help them have
some hope, generally speaking, in the midst of their distressing situation. Our deep trust
comes from caregivers reaching out when we are afraid, in need, and distressed. We can
think of this reaching out and felt presence of love as God working through God’s people.
When people experience brokenness in the world, a sense of basic trust can help them
feel loved and have hope when they face despair and pain. Basic trust is not something
that we just have; it is something that grows and gets cultivated throughout life. It is
equally possible to have a basic trust in the world or to lack this trust, depending on our
experiences. Our sense of the world can also change throughout our life––at times feeling
hope in the world and at other times not. For those times in life when we feel this radical
trust in the world, and in those times when we are pulled out of hopelessness and feel
love, we can think of this as God’s love and presence in, under, and through the auspices
of those who care for us.
David’s family is in a situation of despair and hopelessness, and we can think of
the ability of the medical team to connect with the family’s distress and fear as God
reaching out to the family with love. When fear and hopelessness are so strong,
emotionally connecting with the family, and validating that fear, lets them know that they
are not alone in their despair. This is where we can think of God’s love as present—
present by simply attempting to understand and feel with the family in their need.
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Emotions are Central to Empathy and End-of-life Cases
This guideline addresses are why empathy is important at the end of life, why I
interpret empathy as a sacred ethic, and why empathy helps us to love the family as the
family wants to be loved. First, let us address the nature of empathy as a sacred ethic.
Empathizing with the emotional state of the family can help them feel loved. We can
think of this moment of love as God’s presence between the family and the medical team.
Our empathy with people who are in distress and suffering is a moment when we can
think of God as present calling us to love the family. The other’s distress resonates with
them and we can notice this distress in our own bodies. There is a vague sense awareness
that something is stirring, and when we intersubjectively experience this distress, we can
think of this experience as God calling us to love. Just as we can experience the warmth
and comfort of emotional resonance with another, so to we can experience the distress—a
distress to which God calls us to respond with love.
Second, empathizing with the emotional state of the family helps the medical
team love the family as they want to be love. Like the first guideline, this is not about
following absolutely every medical intervention that the family requests, but is about
entering into the lived reality of the family as much as possible––a shift in the mental and
emotional states that helps the medical team focus on the needs of the family.
Third, is the simple fact that emotions, and therefore empathy, are central to the
process of making decision are at the end of life. Emotions and feeling like others
understand ones emotions helps one develop a basic trust in the world, a map of the
world that is at times good and hopeful, and helps one to understand other’s emotions.
This is well-documented not only in the history of philosophy and theology, but also in
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the medical world as helping in the relationship between the medical team and family. In
intractable end-of-life situations empathizing with the emotions of the family can only
help these difficult cases find a resolution. If we remember from chapter two in the
discussion of clinical ethics, the EOL of decision-making process I outlined lacked
adequate acknowledgment of the emotional nature of clinical ethics. Emotions play a role
in making moral claims and in making decisions about what should be done at the EOL.
If the medical team can empathize with the emotions of the family, it will help the family
and medical team come to a resolution.
From my experience as a chaplain I know that connecting with the emotional state
of the family can be challenging. A medical staff person may be going through their own
distress either from their work in the hospital or from a myriad of other reasons in their
life. As we saw in the discussion about the limits of empathy, the very important need for
us to focus on our own distress can cloud our ability to sense or tap into the emotional
experience of family is in the hospital. There are also days when it is very difficult to
exert the energy that this requires. This could be from compassion fatigue and empathic
over arousal, and it could be simply part of the vicissitudes of being human. One possible
remedy for such a situation could be hospital policies or culture that encourages hospital
staff to be open with each other and honest about when they are struggling, so that others
can take over and provide care. I think hospital policy and culture could encourage team
members who are finding the work of empathizing with a particular family to admit that
and ask for help. If the medical staff is able to connect with the emotional world of the
family and help the family develop a sense of trust in the medical team, this will help
difficult EOL situations find a resolution.
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Medical teams must empathize with the values and beliefs of families
This guideline will sound very familiar to anyone that works in healthcare and
especially in hospitals. For a long time hospitals and healthcare institutions have been
talking about cross-cultural education and training for their staff. Medical staff attend
seminars on cross cultural encounters in healthcare, watch online content about different
cultures, attend workshops on eliminating unconscious biases that whites have for
nonwhites, and participate in a variety of other things to educate them about respecting
different beliefs, cultures, and values. Therefore, my suggestion that staff is open to
different worldviews and cultures may sound silly to people that work in hospitals. They
may say, “we are well aware of how important this is in and practice this already. We
know it is important to respect other peoples beliefs.”
I will grant that hospital staff are aware that they need to respect other peoples
beliefs, but if caring for a patient and family were merely about intellectual and cognitive
ascent to the notion of respect, then there wouldn’t be such a visceral reaction to families
who pursue courses of treatment with which the staff don’t agree. I am not talking about
situations in which respecting someone’s beliefs and different values simply takes a few
minutes to make dietary changes in the hospital menu for that patient or allowing the
family to have their religious leader come to the hospital room, for example. As in our
case with David’s family, I am speaking about the places where the values between
members of the medical team in the family differ at their core. For example, David’s
family sees the cessation of heartbeat as death, not the injury to higher cognitive faculties.
These are the disagreements of which I speak. “They don’t get it … They are being
unrealistic … Don’t they understand how sick he is and that he won’t recover … I feel
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like I am torturing him and don’t they know he is suffering,” are some of the things I
have heard in response to these cases. Those who have uttered similar things have every
right to these feelings. I have had these thoughts and feelings on more than one occasion.
When staff have these feelings, empathy with family members is important. Empathizing
with the beliefs and values of the families is about making an effort to understand the
family’s worldview and experience. Emotional empathy, so to speak, can lead to a desire
to honor the other by making an effort to understand. Empathizing with the values and
beliefs of a family is a consequence of emotional empathy. Let us take a close look at
being open to the dissimilar values of others and how we can love the neighbor.
Openness to the World and Honoring Each Other
There are many theological and philosophical threads from history on which to
draw to make this point. From my perspective as the chaplain, we have a God given
ability to be open to the world. We are, as I have stated numerous times, able to step
outside of our mental and emotional experiences and not only reflect on our own feelings
and thoughts but opened to the thoughts and feelings of others. We are made this way and
have this predisposition.
The medical team has the ability to be open to the values and beliefs of David’s
family. The medical team does not prevent David from going to another facility as the
family requests, so one could argue that in allowing this to happen they are open to
different values and beliefs about what should be done in David’s case. After all, they
met with the family twice, once in an ethics meeting and then in a family care conference,
and explained what they would recommend for David. Even though the family and
medical team did not agree, the staff explained their opinion respectfully and honored the
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family’s wishes. However, there were moments when the family could feel the anger and
frustration from the staff, where the family felt confused by the need for multiple
meetings with the team to keep talking about David’s prognosis, and moments where the
staff amongst themselves spoke about David and the family disrespectfully. “They don’t
really get it … they are not understanding or accepting reality,” so the thoughts of the
medical team went. Again, I too have shared in these thoughts about patients and their
families. I think practicing the first two guidelines will help with this guideline. If the
members of the medical team can empathize with the family, and in that understand the
family’s emotional state, being open to the values of the family will have a tendency to
follow from this.
For further support of this guideline we return to Nussbaum’s obligations of
respecting and honoring people other cultures, as well as her critique of the disastrous
effects that shame has on communities. I quoted Nussbaum’s primary obligation to
respect others in chapter five and I quote again here:
In particular, I assume that an adequate [normative] view should make room for
mutual respect and reciprocity; that it should treat people as ends rather than as
means, and as agents rather than simply as passive recipients of benefit; that it
should include an adequate measure of concern for the needs of others, including
those who live at a distance; and it should make room for attachments to
particular people, and for seeing them as qualitatively distinct from one
another.211
I have italicized two important points in her obligation that relate to my third
guideline. The first, dealing with agency, applies to how the medical team should relate
to the family. David’s family is not simply the passive recipients of the expertise and care
of the medical team. The expertise and experience of the medical team took care of
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David, but the family also has dignity as human agents and to have their wishes for David
respected. The second, dealing with the balance of focus on the family, has been well
explicated in previous sections. The medical team must make allowances for the needs of
the family. It is my interpretation that following the first two guidelines that I laid out,
will significantly contribute to openness to the values and beliefs of the family when they
differ to a large degree at the end of life. Connecting with the emotional distress of the
family through empathy will help the medical staff learn the story of the family, learn
what is important to them, what they value, and why David’s hospitalization is difficult.
Neighbor Love and Dissimilar Beliefs
The guideline “the medical teams must empathize with the values, beliefs, and
worldviews of families” picks up the threads from a slightly different angle. There is less
affectivity in this guideline, though it is still an important part of it. Overall, this guideline
continues to emphasize why empathy is important particularly at the end of life in
difficult end-of-life cases. The struggle is usually over whether the patient should be
placed on comfort care or whether the patient should go to another hospital or care center
in hopes that they will make some sort of recovery. Empathy is important in these cases
because values of the team and the family can differ to such a large degree and these two
options feel emotionally very different––one is a comfort care dying process and the
other is care that involves prolonged respiratory and physical rehabilitation. Openness to
and empathizing with the perspective and values of the family can help the two sides
come together. The intercultural reality of ethical strangers takes time and patience to
overcome. Given the limitations of empathy and our ability as humans to embody
empathy in helpful ways, using empathy in EOL situations may not always help.
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However, as humans we should have hope in the power of empathizing with each other
and our incredible ability to be open to others. As I have said, my hope is that empathy
helps the medical team and family reach a resolution—resolution simply being a plan of
care that honors the patient and the family.
So, how can this be done? Pannenberg speaks of love as a radical and reckless
abandon force in the world. It is my belief and hope that if the medical team takes a step
with empathy in those cases in the hospital where this feels impossible, the family and the
medical team will experience a deep resonance with this radical love that I think of as
God. The family’s beliefs may seem ridiculous and absurd; the family’s beliefs may seem
irrational and unrealistic; but if the medical team takes this step towards empathy I think
there will be unpredictable surprises in the family and the medical staff can come
together to find a resolution to an intractable case.
Bringing the Guidelines to Life
How are hospital staff that are involved with difficult end-of-life cases supposed
to make these guidelines a reality so that they actually impact clinical practice in the
hospital? I want to close by offering what I hope are helpful ways hospitals, and the
medical teams that provide care within them, can make these guidelines come to life. I
think my suggestions will work for the innumerably different contexts in which medicine
is practiced. My suggestions are aimed at helping staff learn how to embody the
guidelines in their clinical practice. One could say I am trying to cultivate the practice of
empathy by making it a habit.
These suggestions come from two places in my life. One, some of my experiences
as a chaplain comes from working in teaching hospitals that have resident physician
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training programs. I observed how the attending physicians used different approaches to
educating the resident physicians. Not all the methods of medical education are directly
transferrable to my goals here, so I will primarily draw on my observations of simulated
patient and family encounters. Residents would work through simulated patient and
family cases (surgical cases, medical cases, and sometimes family care conferences) and
then have time for reflection with a peer group on the process. Two, my training to
become a chaplain included case discussions with a supervisor and a group of peers. One
of the chaplains presented a case (e.g., verbatim) with an analysis of a patient’s
psychosocial spiritual dynamics and a record of the conversation noting the chaplain’s
internal dialogue during the visit. Discussing these cases provided opportunities for me to
grow in my therapeutic listening skills as I struggled to empathize with patients and
families. Working through cases in the following two ways can help medical team
members empathize with the family, empathize and attune to the family’s emotional
state, and cultivate openness to the beliefs of others.
Patient Case Simulations
One of the ways to bring the guidelines to life would be to work through
simulated patient cases with various members of the medical team. I imagine this taking
place in a conference room where the medical team, ethics committee, and family would
normally meet to have a family care conference on EOL decisions. The simulated case
would be a simulation of a family care conference with people playing the family and
medical team. It would help the learning if the people playing the family members and
members of the medical team had only general guidelines about the personality, values,
and role of their character. If the responses are too scripted, it can be difficult to fully
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experience the struggles and benefits of empathizing with someone. Here is an attenuated
version of such a simulated case. This is a case I helped develop with members of an
ethics committee to use to train new resident physicians in difficult EOL family care
conferences.212 Some of the medical terms may be hard for the reader to understand. I
want to provide an example of something that could be used with medical staff. I have
provided footnotes for the terms that may be new to some readers. I have copied the case
summary from this case here.
An Example ICU Case
The Case Summary
The medical team is about to have a second care conference with a family. Here is
the background information for this care conference. Frank is a 58-year-old male and was
hit by a commuter train in Minneapolis. He may have fallen or just stepped into its path,
thus this may have been a suicide attempt but this is not clear. He sustained a serious
head injury. He also has a broken hip, wrist and pelvis and a shattered ankle. At the scene
of the accident, Frank had a Glasgow Coma Scale213 score of 8. Upon arrival to the ED,
the computerized tomography scan (CT scan) revealed a subdural hematoma214, he began
declining (consciousness decreased, blood pressure fluctuated), which required an
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For the full example case, see Appendix A.
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Paramedics and first responders (and other medical professionals) use the Glasgow Coma Scale
to assess a person’s level of consciousness after a head injury. A score of 8 means he was responsive and
obeying commands but had a moderate brain injury. The scores range from 0-16: 0 is legally brain dead,
less than 8 is a severe brain injury, 8-12 is a moderate brain injury, and 13-15 is a minor brain injury.
214

A subdural hematoma occurs when blood gathers between the dura mater and the brain tissue.
There are various layers of the brain and skull. The dura mater and subdural space are the layers just
beneath the skull. The arachnoid mater and subarachnoid space, pia mater, and then the brain tissue follow
the dura mater and subdural space.
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emergent craniotomy215 to remove the hematoma. In the ED trauma room, he had a
passive blood alcohol level of 0.15.216 He was admitted to the surgical intensive care unit.
He has a ventriculostomy217 in place and he is on a ventilator. He is sedated and has no
decisional capacity. When the sedation is lightened, he becomes anxious and his
intracranial pressures increase.218 He does not localize to noxious stimuli219 and does not
follow commands.
After one week there was a care conference led by neurosurgery and the SICU
physicians who described his uncertain neurological prognosis. His wife Patti and
youngest son Jim who is thirty-eight attended that care conference. Patti left him 10 years
ago because of his drinking and abusive behavior. While she devoted most of her life to
her children, it was very hard for Patti to leave Frank and seek independence. She works
as an executive secretary currently. They are separated but not divorced. Patti said Frank
has a sister Sarah who lives in Vermont but does not really talk to or see Frank very
much. Her (their) oldest son Michael lives in California with his wife and two children.
Michael is connected with his mom but not his dad. Patti seems to favor less aggressive

215
A craniotomy is a surgical procedure where part of the skull is removed to perform brain
surgery. In this case, it was necessary to address the bleed in Frank’s brain.
216

Passive blood alcohol levels are recorded if the medical team cannot get the patient to blow
into the breathalyzer. One of the medical staff will place the breathalyzer in the patient’s mouth and record
the number when the patient exhales normally. I have only seen this occur in the ER when the patient is
disoriented or unconscious.
217

These are drains that drain fluid off the brain. They are inserted through a hole in the skull into
the cerebral ventricles. The ventricles are cavities within the brain.
218
Intracranial pressure, or ICP, is the amount of pressure inside the skull, thus in the brain tissue.
As the pressure rises, it becomes harder and harder for the brain to get adequate blood flow, in which case
the brain doesn’t get adequate oxygen.
219

This is a fancy way of saying the patient does not try to get rid of an annoying stimuli. The
patient must show intentional or purposeful movement to eliminate an irritating stimulus.
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care. Jim has lived with his dad for eight years. Jim does not really talk to Michael, his
older brother. Jim completed two tours of duty in Iraq and has struggled to find work. Jim
said his father worked until he was laid off 18 months ago when the business closed.
Frank is at the end of his unemployment and although he has looked, there is no work in
his field and he says he is too old to retrain. He is worried that his dad will lose his house.
He cannot recall his father ever going to a doctor and does not know much about his
dad’s medical issues, but Frank seems depressed and does drink a lot. Jim sometimes
drinks with Frank. Jim is Frank’s POA and Frank is Jim’s POA. Jim seems to favor a
more aggressive care plan. This is the second care conference because Frank has been in
the SICU for two weeks. The next potential intervention would be to place a tracheotomy
tube and a feeding tube. His estranged wife Patti, his eldest son Michael, his youngest son
Jim, and his sister Sarah attend this care conference.
Reflection with Medical Team Members
After the case has been acted out, there would be time for the participants to
reflect on what happened and where there was empathy, emotional resonance, and
openness to the belief of others. The following questions could be used as general guides
through this reflection process:
1. Overall, how did the family care conference go?
2. Where were there places the medical connected with the family’s
emotional state and the family responded well?
3. Where were there missed opportunities to empathize with the family?
4. How would you compare your ethical worldview to that of the family?
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5. What were your thoughts and feelings about the family before the
meeting, during the meeting, and then after the meeting?
Verbatims with Medical Team Members
In addition to going through simulated patient encounters like the one above, it
can be helpful to work through real cases. Medical teams could make time to debrief after
an EOL family care conference and focus on empathy for these debriefings, but the
reality of life in a medical setting makes this difficult. Team members rarely have time to
set aside for these professional development opportunities. After a family care
conference, staff are usually off to their next commitment. The best venue to review
actual cases could be in empathy medical rounds, so to speak. A member of the medical
team would be responsible for writing up a verbatim and presenting it for feedback. A
verbatim includes the following: a brief summary of the hospital course, a brief summary
of the family’s psychosocial dynamics, the dialogue of the family care conference, and
then an analysis of the family care conference. The dialogue needs to include the
thoughts and feelings of the presenter as he/she as they occurred in the care conference.
The analysis would need to focus on the relationship between these internal dynamics
and empathy, as well as an analysis of the family’s inter- and intrapersonal dynamics.
Verbatim Case
Here is an example from the dialogue section of a man who unexpectedly lost a
family member in the hospital. “C” refers to the chaplain, “F” refers to the family
member, “MD” refers to the physician, and “N” refers to the nurse.
C: I know this is hard right now, but
could you come back into the meeting
room for now.
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I wonder how useful this is for the family.
How can he possibly be taking all the
medical information in and digesting it
right now?

MD: This is a lot to hear right now F, but
I am going to tell a bit about how it
happened. (MD goes into a long
discussion of the hospital course and the
difficulties of the patient’s condition.)
F: That don’t work for me right now.
That does not sit with me right now. You
said you were working in his best
interests, to help him so it did not get
worse.

I feel terrible for MD. I know he must feel
completely responsible for what has
happened. I know how meticulous he is
with his patients.

MD: Yes, I looked at it and another
doctor did as well. We could see the
inflammation and were worried about
infection and a few other things. We
wanted to do this to help reduce the
inflammation, and we were aware of the
possible risks of doing so.

I want to know what exactly he means by
that. I am hesitant to broach the issue
fearing he may blow-up at the doctor.
That phrase causes me
anxiety…malpractice? Informed consent
to do the procedure?

F: (He keeps muttering to himself, “That
just don’t work for me … it don’t work
for me right now.” F gets up and walks
around to the window.)

MD: I know how this must feel,
especially given how things turned out.
We saw him getting better and thought
this would help him along even more …
possibly get to a point where he would be
able to talk to us. He was beginning to
track with his eyes…barely…but he was.
This was a step in the right direction. He
was doing fine after the procedure, but
then today we ran into the problems.
C: (F keeps quiet for awhile and shakes
his head. I sit down on the couch next to
him.) This must be so overwhelming right
now … to hear all this.
I feel unsettled sitting next to him. He feels F: This all don’t sit with me right now …
this way as well right now. He can’t
it just don’t work. (Pause) Can I go in and
handle what has happened.
see him?
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I am glad the care conference is over. I
want to talk to F alone.

C: (I make eye contact with Dr. F to make
sure she does not have anything left to
discuss.) Sure, J and T we can go in and
see E. (I lead them down to E’s room.)
F: (He tears up as we enter the room.
They pull back the sheet in order to see
his face and head. F puts his arms down
on the bed and puts his face in his hands.)
C: (We stand around the patient’s bed for
about five minutes while they emote. F
strokes the patient's hair.) I am so sorry F.
It is so hard to lose a loved one … so
much grief.

I finally want to ask him what does not
work for him, though I have a pretty good
idea by now.

F: I know… I know. This just don’t make
sense. He is so young … so young. They
said they thought it would help. It just
don’t make sense to me … it don’t work.

This case was obviously not about a difficult EOL ethics care conference, but it
highlights the layout of the dialogue section. With the dialogue laid out in this way, the
medical team members can help each other identify places where they could have
empathized and places where empathy occurred. (A video recording of an actual family
care conference could also serve this function, but there are a privacy issues to work
through with the hospital and the family.) Analyzing the analysis section also serves this
purpose. Did the presenter miss any obvious psychosocial spiritual issues with the
family? Do any members of the peer group have a different interpretation on the
presenter’s analysis of him- or herself? Picking apart a case like this is challenging work
and can be stressful for members of the medical team, but it is ultimately worth it since
the difficult work will help families feel cared for on a deeper level.
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The Chaplain
In addition to the exercises listed above, the physical presence of a chaplain can
be an empathy-teaching tool. Not only is the training and skills of a chaplain helpful for
learning how to practice empathy in the hospital, but the way chaplains are, their being,
can impact the team and the hospital staff. First, large part of the training and skills of a
chaplain revolve around therapeutic listening, and empathy with those in distress is
crucial for effective therapeutic listening. Chaplains have a master’s degree in religious
studies or theology. After the master’s degree, they have to seek further training in
clinical pastoral education (CPE). Chaplains have to have a minimum of four units of
CPE. Each unit of CPE is three months or around four hundred hours of clinical work.
The chaplain spends half the time in education and with a peer group, and the other half
of the time visiting patients, families, and staff in their clinical setting. The master’s
degree usually includes a course in spirituality and counseling, but the CPE training
includes more rigorous training in therapeutic listening. Similar to the verbatim exercise
mentioned above, CPE requires each chaplain to do multiple verbatims. Presenting one’s
own verbatims, listening to others present their verbatims, and visiting the patients, staff,
and families all help a chaplain develop their therapeutic listening skills and empathic
abilities. Once a chaplain starts working as a staff chaplain, they continue to hone these
skills through self-reflection and continuing education. The empathic and therapeutic
listening skills of a chaplain are analogous to the diagnostic skills of nurses and
physicians. Chaplains listen to and observe nuance in verbal and non-verbal
communication with the same attention that clinical staff give to lab results, what they
can see and hear, and imagery and ultrasounds. These skills are with chaplains when they
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move around their clinical setting and provide emotional and spiritual support to staff,
patients, and families. Given these skills and training, other members of the medical team
could observe the chaplain as a way to learn about the practice of empathy. The team
members would learn what it looks like to practice empathy in one’s day-to-day
interactions in a clinical context as the chaplain encounters families and patients in the
hallways, talks to staff members, and meets with patients and families in private rooms.
Second, while a chaplain is working within his or her clinical setting, the very
presence and being of a chaplain can encourage the medical team to practice empathy in
their encounter with a family. Given the training described above the chaplain can not
only teach the medical team about empathy through their skills, but can also create a shift
in how the medical team experiences the patient and family. The chaplain brings an
empathic perspective to every visit and encounter in a clinical setting. As a chaplain, I
have seen this take place during my encounters with staff. I will briefly describe an
example of the shift in perspective to which I am referring. I have changed some details
to protect the privacy of the hospital staff, patient, and family.
An American Indian family made a request to perform a smudging ceremony in
their room. Their loved one, the patient, was currently on a ventilator with a
tracheostomy. She could mouth some words but was unable to speak. This family
approached the charge nurse for the unit and asked if they could perform this ceremony.
On this particular unit, these ceremonies were not performed very often, and the charge
nurse responded in an irritated way, “Yes, the family can do this but it will take some
time for the hospital to set this up; the smoke detectors needed to be turned off and other
staff members needed to be notified.” The charge nurse paged me to let me know about
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the request. I visited the family and discovered they were not allowed to perform this
ceremony at the previous hospital, even though a smudging ceremony was very important
for them. The patient and her family had been experiencing family stress and grief this
year, and the patient had told them it would help her feel less distressed.
After visiting with the family, I went to speak to the charge nurse to make a plan
for the ceremony. The charge nurse rolled her eyes in reference to the family while I was
speaking with her. The nurse proceeded to tell me, “I am pretty sure the oldest sister of
the patient came to visit the patient a couple days ago while high.” At this point I tried to
shift the dynamic of the conversation to one of empathy. I acknowledged I heard about
the older sister as well. I then spoke about how the family was under a great deal of stress
from the trauma of the patient’s hospitalization as well as grief and loss from earlier in
the year. Also, the family was not able to perform a smudging at the previous hospital
and it would be a very meaningful and life-giving ceremony for the patient. When I spoke
about the grief and stress of the family and how the smudging would help them, the
nurse’s body language and tone of voice changed. To me, she seemed much more
compassionate and understood the family’s request as a something that would help the
patient and family feel less distressed and more hopeful about the patient’s
hospitalization. The family’s request was no longer a source of irritation for the nurse.
My example is a small way in which the chaplain, because of her or his empathic
perspective, can shift the dynamic between the family and medical team. These shifts
could occur in larger ways as well: during difficult family meetings between the family
and medical team, when a hospital writes new policies related to patient and family care,
and even as a hospital or healthcare system re-envisions its mission and values.
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Concluding Thoughts
My hope is that these guidelines and my few suggestions for bringing them to life
will be helpful for the medical team. Given the power that that emotions play in EOL
decisions, I think it is vital that medical team members learn how to empathize with
patients and families. Hospitals will continue to encounter ethical strangers as medical
staff wrestle with difficult end of life cases. God calls us to empathize with those who are
in distress, to love them in a way that coalesces around their experience of distress, and to
be open to the experience of others. If hospitals can continue to teach empathy, I think
this will help the family and medical staff decide what should be done in difficult EOL
cases.

APPENDIX A: PATIENT CASE SIMULATION
Scenario









Frank is a 58-year-old male and was hit by the light rail in Minneapolis. He may
have fallen or just stepped into its path, thus this may have been a suicide attempt
but this is not clear.
He sustained a serious head injury. He also has a broken hip, wrist and pelvis and
a shattered ankle. At the scene of the accident Frank had a GCS of 8. Upon arrival
to the ED, the CT revealed a subdural hematoma, he decompensated, which
required an emergent craniotomy to remove the hematoma. In the ED stabilization
room, he had a passive blood alcohol level of 0.15.
He was admitted to the surgical intensive care unit and is intubated. He has a
ventriculostomy in place and he is on a ventilator. He is sedated and has no
decisional capacity. When the sedation is lightened, he becomes anxious and his
ICPs increase. He does not localize to noxious stimuli and does not follow
commands. After one week there was a care conference lead by neurosurgery and
the SICU physicians who described his uncertain neurological prognosis.
His wife Patti and youngest son Jim who is 38 attended that care conference. Here
is what each family member said at the first care conference.
1. Patti left him 10 years ago because of his drinking and abusive behavior.
While she devoted most of her life to her children, it was very hard for
Patti to leave Frank and seek independence. She works as an executive
secretary currently. They are separated but not divorced. Patti said Frank
has a sister Sarah who lives in Vermont but does not really talk to or see
Frank very much. Her (their) oldest son Michael lives in California with
his wife and two children. Michael is connected with his mom but not his
dad. Patti seems to favor less aggressive care.
2. Jim has lived with his dad for eight years. Jim does not really talk to
Michael, his older brother. Jim completed two tours of duty in Iraq and
has struggled to find work. Jim said his father worked until he was laid off
18 months ago when the business closed. Frank is at the end of his
unemployment and although he has looked there is no work in this field
and he says he is too old to retrain. He is worried that his dad will lose his
house. He cannot recall his father ever going to a doctor and does not
know much about his dad’s medical issues, but Frank seems depressed and
does drink a lot. Jim sometimes drinks with Frank. Jim is Frank’s POA
and Frank is Jim’s POA. Jim seems to favor a more aggressive care plan.
This is the second care conference because Frank has been in the SICU for two
weeks. The next potential intervention would be to place a tracheotomy tube and a
feeding tube
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His estranged wife Patti, his eldest son Michael, his youngest son Jim, and his
sister Sarah attend this care conference.
Family/Friends Roles

Estranged Wife: Patty
Scenario:





Your estranged husband was hit by the light rail in Minneapolis with a blood
alcohol level of 0.15. It seems this may have been a suicide attempt but it is hard
to know for sure.
He has a head injury. At the scene of the accident your brother had a GCS of 8.
Upon arrival to the ED, the CT revealed a subdural hematoma, which required a
craniotomy to remove a clot.
He was admitted to the surgical intensive care unit. After one week, there was a
care conference lead by neurosurgery and the SICU physicians describing his
poor neurological prognosis.
This is the second care conference and your brother has been in the SICU for two
weeks.

Instructions for the Estranged Wife:
1. Interrupt the physician at the beginning to introduce yourself if he/she forgets to
initiate introductions.
2. Ask for clarification when the physician uses medical jargon
3. If the physician does not ask about our beliefs regarding your estranged husbands
situation, jump in with your opinion that he was not concerned about his health in
the past and does not believe he would care for himself in the future.
4. The physician will need to discern that you have had little contact with him and
have over the past 10 years because of how he treated you and the children
particularly when under the influence of alcohol.
Information about the Estranged Wife:





You left the patient 10 years ago. The relationship was tumultuous as he was
verbally abusive.
You are glad that Michael moved away to lead his own healthy and productive
life without the stress he endured living at home.
It was everything it took for you to have the courage to leave him and build your
own life and vocation. You received a 2-year training course after which you
became an executive secretary.
You have little compassion for the patient and feel that “he has made his bed” and
the way he lived his life contributed to his demise.
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You agree with Michael’s position that given all the medical resources available
to perhaps survive this injury, Frank would not take his medical needs seriously
and resume his drinking.

Frank’s Younger Son: Jim
Information for Jim:










You are 38 yrs. old and have lived with your father for eight years. You moved in
after completing two tours in the National Guard in Iraq. You have had difficulty
finding a good job but have worked on and off and although. You probably could
not manage the house on your own. You are working with the VA on getting
some disability for PTSD.
You are not very close to your Mom. You think she favors Michael and do not
like her because of this.
Your Dad is also a vet and has always sort of taken care of you. You are very
close. Your dad made you his POA. You wonder if this does not mean you should
be making medical decisions for your Dad.
You are embarrassed about not being more successful and really don’t like your
brother Michael who thinks he is a big deal and gets on your back about not
working harder. Since your Dad’s accident Michael has tried to take over all the
decisions although he has not seen your Dad in a long time. Michael thinks he
knows everything about medical stuff. He has had almost no contact with your
Dad for years and has not helped his him with any money since he lost his job.
Every time Michael starts in you want to tell him to shut up. He does not know or
care about Dad like you do.
You know your Dad has been depressed but you think this is understandable
because of his job situation. You know he drinks but do not think it is more than a
lot of guys he worked with or hangs out with in the neighborhood bar. You don’t
see your Dad as a quitter and he has been working on a few leads for a job now
that the unemployment is ending,
You know that your Dad is in for a long rehab and may have some disability but
he has been a hard worker all his life and can do hard things. You are really
willing to help him get through this.

Instructions for Jim


Please bring up the following concerns:
o Are the doctors worried that he has no insurance and this is why they are
really not supportive of long term rehabilitation?
o You recall a conversation with your dad where he said he would want to
live no matter what.
o I have POA, shouldn’t I be making the decisions about dad?
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During the conference you repeatedly challenge the physicians every time they
talk about a poor prognosis. You ask them how they know for sure. Isn’t it true
that people can surprise them? Why can’t they just give him a chance?
You feel that you are the only one who knows your father and the only person on
his side.

Frank’s Sister: Sarah
Information for Sister:









You live in Vermont and do not have a lot of contact with your brother.
You know he has been separated from his “wife” for around ten years, and you
know Jim his son lives with him. Mike your other nephew and his family live out
in California. You do not have a lot of contact with Mike either since you are not
in Minnesota or California to see your family very much, even around the
holidays.
You want your brother to have a tracheostomy and a PEG tube placed so he can
go to a long term acute care hospital (LTACH) for vent weaning and neurologic
recovery over time.
You and your brother grew up in a religious community until you left home.
Frank only went when he was with his wife and attendance was still pretty sparse.
You attend a religious community regularly.
Your particular form of religious belief makes you feel there will be a miracle and
that making him comfort care is tantamount to actively killing him. First, God is
using the doctors and the medical devices to keep the patient alive so he can fully
recover. You asked God about a miracle and you are sure God said yes. He needs
to go to a LTACH. Second, making someone comfort care is like actively killing
them. The family and medical team are not the ones that decide when the patient
dies.
You disagree with your nephew Mike and your sister in law Patty because they
want to make him comfort care. You are very angry about their desire to do this.

Instructions for Sister:





Interrupt the physician at the beginning to introduce yourself if he/she forgets to
initiate introductions.
Ask for clarification when the physician uses medical jargon
If the physician does not ask about your beliefs regarding your brother’s situation,
jump in with your claim about there being a miracle because God told you there
would be.
The physician will need to discern your relationship with your brother and how
good of a surrogate you really are.

219
o If the physician does not ask about the (distant) nature of your
relationship, claim that you know him well and that he was also a religious
person.
o If the physician does ask, be honest about how little you know of your
brother but stick to your religious beliefs.

Frank’s Older Son: Mike
Information for Mike:













You are 40 and Frank’s oldest son. You left home for California when you were
20 and have not been back to Minnesota for over 10 years.
You think of yourself as the only one in the family who has been successful and
you are a know-it-all. You like to ask the doctors sophisticated questions about
your dad’s condition and use medical terms that other family members won’t
understand to show off you medical knowledge which you learned as part of your
job as an adjuster for Aetna, a Health Insurance company. You think that you are
the only family member who is competent enough to make medical decisions
about your Dad.
You are married and have 3 children under 10 who have not met their
grandfather.
You always fought with your Dad about his drinking and were happy when your
Mom finally left him when Jim was out of high school. You take care of your
Mom with extra money and have flown her out to California twice to see her
grandchildren. You want to have nothing to do with your father and do not recall
talking to him in the last 15 years.
You think Jim and Dad should not be living together. You think they drink too
much and do not do much to improve their situation.
You keep in touch with your brother and know he is having a hard time after Iraq
but think he is not using the VA enough to get medical or employment help. You
think your brother would have a hard time without his father but that he might be
more motivated to get his life going if he were on his own.
You know how expensive medical care can be from your work as an insurance
adjuster. You worry about the cost off all the surgeries and the effort needed for
rehabilitation when your Dad has taken poor care of himself in the past and in
your opinion, will not work hard at rehab. You do not actually know this but it
seems likely given how you are told he lives his life.
You carry a huge resentment towards your Dad for his treatment of your mother
and although you would never say it, you do not think he is really worth all this
effort and cost.
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Please bring up the following:
1. The cost of medical care
2. That the treatment might not benefit his Dad
3. Bring up Jim’s stake; that he lives in Dad’s house and might have to move if his
father dies.

Physician Roles
Neurosurgeon
Instructions for Neurosurgeon:










Introduce yourself and explain the reason for the meeting.
Ask to go around the room and have each member introduce who they are and
how they are related to the patient.
Ask the primary participants what their understanding is of the patient’s current
situation.
State that you will review the general course of events and current situation.
Admitted with a severe traumatic brain injury requiring surgical evacuation of a
blood clot.
Swelling of the brain, need to drain excess fluid to help prevent additional
damage. This drain will be weaned off over time. You expect another 10-15 days
of ICU care, because of the need for medications and the ventilator
Unsure of the long-term outcome, and will need transition to a long-term acute
care hospital. He will have some deficits, but it is too early to know how severe
they will be. In conjunction with the SICU team, you are recommending a
tracheostomy and PEG procedure. At this point, ask the SICU physician to
describe these procedures more.
Once the SICU physician is done, ask if there are any questions.

Information for Neurosurgeon:





You are the chief resident of the primary team caring for this patient; you
discussed the case with your attending prior to the conference.
The hematoma was removed quickly, intracranial pressures have fluctuated, but
are controlled with drainage and medications and you believe the ventriculostomy
will come out without difficulty.
There is a reasonable chance of recovery over time; however, this is not certain.
It is likely the patient will require some degree of assistance long-term, but the
extent is not known
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SICU Physician
Talking points for the SICU physician:








The Neurosurgery physician will lead the conference.
Introduce yourself as the resident intensivist in the SICU. Your team manages the
ventilator, IV medications, and day-to-day operations.
Once the Neurosurgery physician asks for your input, you describe the
tracheostomy and PEG procedures: The procedures are done at the bedside; there
are some minor risks (bleeding, infection, and conversion to open procedure).
Patients are more comfortable after the procedures, can start to lighten sedation
more.
Stress that this is typically a temporary measure and very common for patients
with this type of injury. Eventually, the PEG is removed, typically in 6 weeks or
so after placement, if he becomes more alert and it is safe to start eating.
Typically the tracheostomy helps wean from the ventilator more quickly, and a
speaking valve can be attached once that happens, if the patient is more alert.
Typically, the tracheostomy is removed in several weeks and heals up with a
small scar.
There is a reasonable chance of recovery over time; however, this is not certain.
o It is likely the patient will require some degree of assistance long-term and
the extent is not known at this time.

Information for the SICU physician:



You are the third year resident in charge of the day-to-day management of the
SICU patients. You have discussed the patient with the attending staff.
There is a reasonable chance of recovery over time however this is not certain. It
is likely the patient will require some degree of assistance long term and the
extent is not known at this time.

APPENDIX B: CHAPLAIN VERBATIM EXAMPLE
Verbatim Reflection Format

Chaplain:
Your Race/Ethnicity:

Verbatim (# _/7)
Your age (optional):

Your religious tradition:
Date of visit:

Date written:

Location of patient (Include hospital and unit):

Length of Visit:

I.

What are you hoping to learn by bringing this verbatim to your supervisor
and peers? How does this connect with your learning goals? Be as clear as you
can, and refer to your specific learning goals, as appropriate. While you might
write this section last, it is the most important part of your verbatim.

II.

Data about the patient and goals: provide a brief summary of the relevant
information about the patient and/or the person you are ministering to if it is
someone other than a patient
A. Demographic information: pseudonym for the person, age, gender, religion,
race and ethnicity
B. Physical dimension: date of admission, diagnosis, brief medical history as
appropriate
C. Your goals: any specific results you wanted from the encounter, anything
you wanted to avoid

III.

Your awareness of self: Prior to the ministry encounter, what was your own
cognitive, emotional, and physical state? Were you tired, apprehensive, angry,
excited, etc.? During the ministry encounter itself you may become aware of
physical, emotional, cognitive changes within yourself. Indicate these in the righthand column as you record your conversation.
Your first impressions and observations: Describe briefly the person and
her/his environment. What is going on in the area? What is the person’s physical
appearance? What non-verbal messages are you receiving? What are your
assumptions based on your impressions and observations?
Your ministry encounter: This is to be as nearly verbatim an account as
possible. Report pauses, interruptions, facial expressions and any other clues,
which may reveal something about relationships within the situation. Include
also--in the right-hand column--what you experience within yourself (feelings,

IV.

V.
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questions, etc.). Your main purpose in presenting your verbatim is to present your
ministry encounter in such a way that you and your peers and supervisors can
understand it. This requires careful attention to detail, honesty, and a fair amount
of vulnerability on your part. Your verbatim represents a privileged conversation
which must be treated with respect and handled in a professional manner.
Dialogue
Please identify the speakers; for example: C=Chaplain, P=Patient, N=Nurse.
C1
P2

D?
Yes, come in.

C3

Hi, it’s Chaplain _____. I’m here to
see how you are doing.
Who?

P4

C5
P6

C7
P8

C9
P10

I asked while I knocked at the doorway.
Her voice is weak; I wonder how strong/well she is.
She was fairly strong the other day when I saw her.

Chaplain _____. I visited with you
yesterday.
Oh yes. Thank you for coming.

Do you mind if I turn down the TV
volume because I can’t hear very well.
Go ahead. I am not sure how to work
those things so I am never able to do
things like that.
That’s OK. So, how are things going
today?
Not very well. I don’t want to be here
anymore. They just won’t let me go.
They come in and do therapy with me.
They try to have me walk but I tell
them that it won’t do any good
because I don’t need it. I don’t want to
be here any more.

Oh, oh! I feel anxious. Does she remember me? I’ll
tell her again who I am so that she doesn’t have to
guess.
Good! There’s a glimmer of recognition. I feel more
confident.
She is saying more but I can’t understand because
she is very quiet and the TV speaker is quite loud. I
feel annoyed. I have to get that TV turned down.
I’d like to turn it off but at least turn it down.
So many people have that trouble. Maybe I should
remember with elderly patients to ask them about
the TV and radio.
I turn down the volume.
What’s she talking about? Going home from the
hospital? Dying? Is she tired of living? Is she
depressed? She doesn’t sound as if she’s just
complaining about things. Therapy is difficult and
many people complain about it. But this seems to be
more than that. Is she with it? Or is she just
rambling? Seems to be with it. I feel afraid.

Assessment
VI. Process Assessment
a. Summarize the dynamics and flow of the visit. Did it have a question and
answer feeling to it, or was it a dialog? Where did the direction of the
conversation change, and who changed it?
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b. What kinds of responses did you use? (e.g., summarization, empathy,
interpretive, reflective, question, self disclosure, teaching affirmation,
challenge, etc.) Assess the strengths and weaknesses of your responses
based on the other person’s responses.
VII. Your Self Assessment
a. Spiritual assessment: What feelings did this person seem to be
experiencing, and how did you know? How would you describe the
spiritual needs or “main message/concern” of the patient? Regarding the
person’s situation and main message/concern, what spiritual/theological
issues do you see? (e.g., faith, doubt, temptation, sin, guilt, shame, despair,
pride, blaming, conflict, judgment, estrangement, punishment, works
righteousness, self indulgence, humility, confession, penance, forgiveness,
repentance, discernment, transformation, rededication, hope, communion,
love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, gentleness, self-control,
grace, etc.) Did you identify any spiritual resources the patient already
has? How did you address the spiritual needs of the patient? Do you have
any thoughts about how you might contribute to the overall care of the
patient? What is going to be your pastoral care plan for this person/family?
b. Psychological/mental/emotional/social dimensions: Comment on
congruencies or incongruences in the person’s situation, thoughts,
feelings, and behaviors. What social conditions, systems and structures did
you see affecting the life of your patient and how were they affecting
them? How did you address this in your ministry?
c. Self-evaluation: (As you write this part of your reflection indicate in
parentheses where you see yourself doing whatever it is you are talking
about; e.g., C1, C2.)
i. Connections: Where did you feel a connection with the patient?
Where did the patient seem to feel a connection with you? Did you
feel yourself disconnecting or wanting to leave the room at any
particular time? If so, what was happening then?
ii. Strengths and Weaknesses: What were your strengths and
weaknesses in this ministry encounter? What went well? What can
you celebrate? What might you try to do differently next time? Did
this verbatim activate a desire to learn more about particular issues
related to self-awareness, interpersonal awareness, and pastoral
concepts, functioning as a pastor, or ministry development and
management?
iii. What major life events, relationships, assumptions, values of
yours are you aware of as you reflect on this visit? How did your
life history influence your ministry practice?
VIII. Theological Reflection:
a. How did you experience being connected to God during this visit? Were
you able to help connect the patient with God?
b. Discuss any spiritual/theological issues that this visit raised for you.
Where did you see God connecting with you and the patient?
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c. What theological understanding led you to do what you did in this visit?
Write about stories, passages, themes, and images from Holy Scriptures or
any other source of truth that come to mind for you.
IX. Your chart note: what did you chart? If you could write more freely, what would
you chart?
X.

Please go up to section I and further reflect and write on what you’d like from
the group.
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